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Amongst younger cohorts in Brazil, there is an educational gender gap that
favors women. As such, this dissertation empirically analyzes several aspects
and dimensions of the educational gender gap in Brazil. The primary focus is
the eﬀect of mothers’ versus fathers’ educational attainment, with a secondary
focus on expected earnings gains. Each chapter is described below.
Chapter 2, “The Determinants of the Changing Educational Gender Gap in
Brazil,” analyzes the inter-temporal change in the educational gender gap by
household type, focusing on the contribution of maternal and paternal educa-
tion. The results indicate that the combined change (both returns and levels) in
the education of household heads, fathers in two-parent households and moth-
ers in female-headed households, has beneﬁted sons more so than daughters,
thereby reducing the gender disparity. In sharp contrast, the combined change
in maternal education in two-parent households beneﬁted girls more so than
boys, widening the divide between sons and daughters.
Chapter 3, “Gender Diﬀerences in Brazil’s Post-Compulsory School Atten-
dance,” examines school enrollment decisions, with an emphasis on the eﬀects
of maternal and paternal education. The empirical estimates show that for girls
in two-parent households, maternal education has a stronger (more positive) ef-
fect on the probability of attending school than paternal education at low levels
of parental schooling. At high levels of parental schooling, however, paternal
education has more of an eﬀect for girls than maternal education.The fourth chapter, “Expected Earnings Gains and Eventual Educational
Attainment: Gender Diﬀerences in Brazil,” examines the role of gender dif-
ferences in expected earnings gains on eventual attainment for adults. The
empirical results show that expected earnings gains has a signiﬁcantly stronger
(more positive) eﬀect for women than for men. Finally, simulations of equal-
izing gains increases the gender gap, but equalizing the coeﬃcients on gains
decreases the gender gap.
Overall, this dissertation provides an empirical analysis on gender and ed-
ucation in Brazil. Despite the existence of a reverse gender gap for several
decades, there is very little research on educational diﬀerences between males
and females. As such, this dissertation presents new information that can oﬀer
some insights into the source of the gender gap, as well as how it may change
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xiiChapter 1
Introduction
Brazil has developed an educational gender gap among younger cohorts that
favors women. This reverse gender gap has persisted for several decades, yet
there is very little research that has addressed it. Examining the gender diﬀer-
ences in Brazil’s educational outcomes can provide some insight into the origin
of the gap as well as how it will evolve over time. As such, this dissertation
empirically analyzes several aspects and dimensions of the gender gap in Brazil.
The primary focus is the eﬀect of mothers’ versus fathers’ educational attain-
ment on the schooling outcomes of sons and daughters. A secondary area of
research presented in this dissertation is the role of diﬀerences in expected earn-
ings gains between men and women on the gender gap in attainment. Each
individual chapter is described in more detail below.
The second chapter of this dissertation, “The Determinants of the Chang-
ing Educational Gender Gap in Brazil,” analyzes the inter-temporal change
in the educational gender gap by household type, focusing on the contribu-
tion of maternal and paternal education. Between 1982 and 2003, the gender
discrepancy in grade attainment amongst 15-year-olds increased in two-parent
households and decreased among children residing in female-headed households.
This chapter estimates how parental education has aﬀected grade attainment in
both household types. Furthermore, non-linear partial decomposition analysis
quantiﬁes the eﬀects of changes in the levels of and returns to parental education
on the change in the gender gap.
Chapter three of this dissertation, “Gender Diﬀerences in Brazil’s Post-
Compulsory School Attendance,” examines school enrollment decisions of youths
who are beyond Brazil’s minimum school leaving age. As in the ﬁrst chapter,
this chapter focuses on the eﬀects of maternal and paternal education in both
1two-parent and female-headed households. To address the causal relationship
between parental education and children’s schooling outcomes, this chapter ex-
ploits a change in the minimum school leaving age for the parents’ generation to
identify the relationship between parental and children’s educational outcomes.
The fourth chapter of my dissertation, “Expected Earnings Gains and Even-
tual Educational Attainment: Gender Diﬀerences in Brazil,” departs from chap-
ters two and three by shifting the focus to the eﬀect of gender diﬀerences in
expected earnings gains on eventual attainment for 24 to 34-year-old men and
women in 1996. Individuals form beliefs concerning their own earnings gains
from schooling when they are still of school age by observing earnings amongst
workers with various educational backgrounds. According to human capital
theory, if men observe higher gains, and therefore have higher expected earn-
ings gains, they should, on average, attain more schooling than women. In
Brazil, however, the opposite is true. For the sample considered, men’s ex-
pected gains were more than twice the value of women’s expected gains in 1982,
when these individuals were still teenagers and making schooling/employment
decisions. Despite this fact, men, on average, eventually attained more than a
half a grade less than women. As a result, this chapter examines the role of
the gender discrepancy in earnings expectations in determining the attainment
gap between men and women.
1.1 Overview of the Educational System and Trends in
Brazil
The Brazilian educational system is divided into three categories. The ﬁrst
category is fundamental education. It is comprised of grades 1 through 8, so it
is essentially equivalent to primary schooling in the United States. Following
fundamental education, students attend intermediate schooling. Intermediate
2schooling lasts 3 years, after which, students may enroll in higher education.
The Brazilian schooling year spans almost the entire calendar year, from
February or March to November or December. Prior to 1971, education was
compulsory for all children aged 7 to 10. In 1971, compulsory education was
extended to children up to and including 14-year-olds. Most children enter
ﬁrst grade at the age of 7, although exceptions are frequently made for slightly
younger children. Under the assumption of entry at 7 years of age and no grade
repetition or schooling interruptions, a child should have completed 8 grades,
or all of fundamental education, by the age of 15, when he or she is legally
permitted to leave the schooling system.
Figure 1.1 depicts mean highest grade completed by gender and age using the
2003 Pesquisa Nacional Por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD), a large nationally
representative survey conducted annually in Brazil since 1976. The ﬁgure shows
that amongst men and women in their late 40’s and older, males had attained
more completed grades than females. Amongst younger cohorts, however,
average female attainment became higher than male attainment.
The gender diﬀerence is particularly large for people in their early to mid-
20’s. It appears that the gap becomes smaller from youths in their late teens,
but more than likely, the gender gap at that age underestimates how large the
schooling diﬀerence will be after this cohort moves beyond the higher educa-
tion age range because female tertiary enrollment now exceeds that of male
enrollment (Chipman-Johnson and Vanderpool, 2003).
As shown above, females now attain, on average, more grades than males.
This is partly because boys are more likely to enter school late, engage in child
labor and repeat grades. These factors have contributed to the reverse gender
g a pi nB r a z i l . T h e i rd i ﬀerential eﬀe c t so nm a l e sa n df e m a l e sa r ed e s c r i b e d
below.
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1.1.1 Late Entry
Children who begin their education at a later age may not accumulate as
many completed grades as their counterparts who were enrolled on time. In
Brazil, education is compulsory beginning at 7 years of age. This law, however,
is imperfectly enforced. In 2003, 4.2% of 7-year-olds were not enrolled in school.
The analogous ﬁgure for 8-year-olds is 2.0%.1 Disaggregated by gender, the
ﬁgures are 3.6 % and 4.9% for 7-year-old girls and boys, respectively, and 1.6%
and 2.5% for 8-year-old girls and boys.2
While late entry is certainly not common in Brazil, it should not be ignored.
Late entry poses a problem because it means that there are fewer years for
1Calculated from 2003 PNAD.
2Calculated from 2003 PNAD.
4which a child is legally required to attend school. Under a compulsory schooling
system, empirical research in the U.S. on the eﬀect of age at initial school
enrollment on eventual educational attainment ﬁnds that, ceteris paribus,l a t e
entrants complete fewer grades than those who begin schooling at an earlier age
(Angrist and Krueger, 1992). To my knowledge, there is no analogous research
on Brazil, and the available data do not indicate age of initial enrollment. As
such, I am not able to directly address the eﬀects of late entry on attainment.
Nonetheless, the existing literature suggests that since boys in Brazil are slightly
less likely to be enrolled on time, they attain fewer grades.
1.1.2 Child Labor and Discontinuous Schooling
In the presence of imperfect capital markets, households may choose to
place children in the work force in response to family income constraints and
shocks (Basu and Van, 1998). This is a common practice in Brazil, particularly
with respect to sons. In 2003, 15% of 15-year-old girls and 28% of 15-year-
old boys reported that they worked.3 While child labor may be necessary
for families to achieve a subsistence level of income, the eﬀects on educational
outcomes are undeniably harmful. Entering the labor force will result in one
of two possible schooling outcomes for children: 1) discontinuous schooling or
attrition and 2) simultaneous work and schooling. These outcomes are discussed
below.
Discontinuous schooling arises when children enter and exit school multiple
times. During "exit spells," a child forgoes the accumulation of completed
grades, resulting in lower attainment. In addition, discontinuous schooling is
problematic if children experience deterioration of human capital while they are
not enrolled. As a result, their academic performance may suﬀer when they
3Calculated from 2003 PNAD. Home production is not captured by the statistics
given above, so they may not be reﬂective of how much girls and boys "truly" work.
5re-enter the schooling system.
Attrition occurs if a child permanently exits the schooling system. Children
who drop out of school also forgo completed grades for every year they are not
enrolled, and they stop accumulating human capital.4 Amongst 15-year-olds
in 2003, 5.2% of girls and 7.9% of boys were not enrolled in school.5 Given the
cross sectional nature of the available data, it is not possible to determine if these
children are experiencing an exit spell or if they have left school permanently,
but it is clear that boys are slightly more at risk than girls.
Children may also opt to concurrently attend school and work. This option
is more common in Brazil than dropping out to join the labor force. In 2003,
12.7% of 15-year-old girls and 22.9% of boys were both employed and enrolled
in school.6 Splitting one’s time in such a manner obviously leaves less time
for school work, inevitably resulting in poorer academic performance, such as
failure and grade repetition.
The empirical research on child labor in Brazil consistently ﬁnds that sons
are conditionally more likely to work than daughters. Using the 1980 Brazilian
Population Census, Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1989) estimate the prob-
ability of working and dropping out among 7 to 14-year-olds as a function of
several variables, including household income. They ﬁnd that, ceteris paribus,
girls are more likely to drop out, but less likely to work. Duryea, Lam, and
Levison (2003) estimate the eﬀect of parental employment shocks on children’s
employment status. They use the Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME), a ro-
tating panel of households in six metropolitan areas of Brazil, from 1982 to
1999 and restrict the analysis to 10 to 16-year-olds. They, too, ﬁnd that boys
4One may also accumulate human capital from job training and through work
experience. These sources of human capital, however, are ignored in this paper.
5Calculated from 2003 PNAD.
6Calculated from 2003 PNAD.
6are, other things equal, more likely to enter the labor force than girls. Finally,
Neri et al. (2000) estimate the eﬀects of idiosyncratic shocks to father’s income
and changes in employment status on the probability of a child beginning to
work and the probability of dropping out. Using the PME for 1982-1999 and
restricting their sample to 10 to 15-year-olds, their results show that boys are
more likely to both drop out and work than girls, even after conditioning upon
individual and household characteristics.
1.1.3 Grade Repetition
Grade repetition occurs when a child must re-enroll in a grade that he or
she has already completed due to poor academic performance. When a child
repeats grades, she is not able to accumulate a completed grade for every year
she is enrolled, again leading to lower grade attainment. This problem exists
in much of Latin America, particularly Brazil. It is not clear, however, if
boys or girls are conditionally more susceptible to grade repetition because the
empirical evidence is sparse and inconsistent. Gomes-Neto and Hanushek (1994)
estimate the probability of repeating the second grade twice in rural, Northeast
Brazil from 1983-1985. Girls and boys are pooled, and the eﬀect of a "female"
dummy is negative but statistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting that girls and boys
are equally likely to experience grade repetition, even after conditioning upon
individual and household characteristics. More recently, however, Neri et al.
(2000) ﬁnd that boys are conditionally more likely to repeat grades than girls.
1.2 Previous Literature on Parental Eﬀects and Educa-
tion in Brazil
The section above discussed why males may have lower attainment than
females. More speciﬁcally, males are more susceptible to late entry, child labor
and grade repetition. All of these factors contribute to the educational gender
7gap in Brazil. The sections below continue to describe what is known about
gender and education in Brazil, but they focus on the eﬀects of mothers and
fathers on sons and daughters, as well as the role of household type and earnings.
1.2.1 Educational Outcomes in Relation to Maternal and Paternal
Characteristics
Emerson and Souza (2005) examine the gender aspect of the decision to
send children into the work force and the decision to send children to school.
They use 1998 data from the Pesquisa Nacional Por Amostra de Domicílios
( P N A D )o nc h i l d r e nb e t w e e nt h ea g e so f7a n d1 6w h ol i v ei nt w o - p a r e n tf a m -
ilies. They ﬁnd that, other things equal, maternal education has a stronger
(more positive) eﬀect than paternal education on the probability of daughters
attending school. In addition, their results show that paternal education has a
larger (more positive) eﬀect on sons’ versus daughters’ school attendance.
Duryea (1998) estimates the eﬀect of transitory shocks in father’s income
on children’s progress in school using the PME from 1982 to 1995. Given the
panel nature of the data, Duryea is able to follow the same children over six-
teen months, thereby obtaining information on grade progression. She considers
children between the ages of 10 and 15 and estimates, separately by gender, the
probability of a child gaining a year of education over a one year time period,
conditional upon individual and household characteristics, as well as being en-
rolled during the initial interview. Transitory shocks to father’s income are prox-
ied by changes in employment status, such as becoming unemployed. She ﬁnds
that a father becoming unemployed during the school year has a negative and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of grade advancement. Mother’s
and father’s education are also included in the empirical analysis. Parental ed-
ucation has a positive eﬀect, with maternal eﬀects being stronger for girls than
boys. In addition, she ﬁnds that maternal education has a stronger eﬀect than
8paternal education on girls’ advancement.
Bourguignon, Ferreira and Menéndez (2003) examine the eﬀect of, among
other factors, parental schooling on years of schooling among adults in Brazil.
They restrict the analysis to men and women aged 26 to 60 in the 1996 PNAD
and conduct their analysis separately for men and women and by cohort. Little
information, however, can be gained regarding gender. The parental education
variables employed are the average years of schooling for one’s mother and
father, as well as the ratio of maternal education to paternal education. Among
the younger cohorts, those aged 26-35, the ratio variable is signiﬁcant for women
but not men. The mean parental education variable is signiﬁcant for both, and
the coeﬃcient estimates are slightly larger in magnitude for men. The diﬀerence
between the male and female estimates is not tested for statistical signiﬁcance,
but the results suggest that parental education has a stronger eﬀect on the
attainment of men than women.
Behrman, Birdsall and Székely (2000) estimate schooling gaps for 16 Latin
American countries. Their outcome variable is deﬁned as expected years of
schooling (the number of years of education a child would have if he or she
entered school at the age of six and completed one grade per year) minus actual
schooling. The paper estimates the eﬀects of parental education and household
income on the gaps and compares the results across countries. With respect to
Brazil, they ﬁnd that, ceteris paribus, maternal education had a slightly stronger
eﬀect than paternal education in 1995. The estimation strategy employed, how-
ever, is problematic. The authors use Ordinary Least Squares, despite the fact
that the gap measure is left-truncated at zero. As a result, the coeﬃcient es-
timates are constrained to be the same for children with zero versus positive
schooling gaps. It is unlikely that the determinants of gaps behave identically
for children who are behind compared to those who have followed the correct
9schooling schedule. In addition, girls and boys are pooled, so gender is not fully
addressed.
Lykke Anderson (2001) also focuses on schooling gaps in Brazil. Using the
1997 PNAD, the paper computes social mobility indexes for girls and boys
between the ages of 13 and 19. Anderson ﬁrst estimates the schooling gap, via
OLS, as a function of the maximum of father’s and mother’s education, adult
household income per capita, a dummy for residing in a single parent household,
and a dummy for residing in a household headed by a female. These regressions
are run separately for girls and boys. Once the estimates are obtained, Anderson
calculates the factor inequality weights for parental education and income. This
technique, the Fields decomposition, estimates the total variance in schooling
gaps explained by family background. The social mobility index, therefore,
is one minus the factor inequality weights for parental education and income.
This value tells us how much variation in schooling gaps is unexplained by family
background. As such, higher values indicate more mobility.
Anderson ﬁnds that girls in Brazil are more mobile than boys. Since ma-
ternal and paternal education are not entered separately, however, one can not
make any comparisons by gender of parent. In addition, the paper pools single
and two-parent households. While he includes dummies for single-parent and
female-headed households, the estimates constrain the eﬀect of parental educa-
tion to be the same across household type. Finally, like Behrman, Birdsall, and
Székely (2000), Anderson uses OLS to estimate schooling gaps. As mentioned
above, OLS does not account for the truncated nature of the dependent vari-
able. The results, therefore, do not take into consideration the possibility that
children who have completed the correct number of grades diﬀer from children
who are behind academically.
Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1989) estimate educational attainment among
107 to 14-year-olds in 1980 as a function of, among other things, maternal and
paternal education. They ﬁnd that, other things equal, maternal education
has a stronger eﬀect than paternal education on boys and girls taken together.
However, boys and girls are pooled, so it is not possible to make any further
gender comparisons. Finally, the paper employs a Tobit because attainment is
left-truncated at zero. While this estimation strategy normalizes the marginal
eﬀects to account for the probability of ever attending school, it does not take
into consideration that fact that children with low (but positive) attainment
diﬀer from children with "correct" attainment.
Lam and Duryea (1999) also pool boys and girls and estimate attainment
for 14-year-olds as functions of parental education. Using the 1984 PNAD, they
ﬁnd that after controlling for race, region, mother’s age at ﬁrst marriage and
husband’s income, an increase in mother’s education from 0 to 4 years results
in a 1 year rise in 14-year-olds’ attainment. The analogous value for fathers is
0.7 years, suggesting that maternal education has a stronger eﬀect on children’s
attainment. As in the papers discussed above, however, the regressions fail to
account for the probabilities of a child ever being enrolled or being behind versus
on-track in the number of completed grades.
Thomas, Schoeni and Strauss (1996) estimate the eﬀect of parental educa-
tion on the attainment of 7 to 18-years-olds for urban Brazil using the 1982
PNAD. They ﬁnd that, ceteris paribus, maternal education has a larger eﬀect
than paternal education on children’s attainment. Furthermore, parental edu-
cation has more of an impact on the educational outcomes of same-sex children.
Barros and Lam (1996) conduct a similar analysis for the urban parts of Brazil’s
Northeast and the state of São Paulo also using the 1982 PNAD. Focusing on
children who turn 14 years old during the survey year, they ﬁnd that under
almost every model speciﬁcation, maternal education has a stronger eﬀect than
11paternal education on the attainment of children. Boys and girls are pooled,
so it not possible to comment on any other gender dimension. In addition,
both papers listed above also fail to incorporate the probability of ever being
enrolled or any diﬀerences between children with age-appropriate versus low
levels of attainment.
The research described above spans several educational outcome variables
as well as model speciﬁcations and age groups. Much of the research pools
boys and girls or ignores the diﬀerential eﬀects of maternal and paternal edu-
cation, so little is known regarding all of the gender dimensions in educational
outcomes. Furthermore, some of the results contradict one another. There is,
however, one ﬁnding that is consistent throughout. The empirical literature
indicates that maternal education has a stronger eﬀe c tt h a tp a t e r n a le d u c a t i o n
on children’s educational outcomes, even after controlling for individual and
household characteristics.
1.2.2 Educational Outcomes of Children in Female-Headed House-
holds
There is a very limited literature that addresses how the educational out-
comes of children in female-headed households diﬀer from the outcomes of chil-
dren who reside in households with two parents in Brazil. In 2003, 19% of
15-year-old children lived in households headed by single females.7 Given their
substantial population share, it is important to investigate if and how their
schooling achievements vary from their counterparts in two-parent households.
Barros, Fox and Mendonça (1997) examine school attendance and labor force
participation of children in female-headed households. Using the 1984 PNAD,
they ﬁnd that conditional upon individual characteristics, children who belong
to households headed by single mothers are less likely to attend school and more
7Calculated from 2003 PNAD.
12likely to work. Horowitz and Souza (2004) estimate intra-household inequal-
ity in education progress by household type. Their results show that house-
holds headed by single mothers exhibit greater educational inequality, other
things equal, than households where both parents are present. As mentioned
in the section above, Anderson (2001) estimates schooling gaps as a function of,
among other things, household type. He includes separate dummies for living
in single-parent and female-headed households and ﬁnds that the coeﬃcients
on both are statistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting that household type does not
negatively aﬀect children’s schooling outcomes. The model speciﬁcation, how-
ever, is problematic because almost all single-parent households in Brazil are
female-headed. The results, therefore, may be biased due to collinearity.
1.3 Gender Diﬀerences in the Relationship between Ed-
ucation and Earnings in Brazil
The literature described above provides an overview of research relevant
to the ﬁrst two papers in this dissertation. As mentioned, however, the third
paper switches the focus from parental eﬀects to the role of earnings gains.
Unfortunately, there is no existing literature on the eﬀect of expected earnings
gains on eventual attainment. As such, this section refers to a related literature
on the returns to education. Much of this literature focuses solely on men
because female labor force participation in Brazil has historically been low.
There is, subsequently, less information on the relationship between education
and earnings for women. There are, however, a few papers that extend their
analysis to both males and females. This research is discussed below.
Birdsall and Fox (1985) estimate income for male and female schoolteach-
ers in Brazil as a function of education, the location distribution of teachers
and job training. They use a 1% sample from the 1970 census, when aver-
13age male attainment was still higher than female attainment. The coeﬃcient
estimates indicate that the returns to education are slightly higher for female
schoolteachers compared to their male counterparts. It is not clear, however,
how generalizable these results are given that the sample is comprised of people
within a very speciﬁc profession. In addition, there were relatively few male
teachers at the time. This professional characteristic results in an extremely
lop-sided sample, with only 718 men and 5,870 women. As such, it is not clear
if these results would hold under a more representative sample.
Green, Dickerson and Arbache (2001) address the role of trade liberalization
on wages and the returns to earnings from 1981 to 1999 for workers aged 18 to
65. They regress hourly wages on, among other things, schooling level (illit-
erate, some elementary, completed elementary, completed primary, completed
secondary and completed college). Their results show that the returns to ed-
ucation for males are conditionally higher than or approximately equal to the
returns for females at all levels of schooling.
Bourguignon, Ferreira and Menéndez (2003) examine the eﬀect of observed
circumstances and personal eﬀorts on education and earnings inequality. In
so doing, they ﬁrst estimate monthly earnings equations as a function of fam-
ily background and individual characteristics, such as education and education
squared. They restrict the analysis to men and women aged 26 to 60 in the
1996 PNAD and conduct their analysis separately for men and women and by
cohort. When evaluated at 8 and 12 years of schooling, their results show that,
other things equal, the returns to education are higher for men than for women
for people born in 1936 to 1945. For men and women born 1946 to 1970, how-
ever, the results show that the returns to education are higher for women than
for men.
Arabsheibani, Carneiro and Henley (2003) examine the gender wage gap
14in Brazil from 1988 to 1998. Using the 1988, 1992 and 1998 waves of the
PNAD, they decompose the gender wage gap to determine how discrimination
has changed over time. The ﬁrst part of their estimation strategy involves
regressing the real hourly wage of 18 to 65-year-olds on, among other things,
schooling level (elementary, primary, secondary, degree and postgraduate). The
regressions are run separately for men and women for all three years. Their
results show that the returns to education are higher for men than for women
in every year and at every level of schooling, with two exceptions. In 1988
and 1992, the coeﬃcients on elementary education for men were slightly smaller
than the coeﬃcient for women. These diﬀerences are not tested for statistical
signiﬁcance, but for the most part, they ﬁnd that the returns to education are
higher for men than for women.
1.4 Contributions to the Literature
The section above describes what is known about gender and education in
Brazil. As discussed, the literature is incomplete and, at times, ﬂawed. Below,
I detail how each chapter in this dissertation departs from and adds to the
literature on gender and education in Brazil.
1.4.1 Chapter 2
This chapter decomposes the gender disparity in attainment over time in
an eﬀort to examine the evolution of the gender gap in Brazil, focusing on
the role of parental education. The educational gender disparity in Brazil
has not been fully explored, and the change in the gender gap over time has
not been characterized at all. In addition, most of the previous literature on
children’s attainment in Brazil implicitly assumes that individuals who have
followed the proper education schedule, meaning they began school at the age
15of 7 and continued until the age of 15 without repetition or interruptions, are
structurally the same as those who have not. From an empirical standpoint, this
assumption may bias any results. As such, my estimation strategy takes into
consideration whether or not a child is on-track or behind in schooling. Finally,
I conduct my research on both two-parent and female-headed households. For
the most part, the literature ignores educational outcomes of children in single-
parent households. Given that these children comprise a substantial share of
the population, it is important to incorporate them in any analysis of education.
1.4.2 Chapter 3
This chapter estimates the eﬀects of parental education on post-compulsory
school attendance amongst 16 to 18-year-olds. The majority of the educational
literature on Brazil focuses on children who are still required to attend school
or adults who have completed their education. As such, very little is known
about children who fall between these two categories. The gender component in
educational outcomes is particularly strong amongst youths in this age bracket
because the data show that without a legal obligation to attend school, boys
attrit at a substantially higher rate than girls. In addition, I compare maternal
and paternal eﬀects in two-parent households as well as parental eﬀects across
girls and boys in both two-parent and female-headed households.
1.4.3 Chapter 4
There exists a great deal of research on the eﬀect of schooling on earnings,
but the reverse relationship has not been explored in Brazil. That is, there is no
literature on the eﬀect of expected earnings gains on eventual attainment. As
such, this chapter is the ﬁrst to examine this area of research in Brazil. Further-
more, this chapter predicts what the educational gender gap would be if men
and women had faced the same expected earnings gains and returns to gains.
16Statistics indicate that over time, women’s gains have almost reached men’s
levels. As such, this research can provide some insight into how the gender gap
will evolve as women’s expected earnings gains change relative to men’s. In
addition, this chapter contributes to the small literature on educational gender
diﬀerences in Brazil. Given the substantial schooling gender gaps in Brazil, it
is important to address what factors may have led to the phenomenon.
1.5 Data and Samples
This dissertation utilizes data from several waves of the Pesquisa Nacional
Por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD). The PNAD is a nationally representative
household survey conducted by Brazil’s census bureau, the Brazilian Institute
for Geography and Statistics (IBGE). The surveys, often described as a Brazil-
i a nv e r s i o no ft h eA m e r i c a nC u r r e n tP o p u l a t i o nS u r v e y( C P S ) ,c o n t a i nd e m o -
graphic, educational, employment, and reproductive information. Data have
been collected almost annually since 1976. Each PNAD wave covers roughly
100,000 households, resulting in up to approximately 500,000 individual records
in any individual wave. The samples used in the empirical analysis are described
below.
1.5.1 Chapter 2
This chapter utilizes the data from the 1982 and 2003 waves. The 1982 data
consist of 507,030 individuals, and the 2003 data consist of 384,834 respondents.
I restrict the analysis to girls and boys who turn 15 during the survey years. As
discussed above, compulsory schooling lasts through the age of 14. As such, any
analysis involving children younger than 15 would be aﬀected by the education
policy. By eliminating children within the compulsory age range, the empirical
results will not be biased by legal requirements regarding school attendance.
17For 1982, the sample consists of children born in 1967, and for 2003, the
sample is comprised of respondents born in 1988. I focus on one age cohort be-
cause the accumulation of completed grades increases with age. Subsequently,
any diﬀerences in male and female attainment from samples that include chil-
dren of several ages will reﬂect diﬀerences in the age distribution. In addition,
the Brazilian academic year spans almost the entire calendar year, from late
February or early March until November or December. This means that all
children born in 1988 (1967) turn 7 in 1995 (1974) and, therefore, are legally
required to be enrolled in 1996 (1975).
Given the chosen age group, there are 4,224 girls and 4,334 boys in the 1982
data who reside in two-parent households. The analogous ﬁgures for children
in female-headed households is 731 and 713, respectively. In the 2003 sample,
there are 2,530 girls and 2,814 boys in two-parent households and 627 girls and
717 boys in female-headed households. After eliminating children with missing
parental information or personal characteristics, the 1982 two-parent sample
shrinks to 4,218 girls and 4,326 boys. The female-headed household values fall
to 730 girls and 712 boys. In 2003, the complete two-parent household sample
is comprised of 2,157 girls and 2,379 boys, and the female-headed household
sample consists of 575 girls and 650 boys. Most of the lost observations are
due to missing parental education.
1.5.2 Chapter 3
This chapter also utilizes the data from the 2003 wave. As mentioned
above, schooling is compulsory until the age of 15. In an eﬀort to examine
post-mandatory attendance, I restrict the analysis to girls and boys who turn
16, 17 or 18 during the survey year. Amongst youths in two-parent households,
there are 6,568 girls and 7,800 boys who fulﬁll this criterion. In female-headed
18households, there are 1,897 girls and 2,117 boys. The empirical analysis involves
estimating enrollment as a function of, among other things, parental education
and several individual and household characteristics. Once all observations
with incomplete information are eliminated, there remain 5,601 girls and 6,485
boys in two-parent households and 1,736 girls and 1,903 boys in two-parent
households. As in the previous chapter, most of the dropped data is due to
missing parental education.
1.5.3 Chapter 4
This chapter focuses on the eventual attainment of adults. Attainment
is a function of, among other things, family background, such as parental ed-
ucation. Normally, it would not be possible to obtain information on adults’
non-residential parents, but the 1982, 1988 and 1996 PNAD surveys contain
retrospective social mobility questions on all heads and spouses who are least
15 years of age. With respect to family characteristics, the data provide in-
formation on parental education, literacy, and father’s employment status and
mortality. Unfortunately, there are no questions regarding birth order or sib-
lings. This chapter utilizes the data from the 1996 wave. The data consist of
331,263 individuals residing in over 180,000 households.
I restrict my analysis to respondents who turn 24 to 34 in the survey year.
This decision allows me to eliminate the eﬀect of changes in Brazil’s educational
system. Through 1970, education in Brazil was compulsory from 7 to 10 years
of age. In 1971, the cutoﬀ age for compulsory education was raised from 10
to 14. As such, this chapter will focus on respondents who turn 10 in 1972 or
after. This decision prevents the change in the law from biasing the empirical
results. More speciﬁcally, this chapter will analyze attainment among men and
women born between the years of 1962 and 1972.
19As mentioned above, the social mobility module of the 1996 PNAD contains
information on parental education only for heads and spouses. For respondents
who are not heads or spouses, I am able to match these individuals to their
parents if they are categorized as the child of the household unit’s head. If the
respondent is categorized as extended family or a non-relative, however, I am
not able to obtain parental education information. Furthermore, the social mo-
bility questions are retrospective and, unfortunately, plagued with many missing
values. There are 28,431 women and 25,371 men in the relevant age group with
complete attainment information. Of these people, only 18,815 women and
15,192 men have both maternal and paternal schooling information. To ad-
dress the incomplete data issue, I conduct the analysis on 2 samples. The ﬁrst
sample only consists of respondents with complete parental education informa-
tion. I then repeat the empirical analysis on the full sample, sample 2. For
the full sample regressions, I set the missing parental education values to 0 and
include dummies for missing values.
1.6 Primary Findings
In my second chapter, the results indicate that the combined change (both
returns and levels) in the education of household heads, fathers in two-parent
households and mothers in female-headed households, has beneﬁted sons more
so than daughters, thereby reducing the gender disparity. In sharp contrast,
the combined change in maternal education in two-parent households beneﬁted
girls more so than boys, widening the divide between sons and daughters.
The third chapter ﬁnds that amongst girls in two-parent households, pater-
nal education has a stronger (more positive) eﬀect on the probability of attend-
ing school than maternal eﬀects at high levels of parental schooling. For boys,
however, the results are not consistent. In addition, at low levels of parental
20schooling, maternal eﬀects in two-parent households are stronger than pater-
nal eﬀects for girls. In summary, the eﬀect of parental education on school
attendance varies in several gender dimensions, as well as by household type.
Finally, the empirical results in my fourth chapter show that expected earn-
ings gains has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on eventual attain-
ment, with the eﬀects being signiﬁcantly stronger (more positive) for women
than for men. This gender diﬀerence exists for both the sample that excludes
individuals with missing parental education information, sample 1, as well as
the full sample that includes all respondents in the relevant age range, sample 2.
The results holds under two robustness checks for sample 2, although the gender
diﬀerence in gain eﬀects weakens amongst the adult children of highly educated
fathers. Simulations of equalizing gains between men and women increases the
gender gap, but equalizing the coeﬃcients on gains decreases the gender gap.
Equalizing both gains and coeﬃcients, however, increases the gender gap.
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24Chapter 2
The Determinants of the Changing
Educational Gender Gap in Brazil
2.1 Introduction
On average, girls get more education than boys in Brazil. Among 15-year-
old children in 2003, girls had attained a mean of 6.56 grades while boys had
attained only 5.98 grades, yielding a gender gap of over half a grade.8 As above,
this gender gap has persisted and changed between 1982 and 2003, but it has
m o v e di nd i ﬀerent directions depending upon household type. In two-parent
households, the gender gap in mean attainment among 15-year-olds increased
from 0.33 grades to 0.61 grades in 2003. Among children of the same age in
female-headed households, however, the gender gap shrank from 0.70 grades
to 0.60 grades. Therefore, while boys still lag behind girls in schooling, in
female-headed households, sons appear to be catching up to daughters whereas
in two-parent households, sons are even further behind.
In this chapter, I analyze the determinants of the gender gap in mean school-
ing attainment of 15-year-olds by household type, focusing on the role of mater-
nal and paternal education. If boys eventually catch up to girls by adulthood,
then the gender gap at the age of 15 would not be such a cause for concern.
This, however, is not the case in Brazil. This chapter focuses on the gender
g a pi na t t a i n m e n ta tt w op o i n t si nt i m e , 1982 and 2003. In 1982, 15-year-old
girls had attained, on average, 4.25 completed grades and boys had attained,
on average, 3.87 completed grades. In 2003, the gender gap in attainment for
this cohort not only still existed, it had increased. Looking at 36-year-olds in
2003, women had an average attainment of 8.14 grades and men had an average
8The age-appropriate number of completed grades for children of this age is 7.
25attainment of 7.40 grades. As such, it is clear that the attainment gap between
girls and boys does not disappear with time.
Given the substantial gender diﬀerence in educational outcomes, it is im-
portant to examine how schooling determinants diﬀerently aﬀect boys and girls.
Estimating the eﬀect of changes in mother’s versus father’s attainment on the
gender gap can provide much insight into the source of the educational diﬀerence
between boys and girls, as well as how it will evolve over time. This information
can assist in determining how Brazil’s educational system can minimize gender
inequality in education.
As such, this chapter attempts to answer some interesting questions regard-
ing the inter-temporal and gender dimensions of attainment. I ﬁrst ask how
the eﬀect of parental educational attainment on children’s attainment diﬀers by
gender of parent. In keeping with previous research, I ﬁnd that maternal eﬀects
are stronger (more positive) than paternal eﬀects. I then examine if parents’
educational attainment has more of an eﬀect on girls versus boys. The results
show that parental education eﬀects, regardless of household type and gender
of parent, are stronger for girls than for boys in 2003. I then turn to deter-
mining whether or not these eﬀects are consistent across years. The empirical
estimates indicate that as in 2003, parental eﬀects were stronger for girls than
for boys in 1982 in both household types, so the results are consistent across
years. I then ask how changes in parental education aﬀected the change in the
gender gap over time. In two-parent households, partial decomposition analysis
shows that maternal education contributed to the increase in the gender gap
while paternal education contributed to the decrease. Finally, I ask if these
eﬀects are consistent across household type. I ﬁnd that maternal education
contributed to the decrease in the gender gap in female-headed households, so
maternal educational eﬀects are not consistent across household type. These
26diﬀerences, in part, explain why the gender gap in mean attainment has moved
in opposite directions according to household type.
2.2 Gender and Low Educational Attainment in Brazil
I nB r a z i l ,a c t u a lg r a d ea t t a i n m e n tc o mmonly lags behind age-appropriate
schooling levels. Under the assumption of no grade repetition or schooling
interruptions and an initial enrollment age of 7, all 15-year-old children in Brazil
should have completed 7 grades. As such, if a child has completed at least 7
grades, I deem him/her to be in the correct grade range. Let Ei be person i0s
highest grade completed:
Low Gradei =1 if Ei < 7
Low Gradei =0 otherwise.
Under this deﬁnition, 42% of 15-year-old children in 2003 were characterized as
being low grade students, meaning they had completed less than 7 grades.9
Table 2.1 oﬀers the analogous ﬁgures by gender and household type for 15-
year-old children in 1982 and 2003.10 As shown, there is clear evidence that low
attainment is a serious problem in Brazil. Looking at the rows marked "Share
Low Grade=1" in 2003, we see that 36% of girls and 48% of boys in two-
parent households lagged behind in school. The analogous ﬁgures for female-
headed households are 43% and 56% respectively. These values show a vast
improvement from 1982, but they are still quite large, and boys are clearly still
doing worse than girls.
Turning now to the rows marked "Mean Attainment," we see that in 2003,
girls in two-parent households had an average attainment of 6.61 grades, and
boys had a mean attainment of 6.00 grades, yielding a gender gap in mean
9Calculated from 2003 (PNAD).
10Calculated from 1982 and 2003 PNADs.
27attainment of 0.61 grades. While mean attainment is lower in female-headed
households, the magnitude of the 2003 gender gap, 0.60 grades, is essentially
the same.
Looking at attainment across years, however, we see very diﬀerent trends in
the gender gap by household type. In 1982, boys in two-parent households had
completed 0.30 fewer grades than girls. This gender gap had more than doubled
to 0.61 grades by 2003. The gender disparity in average attainment, therefore,
increased between 1982 and 2003 among children in two-parent households.
In female-headed households, however, the gender gap exhibits some signs of
equalization. In 1982, boys had completed 0.70 fewer grades than girls, but by
2003, this gender gap had shrunk to 0.60 grades.
Girls Boys G-B Girls Boys G-B
Share Low Grade=1 0.79 0.83 -0.05 *** 0.36 0.48 -0.12 ***
Mean Attainment 4.26 3.93 0.33 *** 6.61 6.00 0.61 ***
N 4224 4334 2530 2814
Girls Boys G-B Girls Boys G-B
Share Low Grade=1 0.83 0.89 -0.07 *** 0.43 0.56 -0.13 ***
Mean Attainment 4.21 3.51 0.70 *** 6.33 5.73 0.60 ***
N 731 713 627 717
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Female-Headed Households
1982 2003
Table 2.1
Completed Grade Measures, Girls and Boys
Two-Parent Households Households
1982 2003
The table above shows that while low grade completion is a problem for all
children in Brazil, the severity of the problem varies by gender of child. This
disparity exists because the mechanisms through which low grade completion
28arises diﬀerently aﬀect boys and girls. These mechanisms, late entry, child
labor, and grade repetition, are described above. As such, I now present a
model that illustrates why gender diﬀerences in educational outcomes may arise.
2.3 Household Bargaining and Gender Gaps in Educa-
tion
There are many reasons why educational outcomes for girls may diﬀer from
those of boys. In addition, there are also several potential explanations for why
the eﬀect of maternal education on the outcomes of oﬀs p r i n gm a yv a r yf r o m
the eﬀect of paternal education. The bargaining literature oﬀers some insights
that address the issues listed above. Consider a very simple collective model of
household allocation. Suppose a household consists of a mother, father, and n
children. Browning and Chiappori (1998) contend that the household’s welfare
function is a weighted combination of the father’s and mother’s utilities. The
weights represent each parent’s exogenously given bargaining power within the
household.
Let U represent a household welfare function, where uf is the father’s util-
ity and um is the mother’s utility. Father’s consumption is represented by cf,
mother’s consumption is cm,a n dci is the consumption of child i. Children’s
grade attainment (a) is denoted analogously. Parents are altruistic and care
about the consumption of all household members as well as children’s attain-
ment. The relative bargaining power of each parent within the household is
depicted by κ,w h e r eκ ∈ [0,1]. θf and θm represent any other characteristics
that aﬀect father’s and mother’s utility, including individual preferences such
as gender bias. To simplify the model, I have assumed that the father’s and
mother’s wages equal their highest grades completed, hf and hm, respectively.
29Everyone is endowed with one unit of time, and parental labor is supplied in-
elastically. Children, however, can split their time between work and attending
school (e), so time spent working is 1−e. In addition, let the wage for children
be γi, allowing for diﬀerences by child.
As such, the household’s utility maximization problem is structured as fol-
lows:11
MaxU = κuf(cf,c m,c 1,...,cn;a1,...,an;θf)
+(1 − κ)um(cf,c m,c 1,...,cn;a1,...,an;θm)
subject to the budget constraint:
cf + cm +
n X
i=1
ci ≤ hf + hm +
n X
i=1
(1 − ei) ∗ γi.
The magnitude of attainment is determined by each child’s own technology:
ai = f(ei;hf,h m),
∂fi(·)
∂ei
≥ 0,
∂fi(·)
∂hf
≥ 0,
∂fi(·)
∂hm
≥ 0.
The production function for ai is child speciﬁc, so the model takes into consider-
ation diﬀerences in abilities and interactions with mother and father. Assuming
an interior solution, the budget constraint binds, yielding the following maxi-
mization problem:
MaxU
(e1,...,en)
= κuf((hf + hm +
n X
i=1
(1 − ei) ∗ γi);f1(·),...,fn(·);θf)
+(1 − κ)um((hf + hm +
n X
i=1
(1 − ei) ∗ γi);f1(·),...,fn(·);θm).
The ﬁrst order condition is, therefore:
∂U
∂ei
= κ
∙
∂uf
∂ei
(−γi)+
∂uf
∂fi
∗
∂fi
∂ei
¸
+( 1− κ)
∙
∂um
∂ei
(−γi)+
∂um
∂fi
∗
∂fi
∂ei
¸
=0 .
The ﬁrst term within the brackets represent the loss of utility that arises from
forgone earnings when the child is in school. The second term represents the gain
11This treatment is a simpliﬁed version of one found in Emerson and Souza (2005).
30in utility from the child’s increase in school time, which parents view as a “good”
because they are altruistic. At the optimum, e 
i = ei(γi;hf,h m;κ,θf,θ m),
where:
∂ei(·)
∂γi
≤ 0,
∂ei(·)
∂hf
≥ 0,
∂ei(·)
∂hm
≥ 0.
The model does not make any assumption regarding the eﬀects of bargaining
power (κ) or parental preferences (θf and θm). The household bargaining
research, however, ﬁnds that more paternal power (as represented by κ) results
in poorer children’s human capital outcomes. This suggests that
∂ei(·)
∂κ < 0.
Finally, optimal attainment is deﬁned as follows: a 
i = fi[e∗
i(·);hf,h m].T h i s
means that grade attainment is a function of, among other things, parental
education, wages from child labor, parental preferences and bargaining power.
The eﬀect of parental education (hf and hm) has yet to be tested in this chapter,
but the existing literature has consistently found that parental education has a
positive eﬀect on children’s educational outcomes.
The model described above illustrates why there is a gender gap in educa-
tional outcomes in Brazil. As mentioned, the ﬁrst term within the brackets of
the ﬁrst order condition represents the loss in utility due to earnings foregone
when a child attends school. For simplicity, the model above assumes that a
child’s wage is γi. If boys’ wages are, on average, higher than girls’ wages, then,
ceteris paribus, the optimal level of time spent in school for boys will be less
than that of girls.12 Less time in school yields fewer completed grades, giving
rise to a gender gap that favors girls.
An additional source of a gender gap comes in the form of parental prefer-
ences. The second term in the brackets of the ﬁrst order condition represents
the rise in parental utility from increasing a child’s time in school. If a parent
12Note that this is a one period model, so it does take into consideration the future
foregone earnings gains from working rather than staying in school.
31is biased against sons, then he or she derives more utility from increasing the
daughter’s schooling time by one unit than by increasing the son’s schooling by
the same amount. If this is the case, then, ceteris paribus,w ea g a i nﬁnd that
the optimal level of time spent in school for boys will be less than that of girls.
A third explanation for the existence of a gender gap lies within the child
speciﬁc attainment function. Recall that
∂fi(·)
∂hf > 0 and
∂fi(·)
∂hm > 0. Suppose,
on average, an additional year of parental education results in a larger increase
in girls’ attainment than in boys’ attainment (
∂fgirls(·)
∂hf >
∂fboys(·)
∂hf and
∂fgilrs(·)
∂hm >
∂fboys(·)
∂hm ). That is, girls are more eﬃcient at converting parental educational
inputs into own educational outputs. If this is the case, then a gender gap in
favor of girls will arise. Given the lack of research on the gender dimension of
education in Brazil, it is not clear if the above relationship is true. As such,
this chapter will empirically test it.
Fathers and mothers also diﬀerently aﬀect schooling outcomes of children
through the attainment production function. Recall that attainment is a func-
tion of time spent in school, mother’s highest grade completed and father’s
highest grade completed. The function is speciﬁc to each child, so natural abil-
ity and gender are (theoretically) incorporated. Maternal and paternal highest
grade completed are entered separately because the empirical literature suggests
that mothers and fathers play very diﬀerent roles in their children’s learning pro-
cess. For example, mothers tend to spend more time directly assisting children
with school work. In addition, boys and girls may interact diﬀerently with
parents of the same versus diﬀerent gender. As such, mother’s education and
father’s education behave diﬀerently when producing children’s schooling out-
put. If children are better able to convert maternal versus paternal education
i n t oo w ne d u c a t i o n(
∂fi(·)
∂hm >
∂fi(·)
∂hf ), then mothers’ and fathers’ schooling will
have diﬀerent eﬀects on children’s attainment.
32The model can easily be adjusted to accommodate female-headed house-
holds. In such a case, κ =0 . Again, a gender gap in optimal school time
can arise if wages for girls diﬀer from boys’ wages or if single mothers have
preferences for children of one gender to be in school more so than children of
the other gender. Maternal eﬀects can also vary by gender of child through the
grade attainment function if single mothers interact diﬀerently with male versus
female children.
2.4 Methodology
T h em o d e la b o v eo ﬀers some reasons why and how maternal and paternal
eﬀects may diﬀer for sons and daughters and from each other. This section
details how I empirically quantify these eﬀects. The methodology employed
ﬁrst involves estimating attainment by gender for the two years considered,
1982 and 2003. The coeﬃcient estimates obtained from the regression results
a r et h e nu s e di nd e c o m p o s i t i o na n a l y s i st oq u a n t i f yt h ee ﬀects of the regressors
on the changing gender gap, focusing on the role of parental education. The
regression model and decomposition method are discussed more fully below.
2.4.1 Two-Limit Tobit Model
The ﬁrst stage of this chapter’s empirical section involves estimating chil-
dren’s attainment. Since my sample consists of children who may or may not
have completed their schooling, I do not know what their eventual attainment
will be. I can only observe their current attainment status, which, given their
age, has an upper bound of 7 and lower bound of 0. Given the truncated na-
ture of attainment, I employ a two-limit Tobit for estimation. This allows me
to account for the probability of having any education (non-zero attainment) as
well as the fact that children who have competed 7 grades diﬀer from children
33who are behind in school.
A child’s potential level of educational attainment, or the latent structure
of completed grades, is shown below:
Ed_Att
∗
Gi = CG +MGi∗πG1+M_SQGi∗πG2
+FGi∗πG3+F_SQGi∗πG4+ZGi∗δG+εGi
where i=1 to N, G=[boy,girl] and εGi~N(0,1). In the above model, CG is the
constant, M denotes maternal education, M_SQ represents maternal education
squared, F denotes father’s education and F_SQ represents father’s education
squared. All other regressors, including child and family-speciﬁc variables, are
i n c l u d e di nZ . T h eo b s e r v e dv a r i a b l ei sa sf o l l o w s :
Ed_AttGi =0 iﬀ Ed_Att
∗
Gi ≤ 0
Ed_AttGi = Ed_Att
∗
Gi iﬀ 0 <E d _Att
∗
Gi< 7
Ed_AttGi =7 iﬀ Ed_Att
∗
Gi ≥ 0.
The complete list of explanatory variables considered in this chapter are listed
below:
1. Household size
2. Birth quarter (dummies for born in the ﬁrst and last quarters)
3. Parental age entered linearly and quadratrically
4. Rural and state dummies
5. Log local median earnings for low-skilled workers
6. Log parental monthly earnings
7. Maternal highest grade completed entered linearly and quadratically
8. Paternal highest grade completed entered linearly and quadratically.
Family composition can play an important role in children’s educational
attainment. Household size should have a negative eﬀect because more people
34within the household generally means that each individual child has less access
to parental resources, such as assistance on school work. There is also evidence
that relative age is an important determinant of school achievement. If a child
who is born early in the year is ﬁrst enrolled at the age of 7, he or she will turn
8-years-old very soon after starting school. Given the child’s relatively advanced
age, parents may opt to enroll him or her the previous year, at the age of 6. As
a result, these children have been in school one year longer than those born in
the latter part of the year. This additional year allows for greater accumulation
of completed grades. As such, I expect that the eﬀect of being born in the ﬁrst
quarter to have a positive eﬀect on attainment.
In contrast, I expect a negative eﬀe c to nb e i n gb o r ni nt h el a s tq u a r t e r .
This is because at early ages, there can be substantial diﬀerences in cognitive
ability among children born in the early versus latter part of the year. As a
result, relatively younger children, those born in the last quarter, tend to have
less successful educational outcomes than their "older" counterparts (Shepard
and Smith 1986; Corman 2002). While the cognitive diﬀerences disappear with
age, "younger" children may accumulate repeated grades while enrolled in lower
primary school.
I enter parental age linearly and quadratically so as not to restrict the
marginal eﬀect to be constant over the entire range of parents’ age. The
quadratic speciﬁcation allows for the relationship between parental age and chil-
dren’s educational attainment to be concave if there are diminishing marginal
returns to parental age or convex if there are increasing returns. Regardless
of convexity or concavity, the variables should have positive marginal eﬀects
throughout the range of parental age because older parents have more "parent-
ing experience."
School infrastructure and quality can have large eﬀects on children’s aca-
35demic achievement. Commonly used measures of infrastructure and quality in
the development literature are number of desks per classroom, the presence of a
library and average years of teachers’ experience (Lavy 1996). Unfortunately,
the available data do not provide community or school level variables that reﬂect
school quality. As such, I include a "rural" dummy to proxy for school quality.
Residing in a rural area should have a negative eﬀect on attainment because
school infrastructure in rural areas is relatively poor. Given the lower quality
of education in such areas, I would expect to ﬁnd that living in a rural area has
a decreasing eﬀect on attainment. In addition, I include state dummies that
can absorb the eﬀect of regional diﬀerences in school quality.
I also include log median earnings for low skilled-workers, deﬁned as wage
earners with 7 or less years of schooling. Such workers are educationally com-
parable to the children used in the sample, so their median earnings oﬀers a
direct measure of income forgone by attending school instead of entering the
work force. The earnings values in the regressions are local and gender speciﬁc,
meaning they are calculated by sampling cluster and gender. The eﬀect of
the variable should be negative because higher wages for low-skilled workers in-
creases the probability of dropping out to work or concurrently work and attend
school. Under both circumstances, children will accumulate fewer completed
grades.
In the presence of credit constraints, poorer families are less able to pay for
the direct costs of education, such as books and transportation. Poorer families
are also more likely to send children into the work force to supplement family
income. As mentioned above, when a child works, he or she has less time to
devote to school work, frequently resulting in poor academic performance, grade
repetition or even attrition. These factors indicate that log parental earnings
should have a positive eﬀect on attainment.
36Finally, the parental education variables are entered both linearly and quadrat-
ically. As in the case of parental age, this speciﬁcation allows for more ﬂexibility
because it does not restrict the marginal eﬀects to be constant over the entire
range of parents’ education. Rather, the quadratic speciﬁcation allows for the
relationship between parental education and children’s attainment to be con-
cave if there are diminishing marginal returns to parental schooling or convex
if there are increasing returns. In either case, parental education should have a
positive eﬀect over the entire range of parental schooling because more educated
parents are better able to assist children with school work. Parents with more
schooling may also have a stronger preference for education, so they are more
likely to encourage their children to focus on academic performance.13
There are also a number of factors that aﬀe c ta t t a i n m e n tt h a tIa mn o ta b l e
to control for due to data limitations. For example, the empirical literature
in the developing world indicates that children’s schooling attainment is, other
things equal, negatively aﬀected by schooling costs (Lavy 1996; Deolalikar 1993).
Schooling costs can be direct, such as enrollment fees, books, uniforms and
transportation fees, or indirect, such as distance to school and the cost of time
from travelling. The PNAD, however, does not contain any of these variables.
As a result, I am not able to control for the costs of schooling.
In developing countries, older children, usually girls, are often responsible for
home production and care of younger siblings. These duties leave less time for
school work, resulting in lower educational performance (Lavy 1996; Parish and
Willis 1998). Furthermore, later-born children tend to have better schooling
outcomes relative to their older siblings because the older siblings may have left
home, leaving more family resources at their disposal (Parish and Willis 1998).
13Parental education can also aﬀect children’s attainment indirectly through
parental earnings, which are a function of parental education. For the purposes
of this paper, however, I am interested only in the direct eﬀect of parental education.
37The number of siblings and birth order reﬂect parents’ fertility decisions.
The empirical literature suggests that high-fertility households are character-
ized by "quantity versus quality". That is, parents with many children devote
fewer resources to the education of each child (Becker and Lewis 1973). Highly
educated parents tend to have fewer children. This suggests that the number
of siblings and birth order may be endogenous because they are simultaneously
determined with children’s schooling outcomes as functions of parental school-
ing.
To test the endogeneity of fertility-related variables, the model speciﬁcation
discussed above was estimated with and without sibling and birth order infor-
mation. The results showed that without sibling and birth order variables,
the parental education coeﬃcient estimates and marginal eﬀects were larger.
This indicates that the sibling and birth order variables, in part, reﬂect parents’
schooling. Without the proper instruments for fertility decisions, the results
that follow do not include these variables. While there may, as a result, be
a no m i t t e dv a r i a b l eb i a s ,t h ee x c l u s i o no ft h ee n d o g e n o u sv a r i a b l e si sp r e f e r a b l e
because they absorb some the eﬀect of parental schooling, the primary variables
of interest in this chapter.
Note that educational attainment can also be aﬀected by a number of un-
observable characteristics. Children with greater innate abilities are probably
more likely to perform well in school, resulting in less grade repetition and low-
ering the probability of dropping out. Unfortunately, ability is not observable.
Assuming children inherit ability from their parents, coeﬃcients on parental
education, therefore, may be biased upward because the estimates will, in part,
reﬂect the inter-generational transmission of ability.
Unobservable ability, when possible, is commonly addressed by using sibling
eﬀects, assuming all siblings inherit the same parental ability eﬀect (Lillard and
38Willis 1994; Parish and Willis 1998). This chapter, however, focuses on 15-
year-old girls and boys. In order to employ sibling eﬀects, I would have to limit
my analysis to households with at least one son and one daughter who are both
15. This severe restriction is not feasible, so I can not control for unobservable
ability via sibling eﬀects.
Ability bias can also be controlled for by instrumenting parental education
with grand-parent’s education (Lillard and Willis 1994; Barros and Lam 1996).
The 1982 and 1996 PNAD data sets contain retrospective questions that ask
adults (the parents of the current sample) about their parents’ (the grand-
parents of the current sample) educational outcomes. For the purposes of this
chapter, however, I want to compare attainment in the past and the (almost)
present. The most recent retrospective data are now a decade old, so this
method of addressing unobservable ability is also not attractive. Given this
lack of common instruments in both the 1982 and 2003 data, I am not able to
eliminate ability bias from my results. Assuming the transmission of ability
is the same for girls and boys, however, the bias should be the same for both
genders. As such, unobservable ability should not qualitatively aﬀect any
analysis of the attainment diﬀerence between girls and boys.
The summary statistics for the variables discussed above are in tables 2.2A,
2.2B, 2.2C and 2.2D.14 The tables show the means and standard deviations of
individual and household characteristics for the full samples and by low grade
status of child. The primary factors to note are the diﬀerences between the
characteristics of children with and without low grade completion.
14The sample used in Table 2.1 included children with missing information on
parental education and household/individual characteristics. The sample employed
in the econometric analysis eliminates such observations, resulting in a smaller sam-
ple size. The sample sizes reported in tables 2.2A, 2.2B, 2.2C and 2.2D reﬂect the
number of observations used in the regressions that follow.
39Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Child's Attainment 3.85 2.30 4.15 2.21
Maternal Education 2.62 2.92 2.65 3.03
Paternal Education 2.85 3.36 2.83 3.39
Maternal Age 42.19 7.01 42.24 6.87
Paternal Age 47.29 8.37 47.23 8.33
Household Size 6.97 2.39 6.98 2.36
Black 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25
Mixed Race 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.48
Born in First Quarter 0.24 0.42 0.22 0.42
Born in Fourth Quarter 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43
Rural 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.48
Log Parental Earnings 9.83 2.81 9.79 2.86
Log Local Low-Skilled Wages 10.10 0.58 9.25 0.71
N 4326 4218
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Child's Attainment 5.97 1.57 6.38 6.79
Maternal Education 6.50 4.11 6.79 4.12
Paternal Education 6.14 4.18 6.31 4.21
Maternal Age 40.40 6.34 40.50 6.30
Paternal Age 44.33 8.05 43.91 7.63
Household Size 4.90 1.46 4.83 1.45
Black 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.21
Mixed Race 0.44 0.50 0.41 0.49
Born in First Quarter 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43
Born in Fourth Quarter 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43
Rural 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.36
Log Parental Earnings 6.00 2.04 6.10 1.90
Log Local Low-Skilled Wages 5.87 0.59 5.35 0.63
N 2379 2157
Boys Girls
2003
Boys Girls
Table 2.2A
Summary Statistics, Two-Parent Households
1982
40Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Child's Attainment 3.47 2.22 4.13 2.01
Maternal Education 2.36 2.97 2.46 3.01
Paternal Education -- --
Maternal Age 45.27 8.11 44.84 8.09
Paternal Age -- --
Household Size 4.98 2.06 5.01 2.05
Black 0.14 0.34 0.09 0.29
Mixed Race 0.44 0.50 0.45 0.50
Born in First Quarter 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43
Born in Fourth Quarter 0.25 0.44 0.21 0.41
Rural 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.39
Log Parental Earnings 5.43 4.79 5.63 4.75
Log Local Low-Skilled Wages 10.10 0.57 9.32 0.70
N7 1 2 7 3 0
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Child's Attainment 5.62 1.72 6.15 1.43
Maternal Education 6.03 4.14 6.67 4.46
Paternal Education -- --
Maternal Age 42.47 7.38 42.15 7.23
Paternal Age -- --
Household Size 3.72 1.36 3.68 1.53
Black 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27
Mixed Race 0.48 0.50 0.43 0.50
Born in First Quarter 0.31 0.46 0.25 0.44
Born in Fourth Quarter 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.42
Rural 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28
Log Parental Earnings 3.52 2.86 3.85 2.79
Log Local Low-Skilled Wages 5.82 0.57 5.28 0.65
N6 5 0 5 7 5
2003
Boys Girls
Boys Girls
Table 2.2B
Summary Statistics, Female-Headed Households
1982
41Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Child's Attainment 7.00 0.00 3.23 1.99 7.00 0.00 3.38 1.85
Maternal Education 5.33 3.69 2.08 2.40 5.41 3.76 1.89 2.28
Paternal Education 6.09 4.52 2.21 2.64 5.94 4.42 1.98 2.44
Maternal Age 41.59 6.23 42.31 7.15 41.80 6.39 42.35 6.99
Paternal Age 46.05 6.92 47.54 8.61 46.65 7.82 47.38 8.46
Household Size 5.64 1.80 7.24 2.41 5.68 1.70 7.33 2.39
Black 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.26 0.02 0.14 0.08 0.28
Mixed Race 0.18 0.39 0.42 0.49 0.17 0.38 0.43 0.50
Born in First Quarter 0.28 0.45 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.41
Born in Fourth Quarter 0.20 0.40 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43
Rural 0.09 0.29 0.39 0.49 0.10 0.30 0.41 0.49
Log Parental Earnings 10.61 3.07 9.68 2.73 10.47 3.09 9.60 2.76
Log Low-Skilled Wages 10.51 0.52 10.02 0.56 9.56 0.61 9.16 0.71
N 742 3584 947 3271
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Child's Attainment 7.00 0.00 4.59 1.58 7.00 0.00 4.88 1.39
Maternal Education 7.78 4.18 4.78 3.32 7.70 4.08 4.57 3.28
Paternal Education 7.45 4.23 4.38 3.40 7.19 4.19 4.17 3.41
Maternal Age 40.61 5.98 40.12 6.77 40.58 6.01 40.33 6.95
Paternal Age 44.54 7.54 44.03 8.68 43.88 7.23 43.96 8.52
Household Size 4.57 1.13 5.33 1.72 4.56 1.18 5.48 1.81
Black 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.23
Mixed Race 0.36 0.48 0.55 0.50 0.34 0.48 0.58 0.49
Born in First Quarter 0.28 0.45 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.19 0.39
Born in Fourth Quarter 0.21 0.41 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44
Rural 0.10 0.30 0.27 0.44 0.12 0.32 0.24 0.43
Log Parental Earnings 6.35 2.05 5.52 1.92 6.31 1.94 5.59 1.70
Log Low-Skilled Wages 6.03 0.55 5.66 0.57 5.45 0.57 5.12 0.71
N 1280 1099 1462 695
Low Grade=0 Low Grade=1 Low Grade=0 Low Grade=1
Low Grade=0 Low Grade=1
2003
Boys Girls
Low Grade=0 Low Grade=1
Table 2.2C
Summary Statistics, Two-Parent Households, By Low Grade Status
1982
Boys Girls
42Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Child's Attainment 7.00 0.00 3.05 1.96 7.00 0.00 3.52 1.77
Maternal Education 5.37 4.49 2.00 2.51 5.36 3.97 1.86 2.35
Paternal Education -- -- -- --
Maternal Age 45.30 7.69 45.26 8.17 45.41 7.78 44.73 8.16
Paternal Age -- -- -- --
Household Size 4.38 1.80 5.05 2.08 4.53 1.87 5.11 2.07
Black 0.04 0.20 0.15 0.35 0.05 0.23 0.10 0.30
Mixed Race 0.24 0.43 0.47 0.50 0.28 0.45 0.49 0.50
Born in First Quarter 0.37 0.48 0.22 0.41 0.29 0.45 0.23 0.42
Born in Fourth Quarter 0.10 0.31 0.27 0.44 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.41
Rural 0.07 0.25 0.23 0.42 0.04 0.21 0.22 0.41
Log Parental Earnings 6.71 5.05 5.27 4.74 5.62 5.10 5.63 4.68
Log Low-Skilled Wages 10.44 0.484 10.06 0.57 9.52 0.57 9.27 0.71
N 84 628 134 596
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Child's Attainment 7.00 0.00 4.39 1.55 7.00 0.00 4.82 1.54
Maternal Education 7.72 4.23 4.52 3.42 7.83 4.59 4.83 3.55
Paternal Education -- -- -- --
Maternal Age 42.08 6.78 42.81 7.87 42.58 7.45 41.47 6.85
Paternal Age -- -- -- --
Household Size 3.40 1.07 4.02 1.51 3.39 1.27 4.14 1.76
Black 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.23 0.11 0.32
Mixed Race 0.38 0.49 0.57 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.49 0.50
Born in First Quarter 0.37 0.48 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.45 0.20 0.40
Born in Fourth Quarter 0.19 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.40 0.27 0.45
Rural 0.05 0.21 0.13 0.33 0.05 0.22 0.14 0.35
Log Parental Earnings 4.04 2.95 3.06 2.70 4.06 2.88 3.52 2.60
Log Low-Skilled Wages 6.02 0.49 5.65 0.58 5.41 0.57 5.07 0.70
N 282 368 341 234
Low Grade=0 Low Grade=1 Low Grade=0 Low Grade=1
Low Grade=0 Low Grade=1
2003
Boys Girls
Low Grade=0 Low Grade=1
Table 2.2D
Summary Statistics, Female-Headed Households, By Low Grade Status
1982
Boys Girls
43As one would expect, parental education is much higher for kids who have
the correct attainment level. Also, children with low grade completion have
bigger family sizes. Children with low grade completion are also more likely
to be born later in the year. Finally, as one would expect, children who are
behind academically reside in households with lower (log) parents’ earnings.
2.4.2 Decomposing the Change in the Gender Gap
As shown above in table 2.1, the gender gap in mean attainment changed
between 1982 and 2003, widening among children in two-parent headed house-
holds and shrinking in female-headed households. What factors have led to this
phenomenon? This section describes the process of decomposing the eﬀect of
changes in parental education on changes in the gender gap by employing an
extension of a method devised by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). Barmby
and Smith (2001) expand upon the linear Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition tech-
nique to use on a non-linear selection model. I adapt Barmby and Smith’s
method to apply to a two-limit Tobit model. The diﬀerence in the gender gap
between 2003 and 1982 can be decomposed into a component due to diﬀerences
in sample characteristics and a component due to returns or "behavior."
For the purposes of this chapter, I want to focus on the partial changes
in the gender gap due to the combined changes in both levels of and returns
to parental education. Recall that Ed_Att∗
Gi represents potential attainment
for a child at 15 years of age. The observed values of attainment are greater
than or equal to zero, but the potential (latent) values can theoretically be
negative. The observed outcome, or realization, of these negative values is
zero, regardless of how far below zero they are. Since a change in potential
attainment from, for example, -2 to -1 still results in an observed attainment
value of zero, I will ignore these cases in the decomposition analysis. Rather, it
44is more informative to examine positive values of potential attainment because
these values can actually be realized. As such, let \ Ed_Att
Y
Gi be the expected
value of latent/potential attainment at the age of 15 given potential attainment
is positive, E[Ed_AttY ∗
Gi|Ed_AttY ∗
Gi > 0,X i], for a child i, of gender G=[boy(b),
girl(g)], in year Y=[82,03].
Using the coeﬃcients obtained from the two-limit Tobit regressions, \ Ed_Att
Y
Gi
is calculated as follows:
(1) \ Ed_Att
Y
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G is shorthand notation for my model speciﬁcation evaluated at each
respondent’s values (CY
G+MY
i ∗πY
G1+M_SQY
i ∗πY
G2+FY
i ∗πY
G2+F_SQY
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Y
G). Finally, Φ i st h eN o r m a lC D F ,a n dφ is the Normal PDF. XY
i ∗ β
Y
G is
expected potential attainment, or E[Ed_AttY ∗
Gi|Xi]. The second part of the
equation is E[εGi|εGi > −XY
i ∗ β
Y
G],where εGi is the normally distributed error
term from latent attainment function above. This part re-scales the expected
attainment values to be strictly positive.
I can make the above calculation and average over all girls and boys sepa-
rately to get the average predicted attainment values by gender. From these
values, I can obtain the predicted gender gap for each year:
[ PGG
Y
=
1
Ng
Ng X
i=1
\ Ed_Att
Y
gi −
1
Nb
Nb X
i=1
\ Ed_Att
Y
bi
where Ng is the number of girls and Nb is the number of boys.
Suppose I want to know what the predicted gender gap would be in 1982
if maternal education and the returns to maternal education were at the 2003
values. To obtain this, I must ﬁrst calculate expected attainments in 1982
using 2003 maternal education levels and returns. To do this, I replace M82
i ,
M_SQ82
i ,π82
G1 and π82
G2 by M03
i , M_SQ03
i , π03
G1 and π03
G2 respectively. The 2003
45maternal education values are drawn from the 2003 sample and matched to
the 1982 sample by state, urban/rural, race (black, white and mixed), parental
earnings quintile and household type (two-parent or female-headed). This
allows the decomposition to take into account demographic variation within the
samples. All other values remain at the 1982 levels:
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I can make the above calculation for both boys and girls and then determine
what the predicted gender gap would be if maternal education and the returns
to maternal education were at the 2003 quantities:
] PGG
82
=
1
Ng
Ng X
i=1
^ Ed_Att
82
gi −
1
Nb
Nb X
i=1
^ Ed_Att
82
bi .
If ] PGG
82
is smaller than [ PGG
82
, that means if maternal education and the
returns to maternal education were at the 2003 values, the gender diﬀerence
would be smaller than it was in 1982. As such, the combined changes in mater-
nal education and returns to maternal education from 1982 to 2003 decreased
t h eg e n d e rg a pb e c a u s et h el a t e ry e a rv a l u e sy i e l das m a l l e rd i ﬀerence between
boys and girls. Conversely, if ] PGG
82
is bigger than [ PGG
82
,t h a ti n d i c a t e s
that if maternal education and the returns to maternal education were at the
2003 level, the gender diﬀerence would be bigger than it was in 1982. As a
result, the combined change in the level of maternal education and returns to
maternal education from 1982 to 2003 increased the gender gap because the
later year values yield a larger diﬀerence between boys and girls. Essentially,
if the predicted gender gap using any 2003 value is greater than [ PGG
82
,t h e n
that factor contributed to gender divergence between 1982 and 2003, and if the
46predicted gender gap using any 2003 value is less than [ PGG
82
, then that factor
contributed to gender equalization between 1982 and 2003.
Now suppose I want to know what the 2003 mean attainment would be if
maternal education and the returns to maternal education were at their 1982
levels. My new expected attainment is:
(3) ^ Ed_Att
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Again, I can make this calculation for both boys and girls and then determine
what the gender gap would be if the level of maternal education and the returns
to maternal education were still at the 1982 values. The interpretations of the
results, however, are slightly diﬀerent (and less intuitive) than when 1982 is the
base year. If ] PGG
03
is smaller than [ PGG
03
, that means if the level of maternal
education and the returns to maternal education were at the 1982 level, then the
gender diﬀerence would be smaller than it was in 2003. As such, the combined
change in the level of maternal education and returns to maternal education
from 1982 to 2003 increased the gender discrepancy because the later year values
yield a larger diﬀerence between boys and girls. Conversely, if ] PGG
03
is
bigger than [ PGG
03
, that indicates that if the level of maternal education and
the returns to maternal education were at its 1982 level, the gender diﬀerence
w o u l db eb i g g e rt h a ni ti si n2 0 0 3 . A sar e s u l t ,t h ec o m b i n e dc h a n g ei nt h e
level of maternal education and the returns to maternal education from 1982
to 2003 decreased the gender discrepancy because the later year values yield a
smaller diﬀerence between boys and girls. In this case, if the predicted gender
gap using any 1982 value is greater than [ PGG
03
, then that factor contributed
to gender equalization, and if the predicted gender gap using any 1982 value is
47less than [ PGG
03
, that factor contributed to gender divergence.
Equations (2) and (3) can easily be modiﬁed to calculate expected attain-
ment allowing levels of and returns to father’s education to vary by year. In-
stead of replacing MY
i , M_SQY
i ,πY
G1 and πY
G2 with values from a diﬀerent year,
simply replace FY
i , F_SQY
i ,πY
G3 and πY
G4 with the other year’s values. Further-
more, expected attainments in female-headed households are also calculated
from equations 1, 2 and 3, but with all paternal parameters omitted.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Two-Limit Tobit Results
Tables 2.3A and 2.3B oﬀer the Tobit coeﬃcients and marginal eﬀects for
two-parent households, respectively, and the analogous values for female-headed
households are in 2.3C and 2.3D. Most of the values behave as expected. One
notable exception, however, is log local low-skilled wages. As discussed above,
this variable was intended to proxy for the opportunity cost, via foregone earn-
ings, of attending school. The coeﬃcients and marginal eﬀects, therefore,
should be negative because higher wages should attract children to the labor
force, thereby decreasing attainment. The coeﬃcients and marginal eﬀects,
however, are positive, suggesting that the variable really measures local wealth.
Presumably, attainment is higher in richer communities, yielding positive val-
ues.
48Maternal Ed. 0.4293 0.4092 0.1283 0.0716
[13.67]*** [13.00]*** [1.79]* [1.27]
Maternal Ed. ^2 -0.0161 -0.0169 0.0052 0.0068
[5.16]*** [5.84]*** [1.00] [1.72]*
Paternal Ed. 0.2939 0.2552 0.2256 0.2345
[9.97]*** [8.66]*** [3.35]*** [4.44]***
Paternal Ed. ^2 -0.008 -0.0077 -0.0093 -0.0073
[3.21]*** [3.32]*** [1.97]** [1.94]*
Maternal Age 0.1017 0.1161 0.2136 0.0733
[2.11]** [2.64]*** [2.11]** [0.88]
Maternal Age ^2 -0.001 -0.0012 -0.0026 -0.0009
[1.88]* [2.39]** [2.20]** [0.94]
Paternal Age 0.0292 0.1179 0.1225 0.0966
[0.80] [3.19]*** [1.95]* [1.94]*
Paternal Age ^2 -0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0007
[0.57] [3.19]*** [1.79]* [1.31]
Household Size -0.1342 -0.157 -0.2919 -0.2347
[8.62]*** [10.28]*** [5.97]*** [5.92]***
Black -0.884 -0.722 -0.265 -0.3872
[6.48]*** [5.12]*** [0.78] [1.31]
Mixed Race -0.3513 -0.3565 -0.4817 -0.0875
[4.39]*** [4.50]*** [2.94]*** [0.66]
Born in Quarter 1 0.2305 0.2821 0.3657 0.2917
[2.74]*** [3.40]*** [1.95]* [2.06]**
Born in Quarter 4 0.05 0.0419 -0.0607 -0.4552
[0.61] [0.52] [0.34] [3.17]***
Rural -1.0312 -1.0379 -0.0647 -0.4231
[12.62]*** [12.39]*** [0.32] [2.61]***
Log Parental Earnings 0.0343 0.011 0.0043 0.0831
[2.71]*** [0.87] [0.10] [2.63]***
Log Low-Skilled Wages 0.1259 0.7092 0.3174 0.4359
[2.08]** [8.51]*** [2.35]** [3.16]***
Constant -0.4218 -8.4769 1.0359 -0.39
[0.26] [3.26]*** [0.32] [0.16]
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4218 4326 2155 2378
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Boys
1982 2003
Table 2.3A
Coefficients from Tobits, Two-Parent Households
Dependent Variable = Educational Attainment
Boys Girls Girls
49ME Sig. ME Sig. ME Sig. ME Sig.
Maternal Ed. 0.429 *** 0.409 *** 0.128 * 0.072
Maternal Ed. ^2 -0.016 *** -0.017 *** 0.005 0.007 *
Paternal Ed. 0.294 *** 0.255 *** 0.226 *** 0.234 ***
Paternal Ed. ^2 -0.008 *** -0.008 *** -0.009 ** -0.007 *
Maternal Age 0.102 ** 0.116 *** 0.214 ** 0.073
Maternal Age ^2 -0.001 * -0.001 ** -0.003 ** -0.001
Paternal Age 0.029 0.118 *** 0.122 * 0.097 *
Paternal Age ^2 0.000 -0.001 *** -0.001 * -0.001
Household Size -0.134 *** -0.157 *** -0.292 *** -0.235 ***
Black -0.884 *** -0.722 *** -0.265 -0.387
Mixed Race -0.351 *** -0.356 *** -0.482 *** -0.088
Born in Quarter 1 0.230 *** 0.282 *** 0.366 * 0.292 **
Born in Quarter 4 0.050 0.042 -0.061 -0.455 ***
Rural -1.031 *** -1.038 *** -0.065 -0.423 ***
Log Low-Skilled Wages 0.034 *** 0.011 0.004 0.083 ***
0.126 ** 0.709 *** 0.317 ** 0.436 ***
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4218 4326 2155 2378
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Boys Girls Boys Girls
1982
Table 2.3B
Marginal Effects from Tobits, Two-Parent Households
Dependent Variable = Educational Attainment
2003
50Maternal Ed. 0.5108 0.3226 0.1133 0.1649
[7.42]*** [4.59]*** [1.03] [1.81]*
Maternal Ed. ^2 -0.0098 0 0.0078 0.0048
[1.48] [0.00] [1.00] [0.74]
Paternal Ed. ----
----
Paternal Ed. ^2 ----
----
Maternal Age 0.1379 0.0605 -0.3764 0.0401
[1.63] [0.81] [1.74]* [0.46]
Maternal Age ^2 -0.0012 -0.0002 0.0047 -0.0004
[1.39] [0.33] [1.90]* [0.46]
Paternal Age ----
----
Paternal Age ^2 ----
----
Household Size -0.0998 -0.0144 -0.2766 -0.1482
[2.48]** [0.34] [3.25]*** [1.93]*
Black -0.7224 -0.5966 -1.1685 -0.0461
[2.47]** [2.20]** [2.40]** [0.11]
Mixed Race -0.4 -0.5587 -0.0276 -0.1708
[2.15]** [2.81]*** [0.09] [0.73]
Born in Quarter 1 0.4316 0.0127 0.6456 0.4711
[2.24]** [0.06] [1.95]* [1.98]**
Born in Quarter 4 -0.0306 -0.2882 -0.6332 0.0879
[0.15] [1.43] [1.95]* [0.32]
Rural -1.3164 -1.36 -0.5102 -0.6219
[5.61]*** [5.74]*** [1.09] [1.76]*
Log Parental Earnings -0.0255 0.0235 -0.0519 0.105
[1.40] [1.27] [0.95] [2.70]***
Log Low-Skilled Wages 0.0308 0.9985 0.489 0.5626
[0.21] [4.99]*** [1.93]* [2.50]**
Constant -3.8196 -9.8706 13.8128 -0.161
[1.13] [2.46]** [2.50]** [0.05]
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 730 712 575 650
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
G i r l sB o y sG i r l sB o y s
Table 2.3C
Coefficients from Tobits, Female-Headed Households
Dependent Variable = Educational Attainment
1982 2003
51ME Sig. ME Sig. ME Sig. ME Sig.
Maternal Ed. 0.511 *** 0.323 *** 0.113 0.165 *
Maternal Ed. ^2 -0.010 0.000 0.008 0.005
Paternal Ed. -- -- -- --
Paternal Ed. ^2 -- -- -- --
Maternal Age 0.138 0.061 -0.376 * 0.040
Maternal Age ^2 -0.001 0.000 0.005 * 0.000
Paternal Age -- -- -- --
Paternal Age ^2 -- -- -- --
Household Size -0.100 ** -0.014 -0.277 *** -0.148 *
Black -0.722 ** -0.597 ** -1.168 ** -0.046
Mixed Race -0.400 ** -0.559 *** -0.028 -0.171
Born in Quarter 1 0.432 ** 0.013 0.646 * 0.471 **
Born in Quarter 4 -0.031 -0.288 -0.633 * 0.088
Rural -1.316 *** -1.360 *** -0.510 -0.622 *
Log Low-Skilled Wages -0.025 0.023 -0.052 0.105 ***
0.031 0.998 *** 0.489 * 0.563 **
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 730 712 575 650
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Boys Boys Girls Girls
Table 2.3D
Marginal Effects from Tobits, Female-Headed Households
Dependent Variable = Educational Attainment
1982 2003
Turning now to the tests of diﬀerences across gender, table 2.4A shows the
Wald test results of diﬀerences in both maternal and paternal coeﬃcients by
gender of parent and table 2.4B oﬀers the results by gender of child. Given the
quadratic nature of parental education in the speciﬁcation, the tables oﬀer the
total eﬀect of increasing parental education by one grade on children’s attain-
ment. The values are sensitive to where the total eﬀects are evaluated. As
such, the tables show the total eﬀects at parental education valued at zero, 4,
8 and the year-speciﬁcp o o l e dm e a n( d e n o t e d’ P M ’ ) .
Table 2.4A shows that in 2003, maternal eﬀects in two-parent households
52were stronger for girls than for boys. Paternal eﬀects in two-parent households
and maternal eﬀects in female-headed households, however, were stronger for
boys. Looking across time, the results are not always consistent. In 1982,
all parental eﬀects were stronger for girls, regardless of household type. As
such, in two-parent households, maternal education consistently had more of
an eﬀect on the attainment of girls rather than boys. Paternal education in
two-parent households and maternal education in female-headed households,
however, experienced a gender reversal over time, with eﬀects being larger for
girls in 1982, but larger for boys in 2003.
Table 2.4B shows that looking across gender of parent in 2003, maternal
and paternal eﬀects in two-parent households were rarely statistically diﬀerent
from one another. This was not the case in 1982. The table shows that at low
levels of parental education (0 and 4 years) maternal eﬀects were stronger than
paternal eﬀects in 1982. At high levels of parental education (8 years) in 1982,
however, maternal and paternal eﬀects were statistically equal.
53TE, G Sig. TE, B Sig. G-B Sig. TE, G Sig. TE, B Sig. G-B Sig.
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.429 *** 0.409 *** 0.020 0.128 * 0.072 0.057
Ed.=4 0.301 *** 0.274 *** 0.027 0.170 *** 0.126 ** 0.044
Ed.=8 0.172 *** 0.139 *** 0.033 0.212 *** 0.180 *** 0.031
Ed.=PM 0.345 *** 0.320 *** 0.024 0.197 *** 0.162 *** 0.035
Fathers
Ed.=0 0.294 *** 0.255 *** 0.039 0.226 *** 0.235 *** -0.009
Ed.=4 0.230 *** 0.194 *** 0.036 0.151 *** 0.176 *** -0.025
Ed.=8 0.166 *** 0.132 *** 0.034 0.077 *** 0.118 *** -0.041
Ed.=PM 0.248 *** 0.211 *** 0.037 0.110 *** 0.144 *** -0.034
TE, G Sig. TE, B Sig. G-B Sig. TE, G Sig. TE, B Sig. G-B Sig.
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.511 *** 0.323 *** 0.188 * 0.113 0.165 * -0.052
Ed.=4 0.432 *** 0.323 *** 0.110 *** 0.176 * 0.203 *** -0.028
Ed.=8 0.354 *** 0.323 *** 0.031 *** 0.238 *** 0.242 *** -0.004 *
Ed.=PM 0.464 *** 0.323 *** 0.141 *** 0.212 ** 0.226 *** -0.014 *
Fathers -- - -- -
Note: 'TE' denotes total effect.
           '**' denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
           '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
           'G' denotes girls, 'B' denotes boys and 'PM' denotes pooled mean.
           'G-B Sig.' indicates whether or not the gender difference is statistically significant.
           '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
1982 2003
Two-Parent Households
1982 2003
Female-Headed Households
Table 2.4A
Wald Test Results of Coefficient Total Effects
Dependent Variable = Educational Attainment
Differences in Parental Effects by Gender of Child
54TE, F Sig. TE, M Sig. F-M Sig. TE, F Sig. TE, M Sig. F-M Sig.
PED=0
Girls 0.294 *** 0.429 *** -0.135 * 0.226 *** 0.128 * 0.097 *
Boys 0.255 *** 0.409 *** -0.154 ** 0.235 *** 0.072 0.163
PED=4
Girls 0.230 *** 0.301 *** -0.071 ** 0.151 *** 0.170 *** -0.019
Boys 0.194 *** 0.274 *** -0.080 ** 0.176 *** 0.126 *** 0.050
PED=8
Girls 0.166 *** 0.172 *** -0.006 0.077 *** 0.212 *** -0.135 ***
Boys 0.132 *** 0.139 *** -0.007 0.118 *** 0.180 *** -0.063
TE, F Sig. TE, M Sig. F-M Sig. TE, F Sig. TE, M Sig. F-M Sig.
Girls -- - -- -
Boys -- - -- -
Note: 'TE' denotes total effect.
           '**' denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
           '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
           'M' denotes mothers, 'F' denotes fathers and 'PM' denotes pooled mean.
           'M-F Sig.' indicates whether or not the gender difference is statistically significant.
Table 2.4B
Wald Test Results of Coefficient Total Effects
Dependent Variable = Educational Attainment
1982 2003
2003
Differences in Parental Effects by Gender of Parent
Two-Parent Households
           '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Female-Headed Households
1982
For the purposes of this chapter, however, marginal eﬀe c t sa r em o r ei n f o r m a -
tive because they take into consideration the truncation of the outcome variable.
As such, tables 2.5A and 2.5B oﬀer the marginal eﬀects by gender of child and
gender of parent. Once again, given the quadratic nature of parental education
in the speciﬁcation, the tables oﬀer the marginal eﬀect of increasing parental
education by one grade on children’s attainment. The values are sensitive to
where the marginal eﬀects are evaluated. As such, the tables show the marginal
55eﬀects at parental education valued at zero, 4, 8 and the year-speciﬁcp o o l e d
mean.
Looking at table 2.5A, the marginal eﬀects are always stronger for girls than
for boys. This result holds regardless of year, gender of parent and household
type. Note, however, that the gender diﬀerences between parental eﬀects on
girls and boys were smaller in 2003 than in 1982. In addition, 2.5B shows
that maternal eﬀects are always stronger than paternal eﬀects. This ﬁnding
is consistent with the earlier literature which showed that maternal education
has a larger eﬀect than paternal education on children’s educational outcomes
(Emerson and Souza 2005; Duryea 1998; Behrman, Birdsall, and Székely 2000;
Psacharopoulos and Arriagada 1989; Thomas, Schoeni and Strauss 1996; Barros
and Lam 1996).
56ME, G Sig. ME, B Sig. G-B Sig. ME, G Sig. ME, B Sig. G-B Sig.
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.131 *** 0.123 *** 0.008 *** 0.160 *** 0.157 *** 0.003 ***
Ed.=4 0.185 *** 0.176 *** 0.009 *** 0.200 *** 0.196 *** 0.003 ***
Ed.=8 0.231 *** 0.221 *** 0.009 *** 0.239 *** 0.237 *** 0.003 ***
Ed.=PM 0.168 *** 0.158 *** 0.009 *** 0.226 *** 0.223 *** 0.003 ***
Fathers
Ed.=0 0.032 *** 0.031 *** 0.002 *** 0.039 *** 0.038 *** 0.001 ***
Ed.=4 0.144 *** 0.136 *** 0.008 *** 0.159 *** 0.157 *** 0.002 ***
Ed.=8 0.148 *** 0.140 *** 0.008 *** 0.157 *** 0.155 *** 0.001 ***
Ed.=PM 0.142 *** 0.133 *** 0.009 *** 0.158 *** 0.156 *** 0.001 ***
ME, G Sig. ME, B Sig. G-B Sig. ME, G Sig. ME, B Sig. G-B Sig.
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.129 *** 0.116 *** 0.013 *** 0.156 *** 0.152 *** 0.004 ***
Ed.=4 0.191 *** 0.170 *** 0.021 *** 0.196 *** 0.194 *** 0.002 ***
Ed.=8 0.239 *** 0.223 *** 0.015 *** 0.237 *** 0.236 *** 0.001 ***
Ed.=PM 0.168 *** 0.148 *** 0.020 *** 0.220 *** 0.219 *** 0.001 ***
Fathers -- - -- -
Note: 'ME' denotes total effect.
           '**' denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
           '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
           'G' denotes girls, 'B' denotes boys and 'PM' denotes pooled mean.
           'G-B Sig.' indicates whether or not the gender difference is statistically significant.
           '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Female-Headed Households
1982 2003
Two-Parent Households
1982 2003
Table 2.5A
T-Test Results of Average Marginal Effects
Dependent Variable = Educational Attainment
Differences in Parental Effects by Gender of Child
57ME, F Sig.ME, MSig. F-M Sig. ME, F Sig.ME, MSig. F-M Sig.
PED=0
Girls 0.032 *** 0.131 *** -0.099 *** 0.039 *** 0.160 *** -0.121 ***
Boys 0.031 *** 0.123 *** -0.092 *** 0.038 *** 0.157 *** -0.119 ***
PED=4
Girls 0.144 *** 0.185 *** -0.041 *** 0.159 *** 0.200 *** -0.040 ***
Boys 0.136 *** 0.176 *** -0.040 *** 0.157 *** 0.196 *** -0.039 ***
PED=8
Girls 0.148 *** 0.231 *** -0.083 *** 0.157 *** 0.239 *** -0.083 ***
Boys 0.140 *** 0.221 *** -0.081 *** 0.155 *** 0.237 *** -0.081 ***
ME, F Sig.ME, MSig. F-M Sig. ME, F Sig.ME, MSig. F-M Sig.
Girls -- - -- -
Boys -- - -- -
Note: 'ME' denotes total effect.
           '**' denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
           '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
           'M' denotes mothers, 'F' denotes fathers and 'PM' denotes pooled mean.
           'M-F Sig.' indicates whether or not the gender difference is statistically significant.
Table 2.5B
T-Test Results of Average Marginal Effects
Dependent Variable = Educational Attainment
Differences in Parental Effects by Gender of Parent
1982 2003
           '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Two-Parent Households
1982 2003
Female-Headed Households
2.5.2 Decomposition Results
Table 2.6 provides expected attainment and predicted gender gaps under
several diﬀerent speciﬁcations. When the base year is 1982, the results oﬀer
the expected attainment and predicted gender gaps when applying parental
attainment levels and returns from the 2003 data to the 1982 sample. When
t h eb a s ey e a ri s2 0 0 3 ,t h er e s u l t so ﬀer the analogous values applying the 1982
58parental attainment and estimated returns to the 2003 sample. In panels A, B,
C and D, row 1 provides predicted values using all own year levels and returns
(see equation 1).
When 1982 is the base year (Panel A), row 2 shows the predicted values of
attainment and the gender gap when using levels of and returns to maternal
education from 2003 (denoted as "Combined Parameter Changes"), leaving all
other parameters, such as race and birth quarter, at the 1982 values (see equa-
t i o n2 ) . T h i se x e r c i s ea l l o w sm et os i m u l a t ew h a tt h eg e n d e rg a pi n1 9 8 2w o u l d
have been if levels of and returns to maternal education were at the 2003 lev-
els. Row 3 shows the analogous predictions when using levels of and returns to
paternal education from 2003, leaving all other parameters at the 1982 values.
When 2003 is the base year (Panel B), row 2 shows the predicted values when
using 1982 maternal education parameters with the 2003 sample (equation 3),
and row 3 shows the analogous results from applying 1982 paternal education
values to the 2003 sample. As in Panel A, this allows me to simulate what
the gender gap in 2003 would have been if levels of and returns to parental
education were at the 1982 levels. Panels C and D are similarly calculated for
female-headed households.
In all panels of table 2.6, column 1 provides the average expected attainment
values for girls and column 2 shows the analogous ﬁgures for boys. Column 3
is the gender gap, or, more simply, column 1 minus column 2. Column 4 (Diﬀ.)
compares the predicted gender gap using other year values to the predicted
gender gap using own year values. For example, in panel A, the entry in row
2, column 4 is the 1982 predicted gender gap using 2003 levels of and returns
to maternal education (row 2, column 3) minus the 1982 predicted gender gap
using all 1982 values (row 1, column 3). The entry (0.17) is positive because
the predicted gender gap when applying 2003 maternal education values to the
591982 sample (0.44) is larger than the predicted gender gap when using all 1982
values (0.27). As such, the combined parameter change results in an increase
in the gender gap. Alternatively, if the entry had been negative, that would
mean that using the other year’s values results in a decrease in the gender gap.
It is important to note that the results show that the changes in expected
attainment are sensitive to which year is used as the base year. As such, the
discussion of the results will focus on whether or not the combined changes in
parental education had an equalizing (lowered the gender gap between 1982 and
2003) or divergent (increased the gender gap between 1982 and 2003) eﬀect.
For the 1982 panels, a positive value in column 4 means that if 1982 parental
education and returns to parental education were at the 2003 levels, the gender
gap would be larger than it was in 1982. Therefore, since the predicted gap using
the later year values is larger than when using the earlier year values, a positive
value indicates that parental education contributed to divergence over time.
When the 1982 value is negative in column 4, that means that applying 2003
parental education values to the 1982 sample shrinks the predicted gender gap.
As such, a negative value in column 4 when 1982 is the base year indicates that
combined parameter changes in parental education contributed to equalization
because the later year predicted gender gap is smaller than when using the
e a r l i e ry e a rv a l u e s .
6012345
PGG Using: G B G-B Diff.
1 All values from Y=1982 4.74 4.47 0.27 - -
Combined Parameter Changes
2 Levels of and returns to maternal education, Y=2003 4.92 4.48 0.44 0.17 D *
3 Levels of and returns to paternal education, Y=2003 4.98 4.96 0.02 -0.25 E *
12345
PGG Using: G B G-B Diff.
1 All values from Y=2003 6.79 6.21 0.58 - -
Combined Parameter Changes
2 Levels of and returns to maternal education, Y=1982 6.67 6.19 0.48 -0.10 D *
3 Levels of and returns to paternal education, Y=1982 6.71 5.98 0.73 0.15 E *
12345
PGG Using: G B G-B Diff.
1 All values from Y=1982 4.51 3.18 1.33 - -
Combined Parameter Changes
2 Levels of and returns to maternal education, Y=2003 4.66 3.49 1.17 -0.16 E *
12345
PGG Using: G B G-B Diff.
1 All values from Y=2003 6.41 5.28 1.13 - -
Combined Parameter Changes
2 Levels of and returns to maternal education, Y=1982 6.22 4.94 1.28 0.15 E *
Note: "G" denotes girls and "B" denotes boys.
Column 4 (Diff) offers the difference between column 3 values in rows 2 and 3 with row 1.
When 1982 is the base year, a positive value in column 4 means divergence (denoted "D").
When 1982 is the base year, a negative value in column 4 means equalization (denoted "E").
When 2003 is the base year, a positive value in column 4 means equalization.
When 2003 is the base year, a negative value in column 4 means divergence.
"*"indicates that effect is the same regardless of base year.
Panel D: Female-Headed Households, Base Year=2003
Effect
Panel B: Two-Parent Households, Base Year=2003
Effect
Panel C: Female-Headed Households, Base Year=1982
Effect
Table 2.6
Predicted Gender Gaps (PGG) of Girls and Boys
Panel A: Two-Parent Households, Base Year=1982
Effect
Panel A oﬀers the decomposition results for children in two-parent house-
holds when the 1982 sample is used as the base. As shown, expected attainment
when using all 1982 values is 4.74 for girls and 4.47 for boys, so the resultant
[ PGG
82
is 0.27 (see row 1, column 3). Now look at row 2, marked "Levels of
and returns to maternal education from year=2003." This row oﬀers the com-
bined eﬀect of changes in levels of maternal education and returns to maternal
61education. When using the values of maternal education and the returns to
maternal education from 2003, the expected attainment for girls and boys is
4.92 and 4.48, respectively. As such, the combined eﬀect of the change in ma-
t e r n a le d u c a t i o ni sa ni n c r e a s ei na t t a i n m ent of 0.18 (4.92-4.74) grades for girls
and 0.01 (4.48-4.47) grades for boys. This results in a new predicted gender
gap of 0.44 grades (row 2, column 3). This means that in 1982, if the level
of maternal education and the returns to maternal education were at the 2003
values, the gender gap would be 0.17 grades larger (row 2, column 4). As such,
the combined change in maternal education from 1982 to 2003 contributed to
gender divergence because the later year values yield a larger gender gap.
Turning to the row marked "Levels of and returns to paternal education
from year=2003," we see that the combined eﬀect of the change in paternal
education (row 3) is an increase in attainment of 0.24 (4.98-4.74) grades for
girls and 0.49 (4.96-4.47) grades for boys. This gives a new predicted gender
gap of 0.02 grades (row 3, column 3). This means that in 1982, if the level
of paternal education and the returns to paternal education were at the 2003
values, the gender gap would be 0.25 grades smaller (row 3, column 4). As
such, the combined change in paternal ed u c a t i o nf r o m1 9 8 2t o2 0 0 3c o n t r i b u t e d
to gender equalization because the later year values yield a smaller gender gap.
For the 2003 panels, a positive value in column 4 means that if 2003 parental
education and returns to parental education were at the 1982 levels, the gender
gap would be larger than it was in 2003. Therefore, since the predicted gap using
the later year values is smaller than when using the earlier year values, a positive
value indicates that parental education contributed to equalization over time.
When the 2003 value is negative in column 4, that means that applying 1982
parental education values to the 2003 sample shrinks the predicted gender gap.
As such, a negative value in column 4 when 2003 is the base year indicates that
62combined parameter changes in parental education contributed to divergence
because the later year predicted gender gap is larger than when using the earlier
year values.
Panel B oﬀers the decomposition results for children in two-parent house-
holds when the 2003 sample is used as the base. As shown, the results are
almost always qualitatively the same as when 1982 is the base year. Expected
attainment when using all 2003 values is 6.79 and 6.21, resulting in a gender
gap of 0.58 grades (row 1, column 3). Using the values of maternal education
and the returns to maternal education from 1982 (row 2) results in expected
mean attainment for girls and boys of 6.67 and 6.19, respectively. The new
predicted gender gap, therefore, is 0.48 grades. This means that in 2003, if the
level of maternal education and the returns to maternal education were at the
1982 values, the gender gap would be 0.10 grades smaller (row 2, column 4). As
such, the combined change in maternal education from 1982 to 2003 contributed
to gender divergence because the later year values yield a larger gender gap. In
contrast, the combined eﬀect of the change in paternal education shows that
when the 1982 values are used, the gender gap is 0.73 grades (row 3, column 3).
This gender gap is larger than when all 2003 values are used, so the combined
change in paternal education contributed to gender equalization because the
later year values yield a smaller predicted gender gap.
Panels C and D oﬀer the decomposition results for children in female-headed
households. As shown, the combined eﬀect of the change in the level of maternal
education and the returns to maternal education does not vary by base year.
More speciﬁc a l l y ,b o t hp a n e l ss h o wt h a tt h ec o m b i n e de ﬀect of the change in
maternal education in female-headed households has been equalizing. This
result is not consistent with maternal eﬀects in two-parent households.
From panels A and B, we learned that among children residing in two-parent
63households, the combined change in the level of maternal education and returns
to maternal education contributed to divergence. In contrast, the combined
maternal education eﬀects in female-headed households beneﬁted boys more so
than girls, thereby decreasing the gender gap and contributing to equalization.
This result mimics that of paternal education in two-parent households, indi-
cating that the combined eﬀect of changes in levels of and the returns to the
education of household heads, fathers in two-parent households and mothers
in female-headed households, was equalizing, but the combined eﬀect of the
change in education of the non-head, the mother in two-parent households, was
divergent.
2.6 Conclusions
Brazil has developed an educational gender gap among younger cohorts
that favors girls. Understanding the source of the gender gap and predicting
how it will change over time can provide many insights into the evolution of
gender inequality in Brazil’s stock of human capital. As such, this chapter
analyzed the inter-temporal change in the educational gender gap by household
type, focusing on the contribution of maternal and paternal education.
Between 1982 and 2003, the gender discrepancy in attainment increased in
two-parent households and decreased among children residing in female-headed
households. There is no previous research that examines how the gender gap
changed over time and why it has moved in diﬀerent directions depending upon
household type. As a result, this chapter examined how parental education
aﬀected children’s attainment and the change in the gender gap and made com-
parisons by household type. Non-linear partial decomposition analysis allowed
me to isolate the eﬀects of changes in the levels of and returns to parental
education.
64The results revealed that in 2003, maternal marginal eﬀects were stronger
(more positive) than paternal marginal eﬀects for both boys and girls. Looking
across gender of child, I found that parental education marginal eﬀects, regard-
less of household type and gender of parent, were stronger for girls than for boys
in 2003. Both of these results also held in 1982.
Turning now to the change in the gender gap, I found that the combined
change in maternal education in two-parent households between 1982 and 2003
had an increasing eﬀect on the gender gap. On the other hand, the combined
eﬀect of changes in paternal education had a decreasing eﬀect on the gender
gap between girls and boys. Looking across household type, the maternal edu-
cation eﬀects were not consistent. The combined change in maternal education
in two-parent households beneﬁted girls more so than boys, widening the di-
vide between sons and daughters. In sharp contrast, the combined change in
maternal education in female-headed households beneﬁted boys more so than
girls, decreasing the gender gap. The results, therefore, indicate that between
1982 and 2003, the combined eﬀect of changes in the education of household
heads, fathers in two-parent households and mothers in female-headed house-
holds, was equalizing, but the combined eﬀect of the change in the education of
the non-head, the mother in two-parent households, was divergent.
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68Chapter 3
Gender Diﬀerences in Brazil’s Post-Compulsory School
Attendance
3.1 Introduction
As in most of Latin America, educational outcomes of girls in Brazil are
now better than those of boys. With respect to enrollment, the gender dis-
crepancy is particularly large once children have aged beyond the compulsory
schooling age range. In Brazil, children are required to attend school between
the ages of 7 and 14. In 2003, 96% of 14-year-old girls and 95% of 14-year-old
boys were enrolled. Amongst 16-year-olds in the same year, the values were
91% and 87% respectively. Looking at 18-year-olds, the enrollment rates had
fallen to 74% for girls and 65% for boys. These values suggest that boys are
dropping out at a faster rate than girls in Brazil. Given the gender diﬀerences
in educational outcomes, it is important to examine how the determinants of
enrollment diﬀerently aﬀect boys and girls. In particular, the eﬀect of paternal
and maternal educational attainment should be closely examined.
Since females now surpass males in schooling outcomes, estimating the eﬀect
of mother’s versus father’s educational attainment on school attendance can
provide information on how Brazil’s educational system can retain students,
particularly boys. As such, this chapter attempts to answer several interesting
questions regarding the gender dimension of school attendance beyond the age of
compulsory education. How does the eﬀect of parental educational attainment
on the probability of school attendance diﬀer by gender of child? Does maternal
educational attainment have more of an eﬀect than paternal education? Do
these relationships vary by age of oﬀspring? Finally, do the maternal educational
results hold for female-headed headed households?
69In summary, I ﬁnd that the results are very sensitive to gender of child,
gender of parent, age, level of parental schooling, household type and model
speciﬁcation. There is, however, one result that is consistent across all of the
dimensions considered. The data show that in two-parent households, at high
levels of parental schooling, fathers’ education always has a stronger (more pos-
itive) eﬀect than mothers’ education on girls’ school attendance. Furthermore,
as ability bias is reduced, maternal education has a stronger (more positive) ef-
fect than paternal education on girls’ school attendance at low levels of parental
schooling.
3.2 Gender and School Attendance in Brazil
In Brazil, compulsory schooling ranges from age 7 to age 14. When a
child reaches the age of 15, he or she is no longer legally required to attend
school. Table 1 shows school attendance rates for Brazilian youths beyond the
mandatory schooling age. As shown, girls are more likely to attend school,
regardless of age and household type. Looking across household type, the table
shows that youths in female-headed households are less likely to attend school
than their two-parent counterparts.
Finally, table 3.1 illustrates that not only does school attendance decrease
with age, the gender discrepancy increases. Amongst 16-year-olds in two-parent
households, 91.8% of girls were enrolled, whereas 88.4% of boys were enrolled.
By the age of 18, the attendance gap between girls and boys had more than
doubled from 3.4 percentage points to 8.3 percentage points. Amongst youths
in female-headed households, the gap widened from 4.5 percentage points to
13.3 percentage points. These values indicate that boys are dropping out at
much faster rates than girls, particularly in female-headed households. This
gender gap exists despite the fact that the empirical evidence ﬁnds that the
70returns to education for males are higher than or approximately equal to the
returns for females at all levels of schooling (Arabsheibani, Carneiro and Henley
2003; Green, Dickerson and Arbache 2000).
The table below shows that post-compulsory attrition is a larger problem for
boys than for girls. The information provided above, however, is not conditional
upon any individual characteristics. As such, the section below describes the
strategy for estimating post-compulsory school attendance as a function of,
among other things, parental education.
Girls Boys G-B Sig. Girls Boys G-B Sig. Girls Boys G-B Sig.
91.8 88.4 3.4 *** 87.8 80.0 7.8 *** 75.5 67.2 8.3 ***
N=2476 N=2642 N=2203 N=2566 N=1889 N=2597
Girls Boys G-B Sig. Girls Boys G-B Sig. Girls Boys G-B Sig.
87.0 82.5 4.5 *** 85.5 74.9 10.6 *** 72.0 58.7 13.3 ***
N=668 N=684 N=606 N=695 N=623 N=738
Note: The columns marked "G-B" provides the Girls' rates minus the Boys' rates.  
 '***' denotes significance at the 1% level. '**' denotes significance at the 5% level. 
'*' denotes significance at the 10% level.
Table 3.1
Share of Youths Attending School by Gender, Age and Household Type
Two-Parent Households
Age=16 Age=17 Age=18
Female-Headed Households
Age=16 Age=17 Age=18
3.3 Methodology
The methodology employed in this chapter ﬁrst involves estimating school
attendance in 2003 by gender for the three ages considered, 16, 17 and 18. I
ﬁrst use a probit approach. I then utilize a change in education policy during
the parents’ generation to identify the eﬀects of parental education on children’s
enrollment. The probit model and identiﬁcation strategy are discussed more
71fully below.
3.3.1 Probit Model
I ﬁrst estimate children’s school attendance via a standard probit. A child’s
desired schooling, or the reduced form latent structure of attendance, is shown
below:
(1) School_Att
∗
Gi=CG +MGi∗πG1+M_SQGi∗πG2
+FGi∗πG3+F_SQGi∗πG4+ZGi∗δG+εGi.
where i=1 to N, G=[boy,girl] and εGi~N(0,1). In the above model, CG is the
constant, M denotes maternal education, M_SQ represents maternal education
squared, F denotes father’s education and F_SQ represents father’s education
squared. All other regressors, including child and family-speciﬁc variables, are
i n c l u d e di nZ . T h eo b s e r v e dv a r i a b l ei ss t r u c t u r e da sf o l l o w s :
School_AttGi=0 iﬀ School_Att
∗
Gi ≤ 0
School_AttGi=1 iﬀ School_Att
∗
Gi > 0.
As such, the probability of attending school is as follows:
(2) P(School_AttGi=1 )=P(School_Att
∗
Gi> 0)
= Φ(CG +MGi∗πG1+M_SQGi∗πG2+FGi∗πG3+F_SQGi∗πG4+ZGi∗δG)
where Φ is the Standard Normal CDF.
The complete list of explanatory variables considered in this chapter are
listed below:
1. Household size
2. Parental age entered linearly and quadratrically
3. Rural dummy
4. Log parental monthly earnings
5. Maternal highest grade completed entered linearly and quadratically
6. Paternal highest grade completed entered linearly and quadratically.
72Family composition can play an important role in children’s educational out-
comes. Household size should have a negative eﬀect because more individuals
within the household generally means that each individual child has less access
to parental resources, such assistance on school work. The scarce resources can
make attending school more diﬃcult, giving rise to attrition.
I enter parental age linearly and quadratically so as not to restrict the
marginal eﬀect to be constant over the entire range of parents’ age. The
quadratic speciﬁcation allows for the relationship between parental age and chil-
dren’s school attendance to be concave if there are diminishing marginal returns
to parental age or convex if there are increasing returns. Regardless of convexity
or concavity, the variables should have positive marginal eﬀects throughout the
r a n g eo fp a r e n t a la g eb e c a u s eo l d e rp a r e n t sh a v em o r e" p a r e n t i n ge x p e r i e n c e . "
School infrastructure and quality can have large eﬀects on children’s aca-
demic achievement. Commonly used measures of infrastructure and quality in
the development literature are number of desks per classroom, the presence of a
library and average years of teachers’ experience (Lavy 1996). Unfortunately,
the available data do not provide community or school level variables that re-
ﬂect school quality. As such, I include a "rural" dummy to proxy for school
quality. Residing in a rural area should have a negative eﬀect on attainment
because school infrastructure in rural areas is relatively poor. Given the lower
quality of education in such areas, I would expect to ﬁnd that living in a rural
area has a negative eﬀect on the probability of attending school. In addition, I
include state dummies that can absorb the eﬀect of regional diﬀerences in school
quality.
In the presence of credit constraints, poorer families are less able to pay for
the direct costs of education, such as books and transportation. Poorer families
are also more likely to send children into the work force to supplement family
73income. As mentioned above, when a child works, he or she has less time to
devote to school work, frequently resulting in attrition. These factors indicate
that log parental earnings should have a positive eﬀect on attendance.
Finally, the parental education variables are entered both linearly and quadrat-
ically. As in the case of parental age, this speciﬁcation allows for more ﬂexibility
because it does not restrict the marginal eﬀects to be constant over the entire
range of parents’ education. Rather, the quadratic speciﬁcation allows for the
relationship between parental education and children’s attendance to be con-
cave if there are diminishing marginal returns to parental schooling or convex
if there are increasing returns. In either case, parental education should have a
positive eﬀect over the entire range of parental schooling because parents with
more schooling may have a stronger preference for education, so they are more
likely to encourage their children to focus on school.15
There are also a number of factors that aﬀect attendance that I am not able
to control for due to data limitations. For example, the empirical literature in
the developing world indicates that children’s enrollment is, other things equal,
negatively aﬀected by schooling costs (Lavy 1996; Deolalikar 1993). Schooling
costs can be direct, such as enrollment fees, books, uniforms and transportation
fees, or indirect, such as distance to school and the cost of time from travelling.
The PNAD, however, does not contain any of these variables. As a result, I
am not able to control for the costs of schooling.
In developing countries, older children, usually girls, are often responsible
for home production and care of younger siblings. These duties leave less time
for school work, resulting in lower educational performance and attrition (Lavy
15Parental education can also aﬀect children’s attendance indirectly through
parental parental earnings, which are a function of parental education. For the
purposes of this paper, however, I am interested only in the direct eﬀect of parental
education.
741996; Parish and Willis 1998). Furthermore, later-born children tend to have
better schooling outcomes relative to their older siblings because the older sib-
lings may have left home, leaving more family resources at their disposal (Parish
and Willis 1998).
The number of siblings and birth order reﬂect parents’ fertility decisions.
The empirical literature suggests that high-fertility households are character-
ized by "quantity versus quality". That is, parents with many children devote
fewer resources to the education of each child (Becker and Lewis 1973). Highly
educated parents tend to have fewer children. This suggests that the number
of siblings and birth order may be endogenous because they are simultaneously
determined with children’s schooling outcomes as functions of parental school-
ing.
To test the endogeneity of fertility-related variables, the model speciﬁcation
discussed above was estimated with and without sibling and birth order infor-
mation. The results showed that without sibling and birth order variables,
the parental education coeﬃcient estimates and marginal eﬀects were larger.
This indicates that the sibling and birth order variables, in part, reﬂect parents’
schooling. Without the proper instruments for fertility decisions, the results
that follow do not include these variables. While there may, as a result, be
a no m i t t e dv a r i a b l eb i a s ,t h ee x c l u s i o no ft h ee n d o g e n o u sv a r i a b l e si sp r e f e r a b l e
because they absorb some the eﬀect of parental schooling, the primary variables
of interest in this chapter.
3.3.2 Identiﬁcation Strategy
The section above describes a standard probit approach for determining
the relationship between parents’ schooling and children’s attendance. The
estimates of this relationship, however, may be biased if parental education is
75correlated with the error term (εGi) in equation 1. Suppose school attendance
is also a function of ability that is inherited from one’s parents. This ability
is unobservable, but it is positively correlated with parents’ abilities, which
are also unobservable. Given the fact that unobserved ability is positively
correlated with school attendance, estimates of the eﬀect of parental education
on children’s school attendance will be biased upwards because the obtained
coeﬃcients will, in part, reﬂect the intergenerational transmission of ability.
Identifying the causal relationship between parental education and children’s
schooling outcomes is particularly diﬃcult in the case of Brazil due to the lack
of available instruments. When addressed, one common methodology is to
employ sibling eﬀects (Lillard and Willis 1994; Parish and Willis 1998). The
problem with this method is that one must assume that any inherited ability is
the same across siblings. In addition, given that this chapter focuses on gender
diﬀerences amongst 16 to 18-year-olds, the use of sibling eﬀects would require
that I limit my sample to households that have at least one son and one daughter
in the relevant age range. This type of analysis would eliminate low fertility
households as well households that do not have both sons and daughter in the 16
to 18-year-old age bracket. These extreme limitations will undoubtedly result
in biased estimates, so this method is not attractive.
A second potential methodology is to instrument parental education with
grand-parents’ education (Lillard and Willis 1994; Barros and Lam 1996). The
1982, 1988 and 1996 waves of the PNAD include retrospective questions that
ask household heads and their spouses (the parents of the children considered in
this chapter) about their parents’ (the grand-parents of the children considered
in this chapter) schooling background. Since this information is only available
in three waves of the data, as well as the fact that the questions are not in-
cluded in a more recent survey, using grand-parents schooling severely restricts
76which years of data researchers can use. More speciﬁcally, one must use data
from a decade ago, thereby sacriﬁcing more contemporary results and policy
implications.
An arguably better alternative is to exploit the 1971 change in Brazil’s mini-
mum school leaving age (Machado 2005). Prior to the policy change, schooling
had been required for children between the ages of 7 and 10, inclusive. In 1971,
the compulsory schooling age range changed to include all children aged 7 to 14.
Table 3.2 oﬀers the share of respondents who had completed at least 8 grades
amongst adults who were of school age around the time of the policy change.
The table focuses on 8 completed grades because that is the number of grades
one would have completed if he or she attended school from the age of 7 to 14
without grade repetition or interruptions.
Adults born from 1954 to 1956 were already 15 at the time of the policy
change, so they were completely unaﬀected by the new law. Adults born from
1962 to 1964, however, were required to abide by the policy change. The table
shows that 45.0% of adults who were born early enough to be unaﬀected by
the policy change had completed at least 8 grades. Amongst adults who were
aﬀected in the immediate aftermath of the change, 51.9% had completed at
least 8 grades, resulting in an increase of almost 7 percentage points. This
diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. As such, the data indicate
that the 1971 policy change was an exogenous shock that positively aﬀected the
attainment of adults in the parents’ generation.
77Birth Year Age in 1971 Age in 2003 % 8+ N
1954 17 49 44.4 3776
1955 16 48 44.8 3809
1956 15 47 45.7 3929
Average 45.0 11514
1962 9 41 51.1 4866
1963 8 40 51.2 5253
1964 7 39 53.3 5209
Average 51.9 15328
Table 3.2
Share of Adults with 8+ Completed Grades
Note: The mininum school leaving age was increased from 11 to 15 in 1971.
Given the change in the minimum school leaving age, I can instrument for
parental education with the policy treatment. As I will show, treatment fulﬁlls
the necessary criteria of being a valid instrument because the policy change
provides an exogenous shock that aﬀects parental schooling but does not directly
aﬀect children’s attendance decisions. Recall the reduced form latent structure
of school attendance:
(1) School_Att
∗
Gi=CG +MGi∗πG1+M_SQGi∗πG2
+FGi∗πG3+F_SQGi∗πG4+ZGi∗δG+εGi.
As discussed above, school attendance may also be a function of inherita-
ble ability. This ability is unobservable, so it is contained within εGi.S i n c e
parental schooling is also a function of inheritable ability, corr(MGi,εGi)6=0a n d
corr(FGi,εGi)6=0. To isolate the eﬀect of parental schooling that is not related
to ability, I can ﬁrst estimate, via OLS, the following parental attainment equa-
tions:
(3) MGi=αM
G0+αM
G1 ∗ (TreatedM
Gi)+αM
G2 ∗ (AgeM
Gi)
+αM
G3 ∗ (InterM
Gi)+αM
G4 ∗ XM
Gi + υ
M
Gi
(4) FGi= αF
G0+αF
G1 ∗ (Treated F
Gi)+αF
G2 ∗ (AgeF
Gi)
+αF
G3 ∗ (InterF
Gi)+αF
G4 ∗ XF
Gi + υ
F
Gi.
Each parental education equation is a function of a constant (α0), a treat-
78ment dummy (Treated), age and an interaction term between age and treatment
(Inter) to allow for the possibility that the eﬀect of the policy may diﬀer for
younger cohorts. In addition, there is a vector of personal characteristics (X)
that includes race (dummies for being black or of mixed race) and parental birth
state dummies to account for regional diﬀerences.
Once again, ability is unobservable, so it is captured in υM
Gi and υF
Gi.S i n c e
ability is hereditary, that means corr(υM
Gi,εGi)6=0 and corr(υF
Gi,εGi)6=0. Using
the coeﬃcient estimates from equations (3) and (4), the predicted values (de-
noted by the hat symbols) of mother’s and father’s education can be expressed
as follows:
(5) c MGi=b α
M
G0+b α
M
G1 ∗ (TreatedM
Gi)+b α
M
G2 ∗ (AgeM
Gi)
+b α
M
G3 ∗ (InterM
Gi)+b α
M
G4 ∗ XM
Gi
(6) b FGi=b α
F
G0+b α
F
G1 ∗ (TreatedF
Gi)+b α
F
G2 ∗ (AgeF
Gi)+
b α
F
G3 ∗ (InterF
Gi)+b α
F
G4 ∗ XF
Gi.
As shown, equations (5) and (6) do not contain the unobserved inheritable
ability component because it is absorbed by the error terms υM
Gi and υF
Gi.A s
a result, the predicted parental education values are not correlated with εGi in
(1), and, therefore, corr(c MGi,εGi)=0a n dc o r r ( b FGi,εGi)=0. As such, I can use
the predicted values of parental education in my probit equation to eliminate
the eﬀect of inheritable ability bias. As such, the second stage of my estimation
strategy involves estimating the initial probit equation with the predicted rather
than reported values of parental education:
(7) School_Att
∗
Gi=CG+c MGi∗πG1+ \ M_SQGi∗πG2
+b FGi∗πG3+ \ F_SQGi∗πG4+ZGi∗δG+εGi.
While this method is in many ways favorable to previous attempts to control
for ability, it does have its drawbacks. For example, the increase in the mini-
mum school leaving age only aﬀected parents who would have left school before
the age of 15 prior to the new policy. These parents are, arguably, low ability
79parents. Parents who would have continued attending school until the age of
15 regardless of the change in policy are most likely high ability parents. As a
result, this instrumental variable method does not identify the eﬀect of parental
education for high ability parents. While this limitation is not trivial, instru-
menting parental schooling with the change in the minimum schooling age is far
less restrictive than using sibling eﬀects or instrumenting with grand-parents’
schooling.
3.4 Results
The summary statistics for the variables discussed above are in tables 3.3A,
3.3B, 3.3C for two-parent households and 3.4A, 3.4B and 3.4C for female-headed
households.16 The tables show the means and standard deviations of individual
and household characteristics for the full samples and by in-school status of
child. The primary factors to note are the diﬀerences between the characteristics
of children who are in school versus those who are not. As one would expect,
parental education is much higher for kids who are currently enrolled. Also,
children who are not in school have bigger family sizes. Finally, children who
are not in school reside in households with lower (log) parents’ earnings.
16The sample used in Table 3.1 included children with missing information on
parental education and household/individual characteristics. The sample employed
in the econometric analysis eliminates such observations. The sample sizes reported
in the tables 3.3A, 3.3B, 3.3C, 3.4A, 3.4B, and 3.4C reﬂect the number of observations
used in the regressions that follow.
80Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
In School 0.87 0.33 0.81 0.39
Age 16.67 0.93 16.73 0.92
Mother's Ed. 6.81 4.27 6.63 4.25
Mother's Ed.^2 64.57 67.66 61.95 66.45
Father's Ed. 6.57 4.41 6.25 4.32
Father's Ed^2 62.52 69.92 57.70 67.31
Mother's Age 42.60 6.35 42.68 6.56
Mother's Age^2 1854.8 568.3 1864.8 591.8
Father's Age 46.26 8.02 46.43 7.85
Father's Age^2 2204.1 792.4 2217.4 772.4
Family Size 4.81 1.43 4.85 1.47
Black 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21
Mixed Race 0.37 0.48 0.41 0.49
Log Par. Earn. 6.01 2.15 6.00 2.07
Rural 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.37
Instruments
Mother's Age 42.60 6.35 42.68 6.56
Mother Treated 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.50
Mother Black 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.23
Mother Mixed 0.38 0.49 0.39 0.49
Father's Age 46.26 8.02 46.43 7.85
Father Treated 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43
Father Black 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25
Father Mixed 0.39 0.49 0.40 0.49
N
Note: "Instruments" refers to the variables used in the first 
stage OLS regressions of Maternal and Paternal Education.
the Dummies for birth state and an interaction between age and
"treated" dummy are also included in the first stage regressions.
Table 3.3A
Summary Statistics
Two-Parent Households
Boys Girls
All
5601 6458
All
81Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
In School 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Age 16.59 0.91 17.17 0.89
Mother's Ed. 7.03 4.29 5.29 3.79
Mother's Ed.^2 67.82 68.89 42.36 53.58
Father's Ed. 6.80 4.44 4.98 3.86
Father's Ed^2 65.87 71.44 39.64 53.11
Mother's Age 42.54 6.33 42.97 6.48
Mother's Age^2 1849.9 567.3 1888.7 574.0
Father's Age 46.16 7.88 46.93 8.88
Father's Age^2 2192.8 778.6 2281.2 877.5
Family Size 4.77 1.38 5.12 1.69
Black 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19
Mixed Race 0.37 0.48 0.39 0.49
Log Par. Earn. 6.06 2.16 5.66 2.06
Rural 0.13 0.34 0.19 0.40
Instruments
Mother's Age 42.54 6.33 42.97 6.48
Mother Treated 0.47 0.50 0.41 0.49
Mother Black 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22
Mother Mixed 0.38 0.49 0.40 0.49
Father's Age 46.16 7.88 46.93 8.88
Father Treated 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42
Father Black 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26
Father Mixed 0.38 0.49 0.42 0.49
N
Note: "Instruments" refers to the variables used in the first 
stage OLS regressions of Maternal and Paternal Education.
the Dummies for birth state and an interaction between age and
"treated" dummy are also included in the first stage regressions.
In School
4939 662
Not In School
Table 3.3B
Summary Statistics
Two-Parent Households
Girls
82Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
In School 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Age 16.64 0.91 17.11 0.88
Mother's Ed. 7.05 4.28 4.78 3.52
Mother's Ed.^2 68.05 68.61 35.15 47.49
Father's Ed. 6.63 4.41 4.58 3.43
Father's Ed^2 63.37 70.56 32.78 42.49
Mother's Age 42.67 6.46 42.75 6.98
Mother's Age^2 1862.2 584.4 1876.2 623.5
Father's Age 46.39 7.70 46.60 8.48
Father's Age^2 2211.5 755.7 2243.2 842.0
Family Size 4.77 1.38 5.16 1.77
Black 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21
Mixed Race 0.40 0.49 0.45 0.50
Log Par. Earn. 6.10 2.06 5.55 2.07
Rural 0.14 0.35 0.26 0.44
Instruments
Mother's Age 42.67 6.46 42.75 6.98
Mother Treated 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.50
Mother Black 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.24
Mother Mixed 0.38 0.48 0.45 0.50
Father's Age 46.39 7.70 46.60 8.48
Father Treated 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.43
Father Black 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.25
Father Mixed 0.39 0.49 0.47 0.50
N
Note: "Instruments" refers to the variables used in the first 
stage OLS regressions of Maternal and Paternal Education.
the Dummies for birth state and an interaction between age and
"treated" dummy are also included in the first stage regressions.
5302 1156
In School Not In School
Table 3.3C
Summary Statistics
Two-Parent Households
Boys
83Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
In School 0.82 0.38 0.74 0.44
Age 16.73 0.93 16.77 0.93
Mother's Ed. 6.73 4.39 6.42 4.30
Mother's Ed.^2 64.51 68.87 59.66 66.47
Father's Ed. -- --
Father's Ed^2 -- --
Mother's Age 44.11 7.35 44.11 7.17
Mother's Age^2 1999.8 705.5 1997.5 674.6
Father's Age -- --
Father's Age^2 -- --
Family Size 3.55 1.37 3.59 1.39
Black 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26
Mixed Race 0.40 0.49 0.46 0.50
Log Par. Earn. 4.04 2.84 3.81 2.85
Rural 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28
Instruments
Mother's Age 44.11 7.35 44.11 7.17
Mother Treated 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.48
Mother Black 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29
Mother Mixed 0.38 0.49 0.44 0.50
Father's Age -- --
Father Treated -- --
Father Black -- --
Father Mixed -- --
N
Note: "Instruments" refers to the variables used in the first 
stage OLS regressions of Maternal and Paternal Education.
the Dummies for birth state and an interaction between age and
"treated" dummy are also included in the first stage regressions.
Table 3.4A
Summary Statistics
Female-Headed Households
Girls Boys
All
1736 1903
All
84Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
In School 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Age 16.66 0.90 17.05 0.98
Mother's Ed. 6.99 4.44 5.46 3.93
Mother's Ed.^2 68.61 70.44 45.23 57.29
Father's Ed. -- --
Father's Ed^2 -- --
Mother's Age 44.15 7.32 43.91 7.50
Mother's Age^2 2003.1 695.7 1984.1 751.3
Father's Age -- --
Father's Age^2 -- --
Family Size 3.55 1.36 3.54 1.39
Black 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24
Mixed Race 0.41 0.49 0.40 0.49
Log Par. Earn. 4.10 2.85 3.73 2.77
Rural 0.07 0.25 0.11 0.31
Instruments
Mother's Age 44.15 7.32 43.91 7.50
Mother Treated 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.49
Mother Black 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26
Mother Mixed 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.49
Father's Age -- --
Father Treated -- --
Father Black -- --
Father Mixed -- --
N
Note: "Instruments" refers to the variables used in the first 
stage OLS regressions of Maternal and Paternal Education.
the Dummies for birth state and an interaction between age and
"treated" dummy are also included in the first stage regressions.
In School
1451 285
Not In School
Table 3.4B
Summary Statistics
Female-Headed Households
Girls
85Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
In School 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Age 16.65 0.92 17.09 0.88
Mother's Ed. 7.05 4.39 4.64 3.48
Mother's Ed.^2 68.93 70.34 33.63 44.95
Father's Ed. -- --
Father's Ed^2 -- --
Mother's Age 43.93 6.95 44.65 7.73
Mother's Age^2 1977.7 647.7 2052.8 742.6
Father's Age -- --
Father's Age^2 -- --
Family Size 3.48 1.29 3.87 1.58
Black 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.32
Mixed Race 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.50
Log Par. Earn. 4.04 2.84 3.15 2.78
Rural 0.07 0.26 0.13 0.34
Instruments
Mother's Age 43.93 6.95 44.65 7.73
Mother Treated 0.38 0.49 0.37 0.48
Mother Black 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.33
Mother Mixed 0.42 0.49 0.50 0.50
Father's Age -- --
Father Treated -- --
Father Black -- --
Father Mixed -- --
N
Note: "Instruments" refers to the variables used in the first 
stage OLS regressions of Maternal and Paternal Education.
the Dummies for birth state and an interaction between age and
"treated" dummy are also included in the first stage regressions.
1410 493
In School Not In School
Table 3.4C
Summary Statistics
Female-Headed Households
Boys
863.4.1 Base Probit Results
As discussed above, the causal relationship between parental and children’s
educational outcomes is diﬃcult to determine because of ability bias. A stan-
dard probit does not control for this ability bias, so coeﬃcient estimates of
parental education on children’s school attendance will be biased upwards be-
cause they will, in part, reﬂect the intergenerational transmission of ability.
Despite this ﬂaw, I ﬁr s tp r e s e n tt h eb a s ep r o b i tr e s u l t sf o rt h es a k eo fc o m p l e t e -
ness. The preferred IV model will be presented thereafter.
Tables 3.5A and 3.5B provide the base probit coeﬃcients and average marginal
eﬀects, respectively, for girls and boys in two-parent households. As shown,
no one variable is statistically signiﬁcant for all groups, so there are no clear
patterns by gender or age. In contrast, the results for children in female-headed
households (tables 3.5C and 3.5D) shows (log) parental earnings has a positive
and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of 17 and 18-year-old boys
attending school. This ﬁnding is consistent with the fact that boys, partic-
ularly in female-headed households, are more responsible for contributing to
family income than girls. As such, their attendance decisions are more sensi-
tive to household income levels.
87Girls Boys
Maternal Ed. 0.043 0.049 0.011 0.069 0.015 0.067
[0.79] [1.03] [0.26] [1.88]* [0.38] [2.18]**
Maternal Ed. ^2 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.002
[0.74] [0.41] [0.94] [0.08] [0.02] [0.99]
Paternal Ed. 0.059 -0.027 0.095 0.051 0.025 -0.036
[1.14] [0.69] [2.46]** [1.47] [0.69] [1.23]
Paternal Ed. ^2 0.002 0.005 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.005
[0.51] [1.58] [1.28] [0.10] [0.26] [2.58]***
Maternal Age -0.114 0.077 -0.119 0.037 0.036 0.016
[1.49] [2.07]** [1.75]* [0.71] [0.54] [0.30]
Maternal Age ^2 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
[1.35] [2.06]** [1.56] [0.41] [0.18] [0.18]
Paternal Age 0.081 0.025 0.079 0.057 -0.035 0.051
[2.24]** [0.76] [2.08]** [1.69]* [0.96] [1.58]
Paternal Age ^2 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
[1.46] [0.64] [2.04]** [1.67]* [0.56] [1.39]
Household Size -0.067 -0.077 -0.090 -0.065 -0.031 -0.038
[1.95]* [2.79]*** [2.88]*** [2.38]** [1.04] [1.61]
Black 0.078 -0.108 0.379 -0.011 0.023 0.216
[0.29] [0.53] [1.48] [0.06] [0.12] [1.35]
Mixed Race 0.200 -0.030 -0.046 0.040 -0.038 -0.027
[1.79]* [0.29] [0.45] [0.43] [0.39] [0.34]
Log Parental Earnings 0.052 -0.001 -0.003 0.056 -0.001 0.024
[1.94]* [0.03] [0.12] [2.79]*** [0.05] [1.34]
Rural -0.169 -0.161 -0.008 -0.307 0.106 -0.097
[1.29] [1.46] [0.07] [3.02]*** [0.86] [1.04]
Constant -0.197 -0.496 2.121 -1.914 1.243 -0.706
[0.11] [0.46] [1.26] [1.39] [0.79] [0.54]
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1968 2176 1873 2100 1606 2112
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Boys
Age=16 Age=17
Robust z statistics in brackets
Girls Boys Girls
Dependent Variable = In School
Coefficients from Base Probit, Two-Parent Households
Table 3.5A
Age=18
88Variable M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig.
Mother's Ed. 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.015 * 0.004 0.021 **
Moth. Ed.^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
Father's Ed. 0.006 -0.004 0.015 ** 0.011 0.007 -0.011
Fath. Ed^2 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002
Mother's Age -0.012 0.012 ** -0.019 * 0.008 0.010 0.005
Moth. Age^2 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Father's Age 0.008 ** 0.004 0.013 ** 0.012 * -0.010 0.016
Fath. Age^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 **
Family Size -0.007 * -0.012 *** -0.015 *** -0.014 ** -0.009 -0.012
Black 0.008 -0.018 0.050 * -0.002 0.006 0.064
Mixed Race 0.021 * -0.005 -0.007 0.009 -0.011 -0.008
Log Par. Earn. 0.005 * 0.000 0.000 0.012 *** 0.000 0.007
Rural -0.019 -0.027 -0.001 -0.072 *** 0.029 -0.031
State dummies Y e sY e s Y e sY e s Y e sY e s
Observations 1968 2176 1873 2100 1606 2112
Note: '***' denotes significance at the 1% level. '**' denotes significance at the 5% level.  
'*' denotes significance at the 10% level.
Age=18
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Age=16 Age=17
Girls Boys
Table 3.5B
Average Marginal Effects from Base Probit Model
Dependent Variable = In School
Two-Parent Households
89Girls Boys
Maternal Ed. 0.130 0.030 0.034 -0.010 0.000 0.072
[1.98]** [0.48] [0.52] [0.18] [0.00] [1.24]
Maternal Ed. ^2 -0.002 0.004 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.001
[0.31] [1.01] [0.05] [1.69]* [0.94] [0.19]
Paternal Ed. -- -- --
-- -- --
Paternal Ed. ^2 -- -- --
-- -- --
Maternal Age 0.079 0.050 0.064 0.154 0.014 0.030
[1.33] [0.63] [0.75] [2.14]** [0.21] [0.39]
Maternal Age ^2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000
[1.14] [0.76] [0.58] [1.95]* [0.10] [0.29]
Paternal Age -- -- --
-- -- --
Paternal Age ^2 -- -- --
-- -- --
Household Size -0.057 -0.104 -0.036 -0.044 0.181 -0.040
[0.94] [2.00]** [0.65] [0.92] [3.22]*** [0.88]
Black 0.089 -0.389 0.220 -0.179 -0.259 -0.272
[0.30] [1.47] [0.70] [0.71] [0.83] [1.07]
Mixed Race -0.188 0.034 0.156 0.081 0.211 -0.077
[1.00] [0.19] [0.88] [0.50] [1.32] [0.57]
Log Parental Earnings 0.005 -0.023 0.013 0.070 0.013 0.038
[0.15] [0.76] [0.48] [2.79]*** [0.52] [1.66]*
Rural 0.549 -0.249 -0.162 -0.550 -1.119 0.033
[1.88]* [0.90] [0.59] [2.45]** [4.24]*** [0.16]
Constant -2.019 -0.915 -1.306 -3.862 -2.608 -0.958
[1.29] [0.46] [0.60] [2.06]** [1.39] [0.51]
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 560 597 511 617 544 647
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Robust z statistics in brackets
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Age=16 Age=17
Table 3.5C
Coefficients from Base Probit, Female-Headed Households
Dependent Variable = In School
Age=18
90Variable M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig.
Mother's Ed. 0.022 ** 0.006 0.007 -0.003 0.000 0.024
Moth. Ed.^2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 * 0.001 0.000
Father's Ed. -- -- --
Fath. Ed^2 -- -- --
Mother's Age 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.042 ** 0.004 0.010
Moth. Age^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 0.000
Father's Age -- -- --
Fath. Age^2 -- -- --
Family Size -0.010 -0.023 ** -0.007 -0.012 0.052 *** -0.013
Black 0.014 -0.096 0.041 -0.051 -0.080 -0.093
Mixed Race -0.032 0.007 0.032 0.022 0.061 -0.026
Log Par. Earn. 0.001 -0.005 0.003 0.019 *** 0.004 0.013 *
Rural 0.072 ** -0.059 -0.036 -0.168 ** -0.374 *** 0.011
State dummies Y e sY e s Y e sY e s Y e sY e s
Observations 560 597 511 617 544 647
Note: '***' denotes significance at the 1% level. '**' denotes significance at the 5% level.  
'*' denotes significance at the 10% level.
Age=16 Age=17 Age=18
Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys
Table 3.5D
Average Marginal Effects from Base Probit Model
Dependent Variable = In School
Female-Headed Households
Turning now to the tests of diﬀerences across gender, table 3.6A shows the
Wald test results of diﬀerences in maternal and paternal coeﬃcients by gender of
child, and table 3.6B oﬀers the results by gender of parent. Given the quadratic
nature of parental education in the speciﬁcation, the tables oﬀer the total eﬀect
of increasing parental education by one grade on children’s attainment. The
values are sensitive to where the total eﬀects are evaluated. As such, the tables
show the total eﬀects at parental education valued at zero, 4, 8 and the pooled
mean (denoted ’PM’). The tables show that there are almost no statistically
signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences in coeﬃcient total eﬀects.
91TE, G Sig. TE, B Sig. G-B Sig. TE, G Sig. TE, B Sig. G-B Sig.
Age=16
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.043 0.049 -0.007 0.130 ** 0.030 0.101
Ed.=4 0.067 ** 0.062 *** 0.005 0.118 *** 0.065 ** 0.053
Ed.=8 0.091 *** 0.075 *** 0.016 0.106 *** 0.100 *** 0.006
Ed.=PM 0.081 *** 0.069 *** 0.012 0.110 *** 0.087 *** 0.023
Fathers
Ed.=0 0.059 -0.027 0.086 ---
Ed.=4 0.075 *** 0.009 0.066 ** ---
Ed.=8 0.092 *** 0.045 ** 0.047 ---
Ed.=PM 0.086 *** 0.029 * 0.057 ** ---
Age=17
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.011 0.069 * -0.058 0.034 -0.010 0.045
Ed.=4 0.034 0.067 *** -0.033 0.036 0.046 -0.010
Ed.=8 0.058 *** 0.066 *** -0.008 0.038 * 0.102 *** -0.064 **
Ed.=PM 0.048 *** 0.067 *** -0.018 0.037 0.081 *** -0.045
Fathers
Ed.=0 0.095 ** 0.051 0.044 ---
Ed.=4 0.069 *** 0.054 *** 0.015 ---
Ed.=8 0.042 ** 0.056 *** -0.014 ---
Ed.=PM 0.052 *** 0.055 *** -0.003 ---
Age=18
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.015 0.067 ** -0.052 0.000 0.072 -0.072
Ed.=4 0.014 0.051 *** -0.037 0.032 0.078 *** -0.047
Ed.=8 0.013 0.035 *** -0.022 0.063 *** 0.085 *** -0.022
Ed.=PM 0.014 0.042 *** -0.029 0.051 *** 0.082 *** -0.031
Fathers
Ed.=0 0.025 -0.036 0.061 ---
Ed.=4 0.030 0.004 0.026 ---
Ed.=8 0.035 ** 0.044 *** -0.010 ---
Ed.=PM 0.033 ** 0.026 ** 0.006 ---
Note: 'TE' denotes total effect.
           '**' denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
           '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
           'G' denotes girls, 'B' denotes boys and 'PM' denotes pooled mean.
           'G-B Sig.' indicates whether or not the gender difference is statistically significant.
           '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Two-Parent Households Female-Headed Households
Table 3.6A
Wald Test Results of Coefficient Total Effects
Dependent Variable = In School
Differences in Parental Effects by Gender of Child
92TE, M Sig. TE, F Sig. M-F Sig. TE, M Sig. TE, F Sig. M-F Sig.
Age=16
PED=0
Girls 0.043 0.059 -0.016 ---
Boys 0.049 -0.027 0.076 ---
PED=4
Girls 0.067 ** 0.075 *** -0.009 ---
Boys 0.062 *** 0.009 0.053 ---
PED=8
Girls 0.091 *** 0.092 *** -0.002 ---
Boys 0.075 *** 0.045 ** 0.030 ---
Age=17
PED=0
Girls 0.011 0.095 ** -0.084 ---
Boys 0.069 * 0.051 *** 0.018 ---
PED=4
Girls 0.034 0.069 *** -0.034 ---
Boys 0.067 *** 0.054 *** 0.014 ---
PED=8
Girls 0.058 *** 0.042 ** 0.015 ---
Boys 0.066 *** 0.056 *** 0.010 ---
Age=18
PED=0
Girls 0.015 0.025 -0.010 ---
Boys 0.067 ** -0.036 0.103 ** ---
PED=4
Girls 0.014 0.030 -0.016 ---
Boys 0.051 *** 0.004 0.047 * ---
PED=8
Girls 0.013 0.035 ** -0.021 ---
Boys 0.035 *** 0.044 *** -0.009 ---
Note: 'TE' denotes total effect.
           '**' denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
           '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
           'M' denotes mothers, 'F' denotes fathers and 'PM' denotes pooled mean.
           'M-F Sig.' indicates whether or not the gender difference is statistically significant.
Differences in Parental Effects by Gender of Parent
Two-Parent Households Female-Headed Households
Table 3.6B
Wald Test Results of Coefficient Total Effects
Dependent Variable = In School
           '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
93For the purposes of this chapter, however, marginal eﬀects are more infor-
m a t i v eb e c a u s et h e yt a k ei n t oc o n s i d e r a t i o nt h ef a c tt h a tt h eo u t c o m ev a r i a b l e
ranges from zero to one. As such, tables 3.7A and 3.7B oﬀer the average
marginal eﬀects by gender of child and gender of parent. Once again, given the
quadratic nature of parental education in the speciﬁcation, the tables oﬀer the
average marginal eﬀect of increasing parental education by one grade on chil-
dren’s attainment. The values are sensitive to where the marginal eﬀects are
evaluated. As such, the tables show the marginal eﬀects at parental education
valued at zero, 4, 8 and the year-speciﬁcp o o l e dm e a n . 17
Looking at parental eﬀects by gender of child (3.7A), maternal eﬀects for
16-year-olds in two-parent households are almost always stronger for girls than
for boys. For 17 and 18-year-olds, however, maternal eﬀects are stronger for
boys. Paternal eﬀects for 16-year-olds, like maternal eﬀects, are stronger for
girls than for boys. Looking at 17 and 18-year-olds, however, shows that at
lower levels of father’s education, paternal eﬀects are stronger for girls but at
higher levels of father’s education, paternal eﬀects are stronger for boys.
17Recall that the probability of attending school is calculated as follows:
(2) P(School_AttGi=1 )=P(School_Att
∗
Gi> 0)
= Φ(CG+MGi∗πG1+M_SQGi∗πG2+FGi∗πG3+F_SQGi∗πG4+ZGi∗δG)
Since parental education are quadratic variables, the average marginal eﬀects of
increasing mother’s education (AMEM) and father’s education (AMEF) by one year
are the average derivative of (2) with respect to maternal education and paternal
education, respectively. The average marginal eﬀects are calculated as follows:
AMEM= 1
Ng
Ng P
i=1
φ(CG+MGi∗πG1+M_SQGi∗πG2+FGi∗πG3+F _SQGi∗πG4+ZGi∗δG)
∗(πG1+2∗MGi∗πG2)
AMEF= 1
Ng
Ng P
i=1
φ(CG+MGi∗πG1+M_SQGi∗πG2+FGi∗πG3+F _SQGi∗πG4+ZGi∗δG)
∗(πG3+2∗FGi∗πG3).
94ME, G Sig. ME, B Sig. G-B Sig. ME, G Sig. ME, B Sig. G-B Sig.
Age=16
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.011 *** 0.014 *** -0.002 *** 0.041 *** 0.009 *** 0.032 ***
Ed.=4 0.017 *** 0.017 *** 0.001 *** 0.033 *** 0.019 *** 0.014 ***
Ed.=8 0.023 *** 0.019 *** 0.004 *** 0.028 *** 0.028 *** 0.000 ***
Ed.=PM 0.021 *** 0.018 *** 0.002 *** 0.030 *** 0.025 *** 0.005 ***
Fathers
Ed.=0 0.016 *** -0.007 *** 0.023 *** ---
Ed.=4 0.020 *** 0.002 *** 0.017 *** ---
Ed.=8 0.023 *** 0.012 *** 0.011 *** ---
Ed.=PM 0.022 *** 0.008 *** 0.014 *** ---
Age=17
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.003 *** 0.021 *** -0.018 *** 0.010 *** -0.003 *** 0.013 ***
Ed.=4 0.009 *** 0.019 *** -0.010 *** 0.010 *** 0.014 *** -0.004 ***
Ed.=8 0.015 *** 0.018 *** -0.003 *** 0.010 *** 0.030 *** -0.019 ***
Ed.=PM 0.013 *** 0.018 *** -0.005 *** 0.010 *** 0.025 *** -0.015 ***
Fathers
Ed.=0 0.027 *** 0.015 *** 0.012 *** ---
Ed.=4 0.018 *** 0.015 *** 0.003 *** ---
Ed.=8 0.011 *** 0.015 *** -0.004 *** ---
Ed.=PM 0.014 *** 0.015 *** -0.001 *** ---
Age=18
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.005 *** 0.022 *** -0.018 *** 0.000 *** 0.026 *** -0.026 ***
Ed.=4 0.004 *** 0.016 *** -0.012 *** 0.010 *** 0.027 *** -0.017 ***
Ed.=8 0.004 *** 0.011 *** -0.007 *** 0.019 *** 0.027 *** -0.008 ***
Ed.=PM 0.004 *** 0.013 *** -0.009 *** 0.016 *** 0.027 *** -0.011 ***
Fathers
Ed.=0 0.008 *** -0.011 *** 0.019 *** ---
Ed.=4 0.009 *** 0.001 *** 0.008 *** ---
Ed.=8 0.010 *** 0.014 *** -0.004 *** ---
Ed.=PM 0.010 *** 0.009 *** 0.001 *** ---
Note: 'ME' denotes total effect.
           '**' denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
           '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
           'G' denotes girls, 'B' denotes boys and 'PM' denotes pooled mean.
           'G-B Sig.' indicates whether or not the gender difference is statistically significant.
           '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Two-Parent Households Female-Headed Households
Table 3.7A
T-Tests of Average Marginal Effects
Dependent Variable = In School
Differences in Parental Effects by Gender of Child
95ME, MSig. ME, F Sig. M-F Sig. ME, MSig. ME, F Sig. M-F Sig.
Age=16
PED=0
Girls 0.011 *** 0.016 *** -0.004 *** ---
Boys 0.014 *** -0.007 *** 0.021 *** ---
PED=4
Girls 0.017 *** 0.020 *** -0.002 *** ---
Boys 0.017 *** 0.002 *** 0.014 *** ---
PED=8
Girls 0.021 *** 0.022 *** -0.001 *** ---
Boys 0.018 *** 0.008 *** 0.011 *** ---
Age=17
PED=0
Girls 0.003 *** 0.027 *** -0.024 *** ---
Boys 0.021 *** 0.015 *** 0.006 *** ---
PED=4
Girls 0.009 *** 0.018 *** -0.009 *** ---
Boys 0.019 *** 0.015 *** 0.004 *** ---
PED=8
Girls 0.013 *** 0.014 *** -0.001 *** ---
Boys 0.018 *** 0.015 *** 0.003 *** ---
Age=18
PED=0
Girls 0.005 *** 0.008 *** -0.003 *** ---
Boys 0.022 *** -0.011 *** 0.034 *** ---
PED=4
Girls 0.004 *** 0.009 *** -0.005 *** ---
Boys 0.016 *** 0.001 *** 0.015 *** ---
PED=8
Girls 0.004 *** 0.010 *** -0.005 *** ---
Boys 0.013 *** 0.009 *** 0.004 *** ---
Note: 'ME' denotes total effect.
           '**' denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
           '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
           'M' denotes mothers, 'F' denotes fathers and 'PM' denotes pooled mean.
           'M-F Sig.' indicates whether or not the gender difference is statistically significant.
           '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Two-Parent Households Female-Headed Households
Table 3.7B
T-Tests of Average Marginal Effects
Dependent Variable = In School
Differences in Parental Effects by Gender of Parent
96As mentioned above, the gender dimension of parental eﬀe c t sv a r i e sb ya g e .
The one consistency is that at low levels of father’s education, 0 and 4 grades,
paternal education has a stronger marginal eﬀect for girls than for boys. This
result holds for all three ages considered.
In comparing eﬀects by household type, the maternal education results are
fairly consistent. In both two-parent and female-headed households, maternal
eﬀects for 16-year-olds are almost always stronger for girls than for boys. For
17 and 18-year-olds, however, maternal eﬀects are usually stronger for boys.
Looking at parental eﬀects by gender of parent (3.7B), the results demon-
strate two clear patterns. The ﬁrst is that for girls, paternal eﬀects are stronger
than maternal eﬀects. On the other hand, maternal eﬀects are stronger than
paternal eﬀects for boys. These ﬁndings are consistent across all three ages
considered.
3.4.2 Instrumental Variable Results: Intermediate Speciﬁcation
T h i ss e c t i o np r o v i d e st h er e s u l t sf o rt h eI Vm o d e l . A si nt h eb a s ep r o b i t
model, the IV speciﬁcation also has some problems. The eﬀect of the ability
bias can not be completely eliminated by instrumenting for parental education
because the instrument is not identiﬁed for high ability parents. I address this
in the following section, but as a basis for comparison, the tables below ignore
the issue.
Tables 3.8A and 3.8B provide the instrumental variable coeﬃcients and av-
erage marginal eﬀect results for girls and boys in two-parent households. Note
that the coeﬃcients and average marginal eﬀects of log parental earnings now
become larger in magnitude and more frequently statically signiﬁcant. Once
again, the results for children in female-headed households (tables 3.8C and
3.8D) shows (log) parental earnings has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
97eﬀect on the probability of 17 and 18-year-old boys attending school. However,
as in the case of two-parent households, the magnitudes of the parental earnings
coeﬃcient estimates have increased for every sub-sample. This result can be
attributed to the fact that the instrumental variable is not identiﬁed for high
ability parents.
Given that the policy treatment has no (or at least less of) an eﬀect on
high ability parents, the ﬁrst stage coeﬃcient estimates of the policy eﬀect on
eventual parental attainment (b α
M
G1 and b α
F
G0) are biased downward, resulting in
predicted values of parental education that are too low. These predicted values
are then used to estimate children’s schooling attendance (equation (7)). As a
result, parental education now loses some of it’s explanatory power because the
values are biased downward. Since parental income is also a factor of parental
education, income will now absorb some of the explanatory power of parental
schooling. As such, the increase in the coeﬃcient estimates on income reﬂect
the lack of identiﬁcation on education for high ability parents.
98Girls Boys
Maternal Ed. 0.704 -0.799 0.199 0.180 0.199 0.526
[1.59] [2.20]** [0.57] [0.74] [0.78] [2.35]**
Maternal Ed. ^2 -0.053 0.067 -0.015 -0.007 -0.015 -0.036
[1.59] [2.34]** [0.56] [0.41] [0.84] [2.12]**
Paternal Ed. 0.032 0.392 -0.224 -0.064 -0.091 -0.309
[0.09] [1.49] [0.81] [0.29] [0.43] [1.68]*
Paternal Ed. ^2 0.006 -0.021 0.026 0.004 0.012 0.027
[0.23] [1.02] [1.21] [0.22] [0.80] [1.87]*
Maternal Age -0.034 0.058 -0.045 0.065 0.045 0.057
[0.46] [1.81]* [0.66] [1.44] [0.76] [1.24]
Maternal Age ^2 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
[0.37] [1.70]* [0.41] [1.18] [0.34] [1.15]
Paternal Age 0.063 0.039 0.057 0.043 0.002 0.032
[1.73]* [1.23] [1.61] [1.50] [0.06] [1.12]
Paternal Age ^2 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
[1.19] [1.05] [1.54] [1.42] [0.49] [0.88]
Household Size -0.098 -0.100 -0.120 -0.100 -0.026 -0.061
[3.25]***[4.03]*** [4.45]***[4.26]*** [0.97] [2.84]***
Black -0.032 0.088 0.378 0.052 0.039 0.140
[0.13] [0.47] [1.50] [0.31] [0.22] [0.93]
Mixed Race 0.085 0.033 -0.084 -0.064 -0.059 -0.011
[0.64] [0.31] [0.70] [0.64] [0.57] [0.12]
Log Parental Earnings 0.080 0.045 0.032 0.094 0.028 0.050
[3.63]*** [2.20]** [1.54] [5.46]*** [1.55] [3.34]***
Rural -0.448 -0.308 -0.220 -0.556 -0.033 -0.271
[3.70]***[3.13]*** [1.91]* [6.00]*** [0.29] [3.21]***
Constant -2.361 -0.085 1.505 -1.968 -0.927 -2.753
[1.03] [0.06] [0.75] [1.35] [0.53] [1.85]*
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First Stage OLS Results
F-Stat, M. Ed. 7.01*** 9.83*** 7.97*** 8.17*** 6.04*** 9.48***
F-Stat, F. Ed. 9.48*** 10.18*** 8.45*** 10.03*** 7.75*** 11.07***
N 1956 2160 1856 2091 1592 2098
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Robust z statistics in brackets
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Table 3.8A
Coefficients from IV Model, Two-Parent Households
Dependent Variable = In School
Age=16 Age=17 Age=18
99M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig.
Mother's Ed. 0.081 -0.130 ** 0.033 0.040 0.055 0.168 **
Moth. Ed.^2 -0.006 0.011 ** -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.012 **
Father's Ed. 0.004 0.064 -0.037 -0.014 -0.025 -0.099 *
Fath. Ed^2 0.001 -0.003 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.009 *
Mother's Age -0.004 0.009 * -0.008 0.014 0.012 0.018
Moth. Age^2 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Father's Age 0.007 * 0.006 0.010 0.010 0.001 0.010
Fath. Age^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Family Size -0.011 *** -0.016 *** -0.020 *** -0.022 *** -0.007 -0.020 ***
Black -0.004 0.014 0.051 * 0.011 0.011 0.043
Mixed Race 0.010 0.005 -0.014 -0.014 -0.016 -0.003
Log Par. Earn. 0.009 *** 0.007 ** 0.005 0.021 *** 0.008 0.016 ***
Rural -0.064 *** -0.056 *** -0.040 * -0.147 *** -0.009 -0.091 ***
State dummies Y e sY e s Y e sY e s Y e sY e s
Observations 1956 2160 1856 2091 1592 2098
Note: '***' denotes significance at the 1% level. '**' denotes significance at the 5% level.  
'*' denotes significance at the 10% level.
Table 3.8B
Average Marginal Effects from IV Model
Dependent Variable = In School
Two-Parent Households
Age=16 Age=17 Age=18
Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys
100Girls Boys
Maternal Ed. 0.228 -0.066 0.520 -0.321 -0.360 -0.163
[0.66] [0.19] [1.37] [1.06] [1.23] [0.76]
Maternal Ed. ^2 -0.004 0.015 -0.032 0.034 0.026 0.016
[0.18] [0.57] [1.19] [1.45] [1.27] [0.98]
Paternal Ed. -- -- --
-- -- --
Paternal Ed. ^2 -- -- --
-- -- --
Maternal Age 0.054 0.018 0.071 0.182 0.027 0.055
[0.97] [0.23] [0.89] [2.64]*** [0.51] [0.75]
Maternal Age ^2 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001
[0.79] [0.26] [0.69] [2.56]** [0.22] [0.66]
Paternal Age -- -- --
-- -- --
Paternal Age ^2 -- -- --
-- -- --
Household Size -0.107 -0.134 -0.040 -0.108 0.141 -0.078
[1.96]** [2.83]*** [0.76] [2.45]** [2.72]*** [1.96]*
Black -0.218 -0.231 0.526 -0.096 -0.412 -0.395
[0.74] [0.84] [1.39] [0.36] [1.42] [1.67]*
Mixed Race -0.136 0.079 0.210 0.194 0.018 -0.100
[0.77] [0.43] [1.14] [1.25] [0.12] [0.71]
Log Parental Earnings 0.037 0.002 0.031 0.075 0.035 0.057
[1.29] [0.06] [1.13] [3.49]*** [1.57] [2.87]***
Rural 0.224 -0.280 -0.460 -0.623 -1.146 -0.233
[0.62] [1.11] [1.74]* [2.95]*** [4.18]*** [1.19]
Constant -1.037 0.145 -3.496 -2.356 -0.937 -1.109
[0.53] [0.06] [1.37] [1.24] [0.49] [0.52]
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First Stage OLS Results
F-Stat, M. Ed. 2.81*** 3.92*** 2.76*** 3.42*** 3.54*** 4.49***
F-Stat, F. Ed. -- -- --
N 560 595 509 616 543 646
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Robust z statistics in brackets
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Table 3.8C
Coefficients from IV Model, Female-Headed Households
Dependent Variable = In School
Age=16 Age=17 Age=18
101M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig.
Mother's Ed. 0.041 -0.015 0.108 -0.091 -0.110 -0.056
Moth. Ed.^2 -0.001 0.003 -0.007 0.010 0.008 0.006
Father's Ed. -- -- --
Fath. Ed^2 -- -- --
Mother's Age 0.010 0.004 0.015 0.051 *** 0.008 0.019
Moth. Age^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.000 0.000
Father's Age -- -- --
Fath. Age^2 -- -- --
Family Size -0.019 ** -0.030 *** -0.008 -0.030 ** 0.043 *** -0.027 **
Black -0.043 -0.056 0.086 -0.028 -0.136 -0.142 *
Mixed Race -0.025 0.018 0.043 0.055 0.006 -0.034
Log Par. Earn. 0.007 0.000 0.006 0.021 *** 0.011 0.020 ***
Rural 0.036 -0.070 -0.115 -0.203 *** -0.397 *** -0.083
State dummies Y e sY e s Y e sY e s Y e sY e s
Observations 560 595 509 616 543 646
Note: '***' denotes significance at the 1% level. '**' denotes significance at the 5% level.  
'*' denotes significance at the 10% level.
Age=16 Age=17 Age=18
Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys
Table 3.8D
Average Marginal Effects from IV Model
Dependent Variable = In School
Female-Headed Households
Tables 3.9A and 3.9B oﬀer the Wald test results of diﬀerences in coeﬃcient
total eﬀects of parental education by gender of child and gender of parents.
Once again, there are almost no statistically signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences. The
exception is that amongst 17-year-olds, paternal education has a stronger eﬀect
on boys at low levels of father’s schooling. At higher levels of father’s schooling,
however, paternal eﬀects are stronger for girls.
102TE, G Sig. TE, B Sig. G-B Sig. TE, G Sig. TE, B Sig. G-B Sig.
Age=16
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.704 -0.799 1.503 0.228 -0.066 0.294
Ed.=4 0.281 -0.262 0.543 0.193 0.054 * 0.139
Ed.=8 -0.142 0.275 * -0.417 0.158 * 0.174 *** -0.016
Ed.=PM 0.024 0.064 -0.040 0.170 * 0.131 ** 0.040
Fathers
Ed.=0 0.032 ** 0.392 ** -0.360 ---
Ed.=4 0.079 *** 0.221 *** -0.142 ---
Ed.=8 0.126 *** 0.051 *** 0.075 ---
Ed.=PM 0.105 *** 0.126 *** -0.021 ---
Age=17
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.199 0.180 0.020 0.520 -0.321 0.841
Ed.=4 0.079 0.121 -0.042 0.262 -0.050 0.311
Ed.=8 -0.042 0.061 ** -0.104 0.003 0.222 ** -0.218
Ed.=PM 0.005 0.085 * -0.079 0.096 0.124 * -0.028
Fathers
Ed.=0 -0.224 ** -0.064 -0.160 ** ---
Ed.=4 -0.017 *** -0.033 0.016 ** ---
Ed.=8 0.190 *** -0.001 0.192 * ---
Ed.=PM 0.099 *** -0.015 0.114 * ---
Age=18
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.199 0.526 -0.328 -0.360 -0.163 -0.197
Ed.=4 0.075 0.236 -0.161 -0.154 -0.034 -0.121
Ed.=8 -0.048 -0.054 0.007 0.051 0.095 -0.044
Ed.=PM 0.001 0.060 -0.059 -0.023 0.049 -0.071
Fathers
Ed.=0 -0.091 -0.309 0.218 ---
Ed.=4 0.008 -0.090 0.098 ---
Ed.=8 0.107 0.130 -0.022 ---
Ed.=PM 0.063 0.033 0.031 ---
Note: 'TE' denotes total effect.
           '**' denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
           '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
           'G' denotes girls, 'B' denotes boys and 'PM' denotes pooled mean.
           'G-B Sig.' indicates whether or not the gender difference is statistically significant.
Wald Test Results of Coefficient Total Effects, IV Model
Dependent Variable = In School
Differences in Parental Effects by Gender of Child
           '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Table 3.9A
Two-Parent Households Female-Headed Households
103TE, M Sig. TE, F Sig. M-F Sig. TE, M Sig. TE, F Sig. M-F Sig.
Age=16
PED=0
Girls 0.704 0.032 ** 0.673 ---
Boys -0.799 0.392 ** -1.190 ---
PED=4
Girls 0.281 0.079 *** 0.202 * ---
Boys -0.262 0.221 *** -0.483 ---
PED=8
Girls -0.142 0.126 *** -0.268 * ---
Boys 0.275 * 0.051 *** 0.224 ---
Age=17
PED=0
Girls 0.199 -0.224 ** 0.424 * ---
Boys 0.180 -0.064 0.244 ---
PED=4
Girls 0.079 -0.017 *** 0.096 * ---
Boys 0.121 -0.033 0.153 ---
PED=8
Girls -0.042 0.190 *** -0.233 ---
Boys 0.061 ** -0.001 0.063 ---
Age=18
PED=0
Girls 0.199 -0.091 0.290 ---
Boys 0.526 -0.309 0.835 ---
PED=4
Girls 0.075 0.008 0.067 ---
Boys 0.236 -0.090 0.326 ---
PED=8
Girls -0.048 0.107 -0.155 ---
Boys -0.054 0.130 -0.184 ---
Note: 'TE' denotes total effect.
           '**' denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
           '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
           'M' denotes mothers, 'F' denotes fathers and 'PM' denotes pooled mean.
           'M-F Sig.' indicates whether or not the gender difference is statistically significant.
Table 3.9B
Wald Test Results of Coefficient Total Effects, IV Model
Dependent Variable = In School
Differences in Parental Effects by Gender of Parent
           '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Two-Parent Households Female-Headed Households
104Turning to the analogous tests for diﬀerences in average marginal eﬀects,
3.10A and 3.10B also oﬀer the results by gender of child and gender of parent.
Looking at maternal education for 16 and 17-year -olds in two-parent house-
holds, the eﬀects are stronger for girls at low levels of maternal education and
stronger for boys at high levels. Turning to 18-year-olds, maternal education
always has a stronger eﬀect on boys rather than girls. Paternal education,
however, does not exhibit any clear gender patterns.
The results by gender of parent (3.10B) show that for girls, paternal educa-
tion eﬀects increase relative to maternal eﬀects as parental education increases.
This holds for all three ages. For boys however, the gender diﬀerences in
parental eﬀects vary by age and education level of parents.
The results discussed above vary substantially from the base probit results.
There are, however, four results that are common to both the base probit model
and IV model. The ﬁrst is that for 18-year-olds in two-parent households,
maternal eﬀects are stronger for boys than for girls. The second common
result is that also for 18-year-old boys, paternal education has more of an eﬀect
for girls at low levels of father’s education but more of an eﬀect for boys at
high levels of father’s education. The third consistency is that for 16-year-olds
in female-headed households, maternal education has more of an eﬀect on girls
than boys. The last commonality is that for 18-year-olds in female-headed
households, maternal education has more of an eﬀe c to nb o y st h a ng i r l s .
105ME, G Sig. ME, B Sig. G-B Sig. ME, G Sig. ME, B Sig. G-B Sig.
Age=16
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.152 *** -0.201 *** 0.354 *** 0.081 *** 0.028 *** 0.053 ***
Ed.=4 0.052 *** -0.072 *** 0.123 *** 0.058 *** 0.036 *** 0.022 ***
Ed.=8 -0.014 *** 0.073 *** -0.087 *** 0.042 *** 0.042 *** 0.000 ***
Ed.=PM 0.011 *** 0.017 *** -0.006 *** 0.047 *** 0.040 *** 0.007 ***
Fathers
Ed.=0 0.020 *** 0.118 *** -0.098 *** ---
Ed.=4 0.022 *** 0.056 *** -0.034 *** ---
Ed.=8 0.024 *** 0.013 *** 0.011 *** ---
Ed.=PM 0.023 *** 0.032 *** -0.008 *** ---
Age=17
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.026 *** 0.002 *** 0.023 *** 0.181 *** -0.038 *** 0.219 ***
Ed.=4 0.009 *** 0.014 *** -0.006 *** 0.074 *** 0.005 *** 0.069 ***
Ed.=8 -0.007 *** 0.025 *** -0.032 *** 0.005 *** 0.046 *** -0.041 ***
Ed.=PM -0.001 *** 0.021 *** -0.022 *** 0.028 *** 0.033 *** -0.005 ***
Fathers
Ed.=0 -0.015 *** -0.013 *** -0.002 *** ---
Ed.=4 0.011 *** -0.006 *** 0.018 *** ---
Ed.=8 0.036 *** 0.000 *** 0.036 *** ---
Ed.=PM 0.025 *** -0.003 *** 0.028 *** ---
Age=18
Mothers
Ed.=0 -0.006 *** 0.077 *** -0.083 *** -0.096 *** -0.056 *** -0.039 ***
Ed.=4 -0.005 *** 0.035 *** -0.039 *** -0.048 *** -0.015 *** -0.033 ***
Ed.=8 -0.003 *** 0.002 *** -0.004 *** 0.017 *** 0.032 *** -0.015 ***
Ed.=PM -0.003 *** 0.014 *** -0.017 *** -0.007 *** 0.015 *** -0.023 ***
Fathers
Ed.=0 -0.038 *** -0.086 *** 0.048 *** ---
Ed.=4 -0.003 *** -0.030 *** 0.027 *** ---
Ed.=8 0.033 *** 0.041 *** -0.008 *** ---
Ed.=PM 0.018 *** 0.010 *** 0.008 *** ---
Note: 'ME' denotes total effect.
           '**' denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
           '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
           'G' denotes girls, 'B' denotes boys and 'PM' denotes pooled mean.
           'G-B Sig.' indicates whether or not the gender difference is statistically significant.
T-Tests of Average Marginal Effects, IV Model
Dependent Variable = In School
           '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Table 3.10A
Differences in Parental Effects by Gender of Child
Two-Parent Households Female-Headed Households
106ME, MSig. ME, F Sig. M-F Sig. ME, MSig. ME, F Sig. M-F Sig.
Age=16
PED=0
Girls 0.152 *** 0.020 ** 0.133 *** ---
Boys -0.201 *** 0.118 ** -0.319 *** ---
PED=4
Girls 0.052 *** 0.022 *** 0.030 *** ---
Boys -0.072 *** 0.056 *** -0.128 *** ---
PED=8
Girls -0.014 *** 0.024 *** -0.038 *** ---
Boys 0.073 *** 0.013 *** 0.060 *** ---
Age=17
PED=0
Girls 0.026 *** -0.015 ** 0.040 *** ---
Boys 0.002 *** -0.013 ** 0.015 *** ---
PED=4
Girls 0.009 *** 0.011 *** -0.003 *** ---
Boys 0.014 *** -0.006 *** 0.021 *** ---
PED=8
Girls -0.007 *** 0.036 *** -0.043 *** ---
Boys 0.025 *** 0.000 *** 0.025 *** ---
Age=18
PED=0
Girls -0.006 *** -0.038 ** 0.032 *** ---
Boys 0.077 *** -0.086 ** 0.163 *** ---
PED=4
Girls -0.005 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 *** ---
Boys 0.035 *** -0.030 *** 0.065 *** ---
PED=8
Girls -0.003 *** 0.033 *** -0.036 *** ---
Boys 0.002 *** 0.041 *** -0.040 *** ---
Note: 'ME' denotes total effect.
           '**' denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
           '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
           'M' denotes mothers, 'F' denotes fathers and 'PM' denotes pooled mean.
           'M-F Sig.' indicates whether or not the gender difference is statistically significant.
Table 3.10B
T-Tests of Average Marginal Effects, IV Model
Dependent Variable = In School
Differences in Parental Effects by Gender of Parent
           '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Two-Parent Households Female-Headed Households
1073.4.3 Low Parental Education IV Results: Preferred Speciﬁcation
Tables 3.11A, 3.11B, 3.11C, 3.11D, 3.12A, 3.12B, 3.13A and 3.13B oﬀer
IV results after limiting the sample to youths with parents who have 8 or fewer
completed grades. As mentioned above, the instrument, policy treatment, is not
identiﬁed for high ability parents. Parents who exited the schooling system once
they were no longer legally required to attend school (i.e. low ability parents)
could have completed, at most, 8 grades. Parents who completed more than 8
grades (i.e. high ability parents) chose to attend school beyond the age of 15
and were, therefore, not (or less) aﬀected by the change in policy. As a result,
instrumenting the educational attainment of high ability parents with the policy
change will result in poor predicted values for parental schooling that will then
be used to estimate children’s attendance. The estimated coeﬃcients on and
marginal eﬀects of (predicted) parental education may subsequently be biased
because of the inaccurate predicted parental education values for high ability
parents. By limiting the sample to girls and boys with parents who completed
8 or fewer grades, I am able to minimize any bias created by including high
ability parents.
In limiting my sample, however, I am not able to completely eliminate the
bias created by high ability parents. This is because some of the parents in the
remaining "low ability" sample may have chosen to remain in school until the
age of 15 without the policy. Unfortunately, I am not able to distinguish these
parents from those who were legally compelled to do so. As a result, the bias
i sn o tc o m p l e t e l ye l i m i n a t e d ,b u ti ti sd i m i n i s h e d . A ss u c h ,t h i ss e c t i o no ﬀers
the results for the preferred speciﬁcation.
108Girls Boys
Maternal Ed. 0.685 -0.574 0.887 0.148 0.482 1.928
[1.05] [0.87] [1.41] [0.30] [0.78] [3.04]***
Maternal Ed. ^2 -0.086 0.061 -0.134 0.007 -0.066 -0.228
[1.09] [0.79] [1.65]* [0.12] [0.97] [2.90]***
Paternal Ed. 0.217 0.877 -0.956 -0.892 -0.880 -0.900
[0.35] [1.93]* [1.62] [1.66]* [1.59] [1.91]*
Paternal Ed. ^2 -0.011 -0.078 0.125 0.097 0.120 0.130
[0.13] [1.39] [1.68]* [1.40] [1.80]* [2.12]**
Maternal Age -0.125 0.086 -0.220 0.096 -0.029 -0.056
[1.45] [1.56] [2.40]** [1.75]* [0.32] [0.94]
Maternal Age ^2 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001
[1.35] [1.76]* [2.05]** [1.53] [0.66] [1.09]
Paternal Age 0.067 0.083 0.098 0.042 -0.012 0.066
[1.67]* [2.28]** [2.20]** [1.20] [0.28] [1.84]*
Paternal Age ^2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
[1.09] [1.92]* [2.09]** [1.26] [0.12] [1.77]*
Household Size -0.066 -0.097 -0.115 -0.076 0.005 -0.063
[1.99]** [3.59]*** [3.85]***[2.94]*** [0.16] [2.54]**
Black 0.186 0.058 0.460 -0.096 0.125 0.088
[0.70] [0.29] [1.65]* [0.53] [0.60] [0.50]
Mixed Race 0.170 -0.008 -0.174 -0.071 -0.076 -0.034
[1.33] [0.07] [1.34] [0.68] [0.62] [0.36]
Log Parental Earnings 0.059 -0.003 -0.004 0.070 0.024 0.021
[2.27]** [0.11] [0.16] [3.16]*** [1.01] [1.11]
Rural -0.300 -0.168 -0.157 -0.405 0.037 -0.147
[2.32]** [1.60] [1.28] [4.05]*** [0.29] [1.57]
Constant -0.112 -3.323 5.625 -1.278 1.381 -1.416
[0.04] [1.44] [2.03]** [0.64] [0.56] [0.75]
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First Stage OLS Results
F-Stat, M. Ed. 5.15*** 4.29*** 3.73*** 4.50*** 3.02*** 3.62***
F-Stat, F. Ed. 6.72*** 6.66*** 5.43*** 6.30*** 5.00*** 6.07***
N 1129 1337 1077 1260 912 1292
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Robust z statistics in brackets
Age=17 Age=18
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Age=16
Table 3.11A
Coefficients from Low Ed. IV Model, Two-Parent Households
Dependent Variable = In School
109M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig.
Mother's Ed. 0.115 -0.121 0.187 0.042 0.145 0.671 ***
Moth. Ed.^2 -0.014 0.013 -0.028 * 0.002 -0.020 -0.079 ***
Father's Ed. 0.036 0.185 * -0.202 -0.252 * -0.265 -0.313 *
Fath. Ed^2 -0.002 -0.016 0.026 * 0.027 0.036 * 0.045 **
Mother's Age -0.021 0.018 -0.046 ** 0.027 * -0.009 -0.019
Moth. Age^2 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000
Father's Age 0.011 * 0.017 ** 0.021 ** 0.012 -0.004 0.023 *
Fath. Age^2 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *
Family Size -0.011 ** -0.021 *** -0.024 *** -0.022 *** 0.002 -0.022 **
Black 0.028 0.012 0.078 ** -0.028 0.036 0.030
Mixed Race 0.028 -0.002 -0.037 -0.020 -0.023 -0.012
Log Par. Earn. 0.010 ** -0.001 -0.001 0.020 *** 0.007 0.007
Rural -0.056 ** -0.037 -0.035 -0.124 *** 0.011 -0.052
State dummies Y e sY e s Y e sY e s Y e sY e s
Observations 1129 1337 1077 1260 912 1292
Note: '***' denotes significance at the 1% level. '**' denotes significance at the 5% level.  
'*' denotes significance at the 10% level.
Table 3.11B
Average Marginal Effects from Low Ed.  IV Model
Dependent Variable = In School
Two-Parent Households
Age=16 Age=17 Age=18
Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys
110Girls Boys
Maternal Ed. -0.306 1.074 1.631 -0.891 1.267 -0.425
[0.33] [1.29] [1.68]* [1.26] [1.48] [1.03]
Maternal Ed. ^2 0.065 -0.120 -0.171 0.132 -0.129 0.044
[0.60] [1.27] [1.48] [1.54] [1.36] [0.84]
Paternal Ed. -- -- --
-- -- --
Paternal Ed. ^2 -- -- --
-- -- --
Maternal Age 0.096 -0.003 0.101 0.207 0.054 0.012
[1.30] [0.03] [1.08] [2.61]*** [0.87] [0.14]
Maternal Age ^2 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000
[1.19] [0.01] [0.81] [2.56]** [0.62] [0.10]
Paternal Age -- -- --
-- -- --
Paternal Age ^2 -- -- --
-- -- --
Household Size -0.099 -0.095 -0.008 -0.086 0.151 -0.049
[1.63] [1.93]* [0.14] [1.81]* [2.59]*** [1.13]
Black -0.288 -0.389 0.329 -0.090 -0.236 -0.582
[0.86] [1.34] [0.89] [0.33] [0.76] [2.18]**
Mixed Race -0.287 0.142 0.267 0.183 0.208 -0.062
[1.44] [0.75] [1.28] [1.06] [1.11] [0.40]
Log Parental Earnings 0.014 -0.035 0.078 0.062 0.039 0.033
[0.39] [1.18] [2.23]** [2.40]** [1.36] [1.34]
Rural 0.343 -0.249 -0.244 -0.631 -1.080 -0.121
[0.91] [0.94] [0.84] [2.73]*** [3.68]*** [0.58]
Constant -2.007 -1.123 -6.665 -3.655 -5.703 0.011
[0.63] [0.36] [1.88]* [1.37] [2.10]** [0.00]
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First Stage OLS Results
F-Stat, M. Ed. 2.06*** 2.04*** 1.54** 1.94*** 1.57** 3.07***
F-Stat, F. Ed. -- -- --
N 353 410 314 443 354 445
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Robust z statistics in brackets
Age=17 Age=18
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Age=16
Table 3.11C
Coefficients from Low Ed. IV Model, Female-Headed Households
Dependent Variable = In School
111M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig. M.E. Sig.
Mother's Ed. -0.068 0.289 0.393 * -0.289 0.398 -0.155
Moth. Ed.^2 0.015 -0.032 -0.041 0.043 -0.041 0.016
Father's Ed. -- -- --
Fath. Ed^2 -- -- --
Mother's Age 0.021 -0.001 0.024 0.067 *** 0.017 0.004
Moth. Age^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.000 0.000
Father's Age -- -- --
Fath. Age^2 -- -- --
Family Size -0.022 -0.026 * -0.002 -0.028 * 0.047 *** -0.018
Black -0.071 -0.117 0.070 -0.030 -0.077 -0.211 **
Mixed Race -0.065 0.038 0.063 0.060 0.066 -0.023
Log Par. Earn. 0.003 -0.009 0.019 0.020 ** 0.012 0.012
Rural 0.067 -0.072 -0.064 -0.224 *** -0.363 *** -0.044
State dummies Y e sY e s Y e sY e s Y e sY e s
Observations 353 410 314 443 354 445
Note: '***' denotes significance at the 1% level. '**' denotes significance at the 5% level.  
'*' denotes significance at the 10% level.
Age=16 Age=17 Age=18
Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys
Table 3.11D
Average Marginal Effects from Low Ed.  IV Model
Dependent Variable = In School
Female-Headed Households
Tables 3.11A and 3.11B show that the coeﬃcient estimates on and marginal
eﬀects of log parental earnings fall relative to estimates obtained when using the
full sample. Turning now to the eﬀect of parental education on children’s school
attendance, tables 3.12A and 3.12B oﬀer the Wald tests of gender diﬀerences in
coeﬃcient total eﬀects. As before, the gender diﬀerences are rarely statistically
signiﬁcant.
112TE, G Sig. TE, B Sig. G-B Sig. TE, G Sig. TE, B Sig. G-B Sig.
Age=16
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.685 -0.574 1.259 -0.306 1.074 -1.380
Ed.=4 -0.001 -0.088 0.088 0.214 0.116 0.097
Ed.=8 -0.686 0.397 -1.084 0.733 * -0.841 1.574
Ed.=PM -0.417 0.207 -0.624 0.546 -0.497 1.042
Fathers
Ed.=0 0.217 * 0.877 ** -0.660 ---
Ed.=4 0.133 *** 0.257 ** -0.123 ---
Ed.=8 0.049 *** -0.364 ** 0.414 ---
Ed.=PM 0.087 *** -0.090 ** 0.176 ---
Age=17
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.887 0.148 0.739 * 1.631 -0.891 2.522
Ed.=4 -0.186 0.206 ** -0.392 * 0.266 0.169 0.097
Ed.=8 -1.259 0.264 *** -1.523 ** -1.100 1.228 -2.328
Ed.=PM -0.838 0.241 ** -1.079 ** -0.608 0.846 -1.455
Fathers
Ed.=0 -0.956 -0.892 -0.064 ---
Ed.=4 0.042 -0.115 0.158 ---
Ed.=8 1.041 0.662 0.379 ---
Ed.=PM 0.599 0.318 0.281 ---
Age=18
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.482 1.928 -1.446 1.267 -0.425 * 1.693
Ed.=4 -0.046 0.101 -0.146 0.234 -0.074 0.309
Ed.=8 -0.573 -1.727 1.154 * -0.799 0.277 -1.076
Ed.=PM -0.366 -1.009 0.644 -0.427 0.151 -0.577
Fathers
Ed.=0 -0.880 -0.900 0.020 ---
Ed.=4 0.083 0.141 -0.059 ---
Ed.=8 1.045 1.183 -0.138 ---
Ed.=PM 0.619 0.722 -0.103 ---
Note: 'TE' denotes total effect.
           '**' denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
           '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
           'G' denotes girls, 'B' denotes boys and 'PM' denotes pooled mean.
           'G-B Sig.' indicates whether or not the gender difference is statistically significant.
Table 3.12A
Wald Test Results of Coefficient Total Effects, Low Ed. IV Model
Dependent Variable = In School
Differences in Parental Effects by Gender of Child
           '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Two-Parent Households Female-Headed Households
113TE, M Sig. TE, F Sig. M-F Sig. TE, M Sig. TE, F Sig. M-F Sig.
Age=16
PED=0
Girls 0.685 0.217 * 0.468 * ---
Boys -0.574 0.877 ** -1.451 ---
PED=4
Girls -0.001 0.133 *** -0.134 * ---
Boys -0.088 0.257 ** -0.345 ---
PED=8
Girls -0.686 0.049 *** -0.736 ** ---
Boys 0.397 -0.364 ** 0.762 ---
Age=17
PED=0
Girls 0.887 -0.956 1.843 ---
Boys 0.148 -0.892 1.040 * ---
PED=4
Girls -0.186 0.042 -0.229 ---
Boys 0.206 ** -0.115 0.321 * ---
PED=8
Girls -1.259 1.041 -2.300 ---
Boys 0.264 *** 0.662 -0.397 * ---
Age=18
PED=0
Girls 0.482 -0.880 1.362 ---
Boys 1.928 -0.900 2.828 ---
PED=4
Girls -0.046 0.083 -0.128 ---
Boys 0.101 0.141 -0.041 ---
PED=8
Girls -0.573 1.045 -1.618 ---
Boys -1.727 1.183 -2.909 ---
Note: 'TE' denotes total effect.
           '**' denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
           '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
           'M' denotes mothers, 'F' denotes fathers and 'PM' denotes pooled mean.
           'M-F Sig.' indicates whether or not the gender difference is statistically significant.
Table 3.12B
Wald Test Results of Coefficient Total Effects, Low Ed. IV Model
Dependent Variable = In School
Differences in Parental Effects by Gender of Parent
Two-Parent Households Female-Headed Households
           '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
114Table 3.13A shows the t-test results of gender diﬀerences in average marginal
eﬀects by gender of child. Parental eﬀects are not stronger for either girls or
boys at all levels of parental schooling or by age, so there no visible patterns
in this model. The results by gender of parent (3.13B), however, fare a little
better. Once again, gender diﬀerences in parental eﬀects are rarely larger for
one parent versus the other at all levels of parental schooling considered. The
one exception is that for 17-year-old boys, maternal education has a stronger
eﬀect than paternal education. In addition, the results show that for girls,
maternal education has more an eﬀect than paternal education at low levels of
parental schooling, but the reverse is true at high levels of parental schooling.
3.4.4 Comparing the Three Sets of Results
The sections above oﬀer wildly diﬀerent results depending upon gender of
child, gender of parent, age, level of parental schooling and model speciﬁcation.
Table 3.14 summarizes which eﬀects were stronger, as well as how the results
diﬀer by the dimensions mentioned above. As discussed, the probit results
are biased by unobservable ability. The IV model lessens the ability bias, but
does not eliminate it because the instrument was not identiﬁed for high ability
parents. As a result, the low education IV model is preferred because of all
three speciﬁcations considered, ability bias is minimized when highly educated
parents are excluded.
115ME, G Sig. ME, B Sig. G-B Sig. ME, G Sig. ME, B Sig. G-B Sig.
Age=16
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.157 *** -0.153 *** 0.309 *** -0.085 *** 0.525 *** -0.610 ***
Ed.=4 -0.005 *** -0.027 *** 0.022 *** 0.062 *** 0.046 *** 0.016 ***
Ed.=8 -0.175 *** 0.109 *** -0.284 *** 0.178 *** -0.382 *** 0.560 ***
Ed.=PM -0.094 *** 0.060 *** -0.154 *** 0.138 *** -0.186 *** 0.324 ***
Fathers
Ed.=0 0.014 *** 0.328 *** -0.314 *** ---
Ed.=4 0.041 *** 0.067 *** -0.026 *** ---
Ed.=8 0.063 *** -0.097 *** 0.160 *** ---
Ed.=PM 0.053 *** -0.022 *** 0.076 *** ---
Age=17
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.121 *** -0.086 *** 0.207 *** 0.436 *** -0.224 *** 0.661 ***
Ed.=4 -0.046 *** 0.054 *** -0.100 *** 0.082 *** 0.054 *** 0.029 ***
Ed.=8 -0.280 *** 0.164 *** -0.443 *** -0.158 *** 0.297 *** -0.456 ***
Ed.=PM -0.166 *** 0.124 *** -0.290 *** -0.062 *** 0.216 *** -0.278 ***
Fathers
Ed.=0 -0.228 *** -0.202 *** -0.026 *** ---
Ed.=4 0.016 *** -0.030 *** 0.046 *** ---
Ed.=8 0.254 *** 0.157 *** 0.097 *** ---
Ed.=PM 0.155 *** 0.084 *** 0.071 *** ---
Age=18
Mothers
Ed.=0 0.051 *** 0.225 *** -0.174 *** 0.505 *** -0.118 *** 0.624 ***
Ed.=4 -0.029 *** 0.012 *** -0.041 *** 0.074 *** -0.025 *** 0.099 ***
Ed.=8 -0.131 *** -0.192 *** 0.060 *** -0.300 *** 0.087 *** -0.387 ***
Ed.=PM -0.085 *** -0.101 *** 0.015 *** -0.141 *** 0.050 *** -0.191 ***
Fathers
Ed.=0 -0.178 *** -0.217 *** 0.040 *** ---
Ed.=4 0.030 *** 0.050 *** -0.021 *** ---
Ed.=8 0.218 *** 0.267 *** -0.049 *** ---
Ed.=PM 0.145 *** 0.195 *** -0.050 *** ---
Note: 'ME' denotes total effect.
           '**' denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
           '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
           'G' denotes girls, 'B' denotes boys and 'PM' denotes pooled mean.
           'G-B Sig.' indicates whether or not the gender difference is statistically significant.
Table 3.13A
T-Tests of Average Marginal Effects, Low Ed. IV Model
Dependent Variable = In School
Differences in Parental Effects by Gender of Child
           '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Two-Parent Households Female-Headed Households
116ME, MSig. ME, F Sig. M-F Sig. ME, MSig. ME, F Sig. M-F Sig.
Age=16
PED=0
Girls 0.157 *** 0.014 ** 0.142 *** ---
Boys -0.153 *** 0.328 ** -0.481 *** ---
PED=4
Girls -0.005 *** 0.041 *** -0.046 *** ---
Boys -0.027 *** 0.067 *** -0.094 *** ---
PED=8
Girls -0.175 *** 0.063 *** -0.238 *** ---
Boys 0.109 *** -0.097 *** 0.206 *** ---
Age=17
PED=0
Girls 0.121 *** -0.228 ** 0.348 *** ---
Boys -0.086 *** -0.202 ** 0.116 *** ---
PED=4
Girls -0.046 *** 0.016 *** -0.062 *** ---
Boys 0.054 *** -0.030 *** 0.084 *** ---
PED=8
Girls -0.280 *** 0.254 *** -0.534 *** ---
Boys 0.164 *** 0.157 *** 0.007 *** ---
Age=18
PED=0
Girls 0.051 *** -0.178 ** 0.229 *** ---
Boys 0.225 *** -0.217 ** 0.442 *** ---
PED=4
Girls -0.029 *** 0.030 *** -0.059 *** ---
Boys 0.012 *** 0.050 *** -0.038 *** ---
PED=8
Girls -0.131 *** 0.218 *** -0.349 *** ---
Boys -0.192 *** 0.267 *** -0.459 *** ---
Note: 'ME' denotes total effect.
           '**' denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
           '***' denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
           'M' denotes mothers, 'F' denotes fathers and 'PM' denotes pooled mean.
           'M-F Sig.' indicates whether or not the gender difference is statistically significant.
Table 3.13B
T-Tests of Average Marginal Effects, Low Ed. IV Model
Dependent Variable = In School
Differences in Parental Effects by Gender of Parent
           '*' denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Two-Parent Households Female-Headed Households
117In comparing the results from the three models, there are several observa-
tions that are common to all three models. First turn to the "By Gender of
Child" panel. The results show that for 18-year-olds in two-parent households,
maternal schooling has a stronger eﬀect on boys than girls at low levels of mater-
nal education (maternal education=0). At high levels of paternal education for
18-year-olds, paternal eﬀects are stronger for boys than for girls. In addition,
at high levels of maternal education in female-headed households, 16-year-old
girls are more aﬀe c t e dt h a nb o y s .
More importantly, there are two results in the "By Gender of Parent" panel
that are noteworthy. The ﬁrst is that at low levels of parental schooling, ma-
ternal education becomes increasingly important relative to father’s education
for girls as ability bias is reduced. This holds for all three ages. The second
noteworthy observation is the at high levels of parental schooling, paternal ed-
ucation has a stronger eﬀect than maternal education for girls. This result is
consistent across all three speciﬁcations.
Recall that the sample considered in this chapter is comprised of post-
compulsory youths, so these children are not legally required to attend school.
As the eﬀect of inheritable ability is reduced, therefore, school attendance is
increasingly a function of personal choice, subject to household employment
needs. This choice may be based, in part, on the schooling outcomes of role
models within the home. At low levels of parental schooling, maternal labor
force participation is low. As such, low-educated mothers may play a larger
role in the lives of their children, relative to fathers. If mothers are the primary
role models under these circumstances, then that would explain why maternal
eﬀects are stronger than paternal eﬀects for girls.
11816 17 18 16 17 18 16 17 18
Two-Parent HH
Mothers
0 GGBG G B BBB
4 GBBG B B GBB
8 BBGB B B GBB
PM BBGB B B GBB
Fathers
0 BBGB B G GGG
4 BGBB G G GGG
8 GGBG G B GBB
PM GGBB G G GBG
Female-Headed HH
Mothers
0 BGBG G B GGB
4 GGBG G B GBB
8 GBGG B B GBB
PM GBGG B B GBB
16 17 18 16 17 18 16 17 18
Two-Parent HH
Girls, PED at:
0 MMMM M M FFF
4 FFFM F F FFF
8 FFFF F F FFF
Boys, PED at:
0 FMMF M M MMM
4 FMFF M M MMM
8 MMF MMF MMM
"G" indicates the parental effect is stronger for girls than for boys.
"B" is defined analogously.  
"M" indicates the effect of mother's education is stronger.
"F" indicates the effect of father's education is stronger.  
"=" indicates the gender difference is not statistically significant.
By Gender of Child
Summary of Gender Differences in Average Marginal Effects
Table 3.14
Low Par. Ed. IV
Low Par. Ed. IV IV Base Probit
IV Base Probit
By Gender of Parent
119Amongst highly educated parents, however, it is more likely that both par-
ents work. The father’s role in the home may now expand in comparison to the
mother’s role. The increased relative presence of fathers may explain why at
high levels of parental schooling, paternal education has more of an eﬀect than
maternal education for girls.
3.5 Conclusions
I ﬁrst addressed how the eﬀect of parental educational attainment on the
probability of school attendance diﬀered by gender of child. The preferred
speciﬁcation results did not consistently show if parental education in two-parent
households had more of an eﬀect on boys than girls. As such, it was not clear
if parental schooling aﬀects school attendance of children of one gender more so
than the other.
I then examined if maternal educational attainment had more of an eﬀect
than paternal education. In the preferred speciﬁcation, I found that the eﬀect of
parental educational attainment on the probability of school attendance oﬀered
no clear patterns with respect to gender. The results were highly sensitive
to age and level of parental schooling. As such, parental education does not
necessarily aﬀect children of one gender versus the other.
The results varied considerably by age. One consistency was that at high
levels of parental schooling, paternal eﬀects were always stronger than maternal
eﬀects for girls in two-parent households, regardless of the child’s age. This
pattern held regardless of model speciﬁcation. Furthermore, at low levels of
parental schooling, maternal education in two-parent households had more of an
eﬀect than paternal education on girls in the preferred speciﬁcation. Otherwise,
the results demonstrated no clear trends with respect to age.
Finally, I determined whether or not the maternal education results held
120across household type. In both types of households, the preferred speciﬁcation
results showed that maternal education did not consistently have a stronger
eﬀect on girls or boys. One commonality, however, was that amongst 18-year-
olds, the eﬀects were stronger for boys at low levels of maternal schooling, but
stronger for girls at high levels of maternal schooling.
The empirical results described above provided some insight into Brazil’s
gender gap in school attendance. The ﬁrst insight was that at low levels of
parental schooling in two-parent households, maternal education had a larger
eﬀect than paternal education for girls. This ﬁnding may be a result of the
fact that the sample utilized in the chapter are in a transition age between
compulsory schooling and adulthood and, therefore, make schooling decisions
based upon, in part, the education choices of primary role models within the
household. Low-educated mothers are less likely to work and, therefore, play
a much larger role relative to fathers in their children’s upbringing. As such,
mothers may serve as the primary role models for girls at low levels of parental
schooling.
The second insight was that for girls in two-parent households, paternal
education had more of an eﬀect than maternal education on attendance at high
levels of parental schooling. This is in sharp contrast to much of the earlier
literature on Brazil, which found that maternal education had more of an eﬀect
than paternal education on children’s schooling outcomes. To continue with
the role model story, at high levels of parental schooling, it is more likely that
b o t hp a r e n t sw o r k . T h er e l a t i v er o l eo ff athers, therefore, rises as parental
schooling increases. As a result, fathers may now emerge as the primary role
model for girls. In summary, parental eﬀects varied substantially by gender of
child, gender of parent, age and household type.
1213.6 References
[1] Arabsheibani, G. Reza, Francisco Galrao Cãrneiro and Andrew Henley.
"Gender Wage Diﬀerentials in Brazil: Trends over a Turbulent Era." World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper #3148, October 2003.
[2] Barros, Ricardo and David Lam. "Income and Educa-
tional Inequality and Children’s Schooling Attainment." In
Opportunity Foregone: Education in Brazil : Publication: Inter-American
Development Bank; Washington, D.C.: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1996.
[3] Becker, Gary S. and H. Gregg Lewis. "On the Interaction Between
Quantity and Quality of Children." Journal of Political Economy,V o l .8 2 ( 2 ,
part 2), 1973.
[4] Deolalikar, Anil. "Gender Diﬀerences in the Returns to Schooling and
in School Enrollment Rates in Indonesia." Journal of Human Resources,V o l .
28(4), Autumn 1993.
[5] Green, Francis, Andy Dickerson, Jorge Arbache. "A Picture of Wage
Inequality and the Allocation of Labour Through a Period of Trade Liberal-
ization: The Case of Brazil." World Development, Vol. 29, 2001.
[6] Lavy, Victor. "School Supply Constraints and Children’s Educational
Outcomes in Rural Ghana." Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 51,
1996.
122[7] Lillard, Lee A. and Robert J. Willis. "Intergenerational Educational
Mobility: Eﬀects of Family and State in Malaysia." Journal of Human Re-
sources, Vol. 29(4), 1994.
[8] Machado, Danielle. "Escolaridade das crianças no Brasil: três ensaios
sobre a defasagem idade-série." Unpublished dissertation, Department of Eco-
nomics, Pontiﬁcia Universidade Catolica-Rio de Janeiro, September 2005.
[9] Parish, William L. and Robert J. Willis. "Daughters, Education and
Family Budgets: Taiwan Experiences." Journal of Human Resources,V o l .
28(4), Autumn 1993.
123Chapter 4
Expected Earnings Gains and Eventual Educational
Attainment in Brazil: Gender Diﬀerences in Brazil
4.1 Introduction
While in school, teenaged boys and girls can observe current market wages
of workers with various educational backgrounds. These observations help
form expectations of earnings gains associated with achieving a high level of
schooling. Human capital theory suggests that greater expected earnings gains
increases the incentive to currently invest in education, thereby augmenting
eventual attainment. Potential earnings gains, therefore, may be an important
factor in determining how many completed grades an individual will achieve.
If these observed earnings gains are greater for one gender than the other,
however, a gender gap could arise because men and women face diﬀerent ex-
pected gains from schooling. Intuitively, the gender with the higher expected
earnings gains should be more educated on average. In the case of Brazil,
however, there appears to be a contradiction in the relationship between ex-
pected gains and attainment. Amongst 24 to 34-year-olds in 1996, women had
attained, on average, 7.5 completed grades. Men, on the other hand, had at-
tained an average of 7.1 completed grades. This reverse gender gap exits despite
the fact that in 1982, when the average person in the cohort turned 15 years old,
the cutoﬀ age for being legally required to attend school, adult male workers
experienced a high education earnings gain of more than twice in magnitude as
their female counterparts.18 This result is counter-intuitive because one would
assume that since males faced a substantially larger expected earnings gain than
18Calculated from the 1982 Pesquisa Nacional Por Amostra De Domicílios (PNAD)
f o ra l lw o r k e r sa g e s2 4a n do v e r . H i g he d u c a t i o ni sd e ﬁned as attainment levels in
the top 25% of the attainment distribution.
124women, men would have, on average, higher attainment. In reality, however,
the opposite is true. This chapter, therefore, explores the eﬀect of expected
earnings gains on eventual attainment for men and women.
The issues above raise several interesting questions regarding the relationship
between early expectations in earnings gains and eventual attainment. How
important are expected gains in determining attainment? In other words, is the
coeﬃcient on the gain variable, to be discussed in more detail below, positive
or negative and is it statistically signiﬁcant. Do these gains aﬀect men and
women diﬀerently? That is, do the coeﬃcients on the gain variables have the
same sign for men and women, and are they statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from one another? Finally, would equalizing gains and the returns to gains
result in a decrease or increase in the gender gap?
In summary, I ﬁnd that for the preferred sample, expected earnings gains
has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on eventual attainment in every
speciﬁcation considered. The eﬀects are signiﬁcantly stronger (more positive)
for women than for men, although the gender diﬀerence in gain eﬀects weakens
amongst the adult children of highly educated fathers. In addition, simulations
of equalizing gains increases the gender gap, but equalizing the coeﬃcients on
gains decreases the gender gap. Combined parameter equalization of gains and
coeﬃcients yields an increase in the gender gap.
4.2 Methodology
Since I am interested in the eﬀect of expected earnings gains on eventual
attainment as well as how equalization of gains and returns to gains will af-
fect the educational gender gap, I employ separate empirical methodologies to
address each issue. These methodologies are discussed in more detail below.
1254.2.1 OLS Model of Attainment
I ﬁr s te s t i m a t ea t t a i n m e n tv i aO L Su s i n gt h e1 9 9 6P N A D . T h er e d u c e d
form structure of attainment is shown below:
(1) Ed_AttGi = CG + XGi∗βG1 + ZGi∗δG + εGi
where i=1 to N, G=[male, female] and εGi~N(0,σ2
G). In the above model,
CG is the constant, X is a vector that includes individual characteristics and
family background, and Z is the expected earnings gain variable. The list of
explanatory variables considered in this chapter are listed below:
1. Maternal highest grade completed entered linearly and quadratically
2. Paternal highest grade completed entered linearly and quadratically
3. Race (dummies for black and mixed race)
4. Age
5. Expected earnings gain
Parental education aﬀects children’s attainment directly through highest
grade completed and indirectly through parental earnings, which is a function
of parental education. I do not have parental earnings information, so the
coeﬃcient estimates on parental schooling measure both the direct and indirect
eﬀects. The parental education variables are entered both linearly and quadrat-
ically. This speciﬁcation allows for more ﬂexibility because it does not restrict
the eﬀect to be constant over the entire range of parents’ education. Rather, the
quadratic speciﬁcation allows for the relationship between parental education
and the oﬀspring’s schooling outcomes to be concave if there are diminishing
marginal returns to parental schooling or convex if there are increasing returns.
In Brazil, black and mixed race individuals have lower attainments on av-
erage, and they come from less educated families. As a result, I would expect
to ﬁnd that being black or of mixed race has a negative eﬀect on eventual at-
126tainment. The younger people in the sample may not have completely ﬁnished
with schooling. As a result, I would expect to ﬁnd that age has a positive eﬀect
on attainment
Finally, I include gender speciﬁc values that represent the expected earnings
gains associated with being highly educated versus being less-educated. Ex-
pected earnings gains aﬀect attainment because they help determine how much
time, money, etc. should be invested in children’s education. Obviously, a low
expected payoﬀ to schooling provides a disincentive for families to use resources
in educating a child. As such, I expect to ﬁnd that expected gains have a
positive eﬀect on attainment. The calculation of the gain variable is described
below
I estimate attainment separately for men and women aged 24-34 using the
1996 PNAD. The median year of birth for this sample is 1967. These re-
spondents turned 15, the age at which Brazilian children can legally exit the
schooling system, in 1982. Using the 1982 PNAD, I calculate the median earn-
ings of workers in the top and bottom 25% of educational attainment by gender,
birth state and paternal schooling bracket (no education, 1-3 years, 4 years, 5-8
years, and 9+). I take into account paternal schooling bracket because social
connections play an important role in determining the type of job one is able
to attain in Brazil and, therefore, also aﬀect potential earnings.
I then match the 1982 values to the 1996 data by gender, birth state and pa-
ternal schooling bracket. These earnings values represent local, gender-speciﬁc
expectations of earnings for both high and low educated workers that adults
in 1996 would have faced when they were school-age teenagers.19 The gain
variable, therefore, is the diﬀerence between the median earnings of workers in
19There are 2 genders, 26 states and 5 paternal schooling brackets. This results in
260 possible cells within which to calculate the median earnings values. If there were
fewer than 25 observations in a cell, however, I match at the gender and state level.
127the top 25% of educational attainment and the median earnings of workers in
the bottom 25% of educational attainment. This value quantiﬁes the expected
gain in earnings a low-educated worker would experience if he or she became
highly educated.
As mentioned above, the 1996 social mobility module in the PNAD is plagued
with missing values for parental education. If these missing values are not ran-
dom, then eliminating these observations completely may bias the empirical
estimates. As a result, I run the regressions on two samples. The ﬁrst sample
consists of respondents with complete parental education data. The second
sample is comprised of all respondents in the relevant age range, including indi-
viduals with incomplete parental data. For these respondents, I set the values to
zero and include dummies indicating that the information is missing. In short,
sample 1 individuals have complete information and sample 2 is the full sample
with missing value dummies. As I will show, sample 1 under-represents low
educated respondents, as well as ethnic minorities. Consequently, the results
that follow will emphasize the ﬁndings from sample 2, the preferred sample.
Using the above deﬁnitions of expected earnings gains and samples, table
4.1 oﬀers the gain values by gender and sample. As shown, men’s gains are
more than twice the value of women’s gains, regardless of sample. Despite
the larger earnings payoﬀ, however, men have lower average attainment than
women. These gender diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
128Women Men Sig. Women Men Sig. Women Men
Sample 1 29,414 72,158 *** 7.723 7.515 *** 18,815 15,192
Sample 2 26,004 57,454 *** 7.470 7.127 *** 28,431 25,371
The gain variable is in Brazilian Reals.
Educational attainment is the highest completed grades.
The column marked "Sig." indicates if the gender difference is 
statistically significant.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
N
Expected Earnings Gains and Education by Gender and Sample
Table 4.1
Earnings Gains Attainment
4.2.2 Simulations
As discussed above, the gender gap in mean attainment favors women. This
is true despite the fact that expected earnings gains are higher for men. This
section therefore, describes the process of simulating the eﬀect of equalizing
levels of and coeﬃcients on gains via an extension of a decomposition technique
devised by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). The standard Oaxaca-Blinder
method decomposes diﬀerences of an outcome variable into the contribution of
diﬀerences in sample means and the contribution of diﬀerences in coeﬃcients for
all explanatory variables. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I want to
focus on the partial contributions of diﬀerences in gains and the coeﬃcients on
gains, leaving all other variables untouched. As a result, I adapt the Oaxaca-
Blinder technique to address one explanatory variable at a time.
Equation (2) represents the predicted value of educational attainment, de-
noted \ Ed_Att, for women using the OLS coeﬃcient estimates:
(2) \ Ed_AttWi = b CWi + XWi∗b βW1 + ZWi∗b δW.
The predicted value of educational attainment for men is calculated analo-
gously. The predicted gender gap ( [ PGG) in educational attainment, therefore,
129is the diﬀerence in the mean predicted attainment values:
(3) [ PGG= 1
NW
NW P
i=1
\ Ed_AttWi - 1
NM
NM P
i=1
\ Ed_AttMi.
Suppose I want to know what women’s educational attainment would have
been if they had faced the same expected earnings gains as men. To do this, I
replace women’s gain values with the men’s values, matched by birth state and
paternal schooling bracket. I can now calculate the simulated value of women’s
attainment.
(4) ^ Ed_Att
1
Wi = b CWi + XWi∗b βW1 + ZMi∗b δW
Now suppose I want to know what women’s educational attainment would
have been if they had faced the same coeﬃcients o ng a i n sa sm e n . T od ot h i s ,
I replace the coeﬃcient on women’s expected gains with men’s estimates. The
new simulated value of women’s attainment is as follows:
(5) ^ Ed_Att
2
Wi = b CWi + XWi∗b βW1 + ZWi∗b δM
Finally, I want to know what women’s educational attainment would have
been if they had faced the same earnings gains and coeﬃcients on gains as
men. To do this, I replace both women’s gains and coeﬃcient values with
men’s values. Again, gains are matched by birth state and paternal schooling
bracket. The new simulated value of women’s attainment is as follows:
(6) ^ Ed_Att
3
Wi = b CWi + XWi∗b βW1 + ZMi∗b δM
I can now calculate the predicted gender gap under several alternative sce-
narios. For example, what would the predicted gender gap be if both men and
w o m e nh a df a c e dt h em a l eg a i nv a l u e ? 20 My simulated predicted gender gap
is as follows:
20Note that since male gains are used, the male predicted educational attainment
value remains unchanged.
130(7) ] PGG= 1
NW
NW P
i=1
^ Ed_Att
1
Wi - 1
NM
NM P
i=1
\ Ed_AttMi.
The simulated predicted gender gaps can be calculated with all possible
combinations of men and women’s gains and coeﬃcients. These results are
shown below.
4.3 Results
Tables 4.2A and 4.2B oﬀer summary statistics by gender and sample, as well
as t-test results indicating whether or not the gender diﬀerences in means are
statistically signiﬁcant. As shown in both tables, women have completed more
grades than men on average. This diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% level. There are also small diﬀerences in several of the other explanatory
variables, depending upon sample.
Both tables also show that the gender diﬀerences in expected earnings gains
are quite substantial. The average expected annual earnings gains for women
in sample 1 (table 4.2A) is 29,410 reals, while the average gains for men are
72,160 reals. These values show that gains for men are more than twice the
gains for women, and this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Table 4.2B
oﬀers similar results for sample 2. Men in sample 2 also have expected gain
values more than twice the gain values for women.
Tables 4.2A and 4.2B qualitatively oﬀer the same story with respect to gen-
der diﬀerences in highest grade completed and expected earnings. It is worth
noting, however, that there are quantitative diﬀerences between samples that
may aﬀect the empirical estimates. The average attainment and gain values
are higher for sample 1, which excludes respondents with missing parental ed-
ucation information, than for sample 2, which includes all individuals in the
relevant age group. This suggests that sample 1 individuals are disproportion-
131ately highly educated and with high expected earnings gains. In addition, the
summary statistics imply that sample 1 under-represents ethnic minorities, as
evidenced by the fact that the percentages of black and mixed race respondents
are lower in sample 1 than in sample 2. The under-representation of low ed-
ucated respondents and ethnic minorities in sample 1 indicates that sample 1
estimates should be viewed with skepticism. For the sake of completeness, I
present results from both samples, but I will emphasize the sample 2 estimates.
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. W-M Sig.
Highest Grade Completed 7.723 4.102 7.515 4.098 0.208 ***
Mother's Education 3.124 3.444 3.347 3.543 -0.223 ***
Missing Mother's Ed. -- --
Father's Education 3.363 3.685 3.593 3.820 -0.229 ***
Missing Father's Ed. -- --
Black 0.042 0.200 0.049 0.215 -0.007 ***
Mixed Race 0.324 0.468 0.325 0.469 -0.001
Age 28.875 3.207 28.874 3.205 0.001
Expected Earnings Gain 2.941 2.583 7.216 7.038 -4.274 ***
N
"Expected Earnings Gain" was divided by 10000, so a value of 3.260 refers to 32,600 reals.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Diff. In Means
Summary Statisics by Gender, 24 to 34-Year-Olds, 1996
Table 4.2A
18,815 15,192
Women Men
Sample 1, Complete Parental Education Values
132Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. W-M Sig.
Highest Grade Completed 7.470 4.048 7.127 4.021 0.343 ***
Mother's Education 2.516 3.330 2.554 3.404 -0.038
Missing Mother's Ed. 0.198 0.398 0.235 0.424 -0.037 ***
Father's Education 2.387 3.433 2.355 3.504 0.032 *
Missing Father's Ed. 0.281 0.449 0.334 0.472 -0.054 ***
Black 0.052 0.222 0.061 0.239 -0.009 ***
Mixed Race 0.355 0.479 0.360 0.480 -0.004
Age 28.718 3.213 28.646 3.215 0.072 *
Expected Earnings Gain 2.600 2.246 5.745 6.004 -3.145 ***
N
"Expected Earnings Gain" was divided by 10000, so a value of 3.260 refers to 32,600 reals.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Missing values of Mother's Education and Father's Education are set to 0.
28,431 25,371
Table 4.2B
Sample 2, Incomplete Parental Education Values
Summary Statisics by Gender, 24 to 34-Year-Olds, 1996
Women Men Diff. In Means
The values in tables 4.2A and 4.2B are not conditional upon any charac-
teristics, but they demonstrate an apparent contradiction in the relationship
between expected gains and attainment. As discussed above, human capital
theory would lead one to believe that the gender with the larger expected earn-
ings gains would be more educated. Clearly, this is not the case in Brazil. As
such, the regression results below attempt to shed more light on the issue.
4.3.1 OLS Results
Table 4.3 oﬀers the OLS estimates of equation (1) by gender and sample.
As discussed above, sample 1 under-represents low-educated respondents as well
133as ethnic minorities, and should, therefore, be evaluated with skepticism. As
shown in the table, the coeﬃcients on parental schooling are positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant, and the coeﬃcients on the squared parental education terms
are negative. This suggests that attainment is concave in parental education.
The turning points for women are roughly 16.01 and 15.77 for maternal and pa-
ternal education respectively. Only 0.16% of women in sample 1 have mothers
with more than 16 completed grades, and 0.64% of women in sample 1 have
fathers who have completed 16 or more grades. As such, there are positive but
decreasing returns to parental schooling for women throughout essentially the
entire range of observed parental schooling.
The turning points for men in sample 1 are 17.93 for maternal education
and 19.31 for paternal education. There are 0.03% of sample 1 men who
have mothers who completed at least 18 grades, and there are no parents in
the sample who have completed 19 or more years of schooling, so there are
decreasing returns to parental schooling for men throughout the essentially the
entire range of observed parental schooling as well. The turning points for men
and women in sample 2 are also very high, indicating that there are positive
but diminishing marginal returns to parental education for the full sample as
well.
The coeﬃcients on the black and mixed race dummies are always negative
and statistically signiﬁcant, which is consistent with the fact that ethnic mi-
norities in Brazil are less educated. The race coeﬃcients, however, are larger
in absolute value for sample 2 than for sample 1. This is a result of sample 1’s
under-representation of ethnic minorities. Age has a positive eﬀect. This may
be because the younger members of the sample could still be attending school.
134Women Men Women Men
Mother's Education 0.6039 0.4752 0.6365 0.5209
[25.57]*** [18.42]*** [30.64]*** [23.75]***
Mother's Education^2 -0.0189 -0.0133 -0.0190 -0.0126
[10.77]*** [7.24]*** [12.17]*** [7.73]***
Turning Point 16.0059 17.9305 16.7526 20.6252
Missing Mother's Ed. -- 0.8587 0.7180
--[11.05]*** [9.41]***
Father's Education 0.5012 0.5105 0.4661 0.4471
[20.66]*** [18.31]*** [20.73]*** [17.72]***
Father's Education^2 -0.0159 -0.0132 -0.0151 -0.0120
[10.06]*** [7.52]*** [10.10]*** [7.25]***
Turning Point 15.7675 19.3127 15.3923 18.6646
Missing Father's Ed. -- 1.0215 1.0722
--[14.09]*** [14.55]***
Black -0.7421 -0.9509 -0.9006 -1.1411
[5.74]*** [7.20]*** [8.80]*** [12.05]***
Mixed Race -0.7833 -0.9861 -0.8470 -1.0943
[13.56]*** [15.65]*** [17.60]*** [21.80]***
Age 0.0219 0.0686 0.0089 0.0548
[2.62]*** [7.39]*** [1.26] [7.37]***
Expected Earnings Gain 0.0431 0.0219 0.0639 0.0372
[3.46]*** [4.43]*** [5.33]*** [7.80]***
Constant 4.4825 2.9918 4.8208 3.3334
[18.08]*** [10.82]*** [22.85]*** [14.89]***
Observations 18,815 15,192 28,431 25,371
R-squared 0.36 0.37 0.30 0.30
Robust t-statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
"Expected Earnings Gain" was divided by 10000.
For sample 2, missing values of Mother's Education and Father's Education are set to 0.
Sample 1 Sample 2
Table 4.3
Regression Results by Gender and Sample
Dependent Variable = Highest Grade Completed
Expectation Variable = Expected Earnings Gain
135Finally, the coeﬃcients on expected earnings gain are positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant for both men and women. This result is consistent with
the standard human capital belief that higher expected earnings gains result in
higher attainment. As shown, however, the sample 1 coeﬃcients are smaller
than the sample 2 coeﬃcients.
This may be because the over-representation of highly educated men and
women in sample 1 has biased the regression coeﬃcients. For example, sup-
pose attainment is positively correlated with unobservable ability. Perhaps
ability displaces some of the eﬀect of expected earnings gains for high ability
people, who are capable of performing better in schooling and may have a higher
preference for education. If this is the case, then the eﬀect of expected earn-
ings gains on attainment should be weaker for highly educated/high ability men
and women. As such, the sample 1 coeﬃcient estimates for expected gains are
biased downward. Given this bias, it is likely that the sample 2 results oﬀer a
more accurate representation of the "truth."
Regardless of sample, the coeﬃcient magnitudes vary substantially by gen-
der. As shown, the gain coeﬃcient for women is larger than the gain coeﬃcient
for men. Wald test results indicate that these diﬀerences are statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 10% level for sample 1 and 5% level for sample 2. These gender
diﬀerences are discussed in more detail below.
4.3.2 Discussion of Gender Diﬀerences in OLS Results
The summary statistics in tables 4.2A and 4.2B showed that men experience
larger earnings gains than women. As evidenced by the larger coeﬃcients on
the gain variable in table 2, however, women’s attainment is more sensitive to
gains. This scenario is illustrated in ﬁgure 4.1. The ﬁgure demonstrates the
relationship between gains and attainment. Note that the ﬁgure is not drawn
136to scale, it is simply for illustrative purposes.
In Brazil, there is a gender gap that favors females even at the age of 15.
This gap is due to the fact the boys are conditionally more likely to repeat
grades (Neri et al., 2000). They are also more likely to exit the schooling
system to engage in child labor (Psacharopoulos and Arriagada, 1989; Duryea,
Lam, and Levison, 2003; Neri et al. 2000). Both of these factors contribute to
t h ef a c tt h a tb o y sl a gb e h i n dg i r l si na t t a i n m e n te v e nd u r i n gt h et e e n a g ey e a r s .
T h ey - i n t e r c e p t s( A M
15 and AW
15)i nﬁgure 1, therefore, represent attainment for
m e na n dw o m e na tt h ea g eo f1 5 . F u r t h e r m o r e ,i ft h e r ew e r en og a i n st oh i g h e r
education (gains = 0), then eventual attainment would remain at these levels.
The lines for women and men depict the eﬀect of gains on attainment. The
steeper slope for women reﬂects the fact the women are more sensitive than men
to gains.
GM
15 and GW
15 represent the expected earnings gains men and women faced at
the age of 15. As shown, the value for men is greater than the value for women.
Evaluating the men’s line at men’s gains results in an eventual attainment
value of AM
E . Similarly, eventual attainment for women is AW
E .A s s h o w n ,
eventual attainment for women is greater than eventual attainment for men.
This result indicates that men’s higher expected gains, which has a positive
eﬀect on attainment, are not suﬃciently large enough to overcome the initial
gender gap at the age of 15 coupled with women’s higher sensitivity to gains.
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Figure 4.1 
The Effect of Gains on Attainment 
The ﬁgure above illustrates the impact of expected gains on attainment as
observed in Brazil in 1996. The decomposition results below, however, oﬀer
some insight into how the gender gap may change if gains and returns to gains
were equalized.
4.3.3 Simulation Results
Tables 4.4A and 4.4B oﬀer the results of equalizing expected gains and
returns to gains by sample. The row 1 value in the women’s column (W)
corresponds to equation (2). The row 1 value in the male column oﬀers the
analogous ﬁgure for men. The "W-M" column is the diﬀerence in the women’s
138and men’s values, as calculated by equation (3). Row 2 oﬀers the results when
women’s gains are applied to both women and men. The women’s value remains
the same, but the male value changes because predicted attainment now uses
t h ef e m a l eg a i nv a l u e s( t h em a l ee q u i v a l e n to fe q u a t i o n( 4 ) ) . R o w3o ﬀers the
results when men’s gains are applied to both women and men.
R o w s4a n d5o ﬀer the same results for equalizing the coeﬃcients on gains
(equations (4) and (5) respectively). Finally, rows 6 and 7 show the predicted
attainment values when both gains levels and coeﬃcients are equalized (equation
(6)). Note that values are sensitive to which gender is used as the base, so the
discussion of the results will be in terms of whether equalizing gains has a
convergent (reduces the size of the gender gap) or divergent (increases the size
of the gender gap) eﬀect.
Table 4.4A shows that when all own values are used, the sample 1 gender gap
is 0.215 grades, in favor or women (Row 1). When women’s gains are applied
to both genders (Row 2), the size of the gender gap increases to 0.309 grades, so
the eﬀect is divergent. The same qualitatively holds for when men’s gains are
applied to both genders (Row 3). When the coeﬃcients on gains are equalized
(rows 4 and 5), however, the eﬀects are convergent. Finally, the combined
parameter changes (Rows 6 and 7) result in divergent. This means that the
convergent eﬀect of equalizing coeﬃcients is not suﬃciently large enough to
compensate for the divergent eﬀect of gains.
139WM W - M
1 All own values 7.724 7.509 0.215 -
2 Women's Gain Variable 7.724 7.415 0.309 D *
3 Men's Gain Variable 7.916 7.509 0.407 D *
4 Coeff. on Women's Gain Variable 7.724 7.662 0.062 C *
5 Coeff. on Men's Gain Variable 7.661 7.509 0.152 C *
6 Coeff. On and Value of Women's Gain Variable 7.724 7.476 0.247 D *
7 Coeff. On and Value of Men's Gain Variable 7.759 7.509 0.250 D *
Note: "D" denotes divergence and "C" denotes convergence.
All values use the estimated coefficients from the regressions.
"*"indicates that effect is the same regardless of base gender.
Table 4.4A
Mean Predicted Highest Grade Completed, Sample 1
Combined Parameter Changes
Expectation Variable = Expected Earnings Gain
Effect
Single Parameter Changes
Table 4.4B oﬀers the same analysis using sample 2, the preferred sample.
As shown, when using the full sample, the predicted attainment diﬀerence be-
tween men and women is wider under every scenario than with sample 1. This
suggests that sample 1 understates the gender gap. In terms of convergence
and divergence, however, the results are qualitatively the same. Once again,
equalizing gains (rows 2 and 3) results in divergence and equalizing the coef-
ﬁcients on gains results in convergence. Finally, combined parameter changes
yields an increase in the gender gap.
140WM W - M
1 All own values 7.469 7.122 0.347 -
2 Women's Gain Variable 7.469 7.003 0.466 D *
3 Men's Gain Variable 7.692 7.122 0.569 D *
4 Coeff. on Women's Gain Variable 7.469 7.276 0.194 C *
5 Coeff. on Men's Gain Variable 7.400 7.122 0.277 C *
6 Coeff. On and Value of Women's Gain Variable 7.469 7.070 0.399 D *
7 Coeff. On and Value of Men's Gain Variable 7.530 7.122 0.407 D *
Note: "D" denotes divergence and "C" denotes convergence.
All values use the estimated coefficients from the regressions.
"*"indicates that effect is the same regardless of base gender.
Single Parameter Changes
Combined Parameter Changes
Table 4.4B
Mean Predicted Highest Grade Completed, Sample 2
Expectation Variable = Expected Earnings Gain
Effect
As shown in the table above, equalizing gains increases the gender gap. In
contrast, equalizing the coeﬃcients on gains results in convergence. Figures 4.2
and 4.3 demonstrate why this is the case. As in ﬁgure 4.1, ﬁgure 4.2 demon-
strates the relationship between gains and eventual attainment. Again, the
y-intercepts are men and women’s attainments at the age of 15 (AM
15 and AW
15).
As shown, even at 15, female attainment was higher than male attainment.
Thereafter, women’s attainment is more sensitive than men’s attainment to
gains, as evidenced by the larger coeﬃcients on gains for women than for men.
This gives rise to a steeper slope in the women’s line. Evaluated at the men’s
high gains and women’s low gains at the age of 15 (EM
15 and EW
15), eventual
attainment is higher for women than for men (AM
E and AW
E ).
A’M
E represents men’s attainment evaluated at women’s gains. As shown,
t h i sv a l u ei sl o w e rt h a nw h e nm e n ’ sa t t a i n m e n ti se v a l u a t e da tm a l eg a i n s( A M
E ).
The original gender gap was the vertical distance between AW
E and AM
E .T h e
141new gender gap when gains are equalized to women’s values is now the vertical
distance between AW
E and A’M
E . The new gender gap, therefore, is larger than
the original gap because women’s gains are lower than those of men.
When gains for men and women are equalized to men’s values, the results
are qualitatively the same. Women’s attainment increases from AW
E to A’W
E .
The new gender gap when gains are equalized to men’s values is now the vertical
distance between A’W
E and AM
E . Again, the new gender gap is larger than the
original gap (the vertical distance between AW
E and AM
E ) because women’s gains
are lower than those of men.
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The Effect of Gains on Attainment, Equalization of Gains 
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142Figure 4.3 illustrates how the gender gap changes when the coeﬃcients on
g a i n sa r ee q u a l i z e d . F i r s tl o o ka tt h em e n ’ sl i n e . T h eo r i g i n a la t t a i n m e n tf o r
men is AM
E . When the women’s coeﬃcient is applied, the men’s line rotates
to become parallel to the women’s line, resulting in Men’. The new value for
men’s attainment is obtained at the intersection of the Men’ and EM
15,A ’ M
E .T h e
original gender gap was the vertical distance between AW
E and AM
E .T h e n e w
gender gap when the coeﬃcients on gains are equalized to women’s values in
now the vertical distance between AW
E and A’M
E . As shown, the new gender
gap is now smaller than the original gap because women’s coeﬃcients on gains
are larger than those of men.
When women’s coeﬃcients are equalized to men’s coeﬃcient values, the
results are qualitatively the same. Women’s attainment decreases from AW
E to
A’W
E . The new gender gap when coeﬃc i e n t sa r ee q u a l i z e dt om e n ’ sv a l u e si s
now the vertical distance between A’W
E and AM
E . Again, the new gender gap
is smaller than the original gap (the vertical distance between AW
E and AM
E )
because women’s coeﬃcients are larger than those of men.
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The Effect of Gains on Attainment, Equalization of Coefficients 
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4.4 Robustness Checks
The results above demonstrate that while men experience larger gains from
additional education, women are more sensitive to gains. Would this result hold
if the indirect costs of schooling were also incorporated? Do the results hold
for both the adult children of high and low educated fathers? These questions
are addressed below.
1444.4.1 Net Present Value of Gains
The analysis above utilizes expected gains in earnings associated with be-
ing highly educated. The gain values, however, do not take into account the
fact that the costs of schooling also factor into education outcomes. As such,
individuals may make schooling decisions based upon not just earnings gains
observed at the age of 15, but on a discounted stream of expected earnings
gains net of schooling costs. Under the assumption of equal direct costs across
gender, the only costs I consider are the indirect costs that arise from earn-
ings forgone when one attends school. These values represent the wages 24 to
34-year-old men and women in 1996 would have given up by attending school
instead of entering the labor force when they were teenagers. Using expected
gains and forgone earnings, I calculate the net present value (NPV) of lifetime
expected earnings gains as follows:
(8) NPVi =
65 P
a=18
Gaini ∗ λ
a−15 −
17 P
a=15
Child_Earni ∗ λ
a−15.
In equation (8), Gaini is the expected gain variable as deﬁned above, and
forgone child labor earnings is Child_Earni, which is measured as average state
and gender speciﬁc earnings amongst 15 to 17-year-olds in 1982. The discount
rate, λ, is comprised of a 5% time discount rate and a mortality rate of 2%
(λ = 1
1+.05+.02). The ﬁrst part of the equation is the present discounted value
of the earnings gains stream under the assumption of labor force participation
between the ages of 18 and 65. The second part of the equation represents the
present discounted value of earnings if one were to work between the ages of 15
and 17 instead of continuing in school. If one chooses to attend school instead
of work between the ages of 15 and 17, he or she will forgo the earnings stream
represented by the second half of the equation. As such, the net present value
of earnings gains is the discounted earnings stream of expected gains minus the
145discounted earnings stream of child earnings.
As in the earlier case, NPV of lifetime earnings gains for men are more than
twice the lifetime gains for women. Table 4.5 oﬀers the regression results
utilizing the net present value of lifetime earnings gains. Gains still have
a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on attainment for both men and
women in either sample. Once again, we see that sample 1 coeﬃcients estimates
are smaller than the sample 2 coeﬃcients.
Furthermore, the regressions show that women are more sensitive than men
to earnings gains, even net of indirect schooling costs. Wald tests on the gender
diﬀerences in coeﬃcient estimates, however, show that the sample 1 diﬀerence
is not statistically signiﬁcant, and the sample 2 diﬀerence is only signiﬁcant at
the 10% level. Eﬀectively, when the opportunity cost of schooling is factored
in, the gender diﬀerence in the eﬀect of gains shrinks substantially.
146Women Men Women Men
Mother's Education 0.6042 0.4751 0.6371 0.5210
[25.58]*** [18.41]*** [30.66]*** [23.75]***
Mother's Education^2 -0.0189 -0.0132 -0.0190 -0.0126
[10.78]*** [7.24]*** [12.20]*** [7.74]***
Turning Point 15.9875 17.9315 16.7276 20.6189
Missing Mother's Ed. -- 0.8575 0.7172
--[11.03]*** [9.40]***
Father's Education 0.5035 0.5125 0.4695 0.4500
[20.75]*** [18.38]*** [20.88]*** [17.84]***
Father's Education^2 -0.0160 -0.0133 -0.0153 -0.0121
[10.12]*** [7.57]*** [10.19]*** [7.31]***
Turning Point 15.7559 19.2839 15.3754 18.6272
Missing Father's Ed. -- 1.0254 1.0749
--[14.14]*** [14.58]***
Black -0.7445 -0.9513 -0.9038 -1.1421
[5.76]*** [7.20]*** [8.82]*** [12.06]***
Mixed Race -0.7891 -0.9884 -0.8549 -1.0980
[13.69]*** [15.69]*** [17.80]*** [21.88]***
Age 0.0221 0.0689 0.0091 0.0551
[2.64]*** [7.42]*** [1.29] [7.41]***
NPV Expected Earnings Gain 0.0033 0.0018 0.0050 0.0030
[3.17]*** [4.25]*** [4.89]*** [7.49]***
Constant 4.4932 2.9939 4.8379 3.3420
[18.12]*** [10.81]*** [22.93]*** [14.92]***
Observations 18,815 15,192 28,431 25,371
R-squared 0.36 0.37 0.30 0.30
Robust t-statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
"Expected Earnings Gain" was divided by 10000.
For sample 2, missing values of Mother's Education and Father's Education are set to 0.
Sample 1 Sample 2
Table 4.5
Regression Results by Gender and Sample
Dependent Variable = Highest Grade Completed
Expectation Variable = NPV of Expected Earnings Gain
1474.4.2 Interaction between Gains and Father’s Education
The regression results above treat gains and father’s education as addi-
tively separable, but there are a number of reasons why the two variables may
be inter-connected. One reason is that unobservable ability aﬀects attainment
via father’s education. Suppose attainment is positively correlated with unob-
servable ability. Highly educated fathers, therefore, are on average also of high
ability. If ability is inheritable, then high ability fathers produce high ability
children, who perform better in school and may have stronger preferences for
education. In eﬀect, father’s education is partly a proxy for children’s ability.
Suppose that as ability rises, the eﬀect of ability is increasingly important
relative to earnings incentives when make schooling decisions. This relationship
suggests that the role of expected earnings gains on eventual attainment is
weaker amongst high ability oﬀspring. If this is the case, than I would expect
to ﬁnd that the net present value of earnings gains has less of an eﬀect on
the adult children of high ability/highly educated fathers. Assuming that the
transmission of ability does not vary across genders, however, the weakening of
the gain eﬀect as father’s education increases should be parallel for men and
women.
In contrast, highly educated fathers earn higher wages and are, therefore,
less likely to need their children to enter the work force. That is, father’s
education is an inverse indicator of the need for child labor. As such, the adult
children of highly educated fathers could be more sensitive to expected earnings
gains because their educational outcomes are not as restricted by family income
shortfalls. Unlike the transmission of ability, however, this eﬀect should not
be the same for men and women. As mentioned above, boys exhibit a higher
propensity to engage in child labor. As a result, men’s education decisions
148are more constrained by family income needs relative to women’s decisions,
resulting in lower sensitivity to expected gains. This indicates that as father’s
education rises, men should experience a larger bump than women in the gain
eﬀect, yielding a smaller gender diﬀerence in the eﬀect of expected gains.
The two possible relationships between father’s education and gains move in
diﬀerent directions. If as ability rises, individuals increasingly make schooling
decisions as a function of ability as opposed to expected earnings gains, then the
eﬀect of gains on attainment should fall as paternal education rises. In contrast,
if father’s education inversely measures the need for child labor, then the eﬀect
of expected earnings gains should rise with paternal schooling, particularly for
m e n . B o t hs c e n a r i o sm a yb eo c c u r r i n ga tt h es a m et i m e ,a n di ti sn o tp o s s i b l e
to identify the separate eﬀects. The empirical results shown below, however,
can illustrate which is stronger.
Table 4.6 oﬀers the regression results with the net present value of lifetime
earnings gains as well as an interaction of gains and paternal schooling. As in
the previous regression results, gains have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect, and the coeﬃcient estimate is larger for women than for men. The in-
teraction term, however, has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. This
means that the eﬀect of gains weakens as paternal education rises, indicating
that the ability eﬀect is stronger than the child labor eﬀect.
149Women Men Women Men
Mother's Education 0.6035 0.4778 0.6343 0.5196
[25.57]*** [18.51]*** [30.56]*** [23.69]***
Mother's Education^2 -0.0188 -0.0134 -0.0189 -0.0126
[10.77]*** [7.29]*** [12.12]*** [7.68]***
Turning Point 16.0118 17.8857 16.7899 20.6865
Missing Mother's Ed. -- 0.8640 0.7463
--[11.13]*** [9.81]***
Father's Education 0.4889 0.4670 0.4382 0.3737
[19.06]*** [15.79]*** [18.70]*** [14.16]***
Father's Education^2 -0.0140 -0.0076 -0.0104 -0.0014
[7.36]*** [3.70]*** [5.94]*** [0.71]
Turning Point 17.5135 30.7357 21.0403 137.4838
Missing Father's Ed. -- 0.9706 1.0197
--[13.20]*** [13.87]***
Black -0.7465 -0.9570 -0.9129 -1.1506
[5.78]*** [7.26]*** [8.92]*** [12.19]***
Mixed Race -0.7822 -0.9695 -0.8382 -1.0555
[13.57]*** [15.36]*** [17.44]*** [21.02]***
Age 0.0220 0.0676 0.0090 0.0537
[2.64]*** [7.28]*** [1.27] [7.24]***
NPV Expected Earnings Gain 0.0069 0.0058 0.0135 0.0108
[2.86]*** [5.73]*** [6.33]*** [11.59]***
NPV*Father's Education -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0009
[1.78]* [4.72]*** [4.93]*** [9.99]***
Constant 4.4455 2.9060 4.7257 3.1414
[17.73]*** [10.45]*** [22.17]*** [13.97]***
Observations 18,815 15,192 28,431 25,371
R-squared 0.36 0.38 0.30 0.31
Robust t-statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
"Expected Earnings Gain" was divided by 10000.
For sample 2, missing values of Mother's Education and Father's Education are set to 0.
Sample 1 Sample 2
Table 4.6
Regression Results by Gender and Sample
Dependent Variable = Highest Grade Completed
Expectation Variable = NPV of Expected Earnings Gain
150Figures 4.4A and 4.4B illustrate the relationship between father’s education
and the eﬀect of gains on attainment using the regression results from table 4.6.
As discussed, the eﬀe c to fg a i n so na t t a i n m e n ts h r i n k sa sf a t h e r ’ se d u c a t i o n
rises, which is consistent with the ability story. For sample 1, however, there is
no statistically signiﬁcant gender diﬀerence in gain eﬀects except when father’s
education is 0. This ﬁnding, however, should be examined with skepticism
given the sample 1 bias discussed above.
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Figure 4.4A
Figure 4.4B tells a slightly diﬀerent story. As shown, the sample 2 eﬀect of
gains experiences a slightly steeper decline for women than for men, resulting
in a smaller gender diﬀerence in gain eﬀects amongst the adult children of
highly educated fathers. Furthermore, the gender diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant at low levels of father’s schooling but insigniﬁcant at high levels.
151This equalization of gain eﬀects is consistent with the child labor story, thereby
leading to the conclusion that men’s lower sensitivity to expected earnings gains
is, in part, due to child labor.
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Figure 4.4B
Table 4.7 summarizes the regression results discussed above. Included in the
t a b l ea r et h ec o e ﬃcient estimates from all three regression models by gender and
sample. Also included are the Wald test results indicating whether or not the
diﬀerences in coeﬃcients between men and women are statistically signiﬁcant.
As shown, regardless of the model, the eﬀect of expected earnings gains on
attainment is always positive. In addition, the values for women are also
always larger than the values for men, indicating that women are more sensitive
to expected earnings gains.
152Women Men W-M
Earnings Gain
OLS Coefficient, Sample 1 0.0431 0.0219 0.0212 *
OLS Coefficient, Sample 2 0.0639 0.0372 0.0267 **
OLS Coefficient, Sample 1 0.0033 0.0018 0.0016
OLS Coefficient, Sample 2 0.0050 0.0030 0.0020 *
Sample 1 Gain Effect When:
Father's Ed. = 0 0.0069 0.0058 0.0011 ***
Father's Ed. = 4 0.0053 0.0041 0.0013
Father's Ed. = 8 0.0037 0.0023 0.0014
Father's Ed. = 12 0.0021 0.0005 0.0016
Sample 2 Gain Effect When:
Father's Ed. = 0 0.0135 0.0108 0.0027 ***
Father's Ed. = 4 0.0094 0.0073 0.0022 ***
Father's Ed. = 8 0.0054 0.0037 0.0017 ***
Father's Ed. = 12 0.0014 0.0002 0.0012
Sample 1 18,815 15,192
Sample 2 28,431 25,371
Table 4.7
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Sample Sizes
Model
NPV Expected Earnings Gain
NPV Gain with Interaction Term
Wald Test Results of Gender Differences in Effects
Summary of Gain Effects
The regression results, however, are not always consistent across samples.
For the ﬁrst 2 models, the sample 1 results appear to under-estimate the gain
coeﬃcients. Furthermore, the sample 1 interaction model ﬁnds that, the gain
eﬀect is, for statistical purposes, the same for men and women except when
father’s education is 0. In contrast, the sample 2 interaction model shows that
the eﬀect of gains weakens more so for women than men as paternal education
rises. This result suggests that men’s lower sensitivity to gains, in part, reﬂects
their higher probability of having engaged in child labor. Again, the sample 1
153bias suggests that the sample 2 results are more accurate.
4.5 Conclusions
When a youth is of school age, he or she will base education decisions, in
part, on expected earnings gains from being highly educated compared with
being less educated. This chapter, therefore, explores the role of expected
earnings gains on eventual educational attainment in Brazil. Brazil serves as
a particularly interesting setting for this analysis because there appears to be a
counter-intuitive relationship between gains and attainment. More speciﬁcally,
men experience higher expected gains than women, but they are, on average,
less educated. This contradiction inspired several empirical questions that are
addressed in this chapter.
The ﬁrst question posed in this chapter addressed how important expected
earnings gains are in determining attainment. The empirical analysis showed
that gains had a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on eventual attain-
ment. This result held even after factoring in the indirect costs of schooling as
well as an interaction with paternal education. This ﬁnding is consistent with
human capital theory, which suggests that larger earnings gains associated with
being highly educated should have a positive eﬀect on attainment.
T h i sc h a p t e rt h e ne x a m i n e di fe x pe c t e de a r n i n g sg a i n sa ﬀect men and women
diﬀerently. The coeﬃcient values for men and women were always positive and
statistically signiﬁcant. With respect to the magnitudes, however, the values
for women were larger than the men’s values. For sample 2, this was true even
after accounting for the indirect costs of schooling. Furthermore, the sample
2g e n d e rd i ﬀerence in the eﬀect of gains on attainment was smaller for the
adult children of highly educated fathers. This result indicates that men are
less sensitive than women to gains partly because they are more likely to have
154engaged in child labor.
Finally, I simulated equalizing gains and the coeﬃcients on gains to observe
changes in the gender gap under several alternative scenarios. As shown above,
women’s gains in 1982 were less than half of men’s gains. According to the 2003
PNAD, however, women’s gains at the state level were almost equal to men’s
gains. As such, it is important to examine the eﬀect of equalizing earnings
gains across genders because it appears that labor market conditions in Brazil
are heading in such a direction. The simulation showed that equalizing gains
resulted in a larger educational gender gap. This implies that as women’s
earnings gains continue to rise relative to men’s gains, the educational gender
gap will increase.
In contrast, equalizing the coeﬃcients on gains always reduced the gender
gap. The empirical results showed that higher paternal education, an inverse
measure of the need for child labor, yielded a reduction in the gender diﬀerence
in the eﬀect of gains on attainment. These factors indicate that as child labor
becomes less prevalent in Brazil, which, according to the recent research by the
ILO, is the case, men’s sensitivity to gains will increase relative to women’s
sensitivity, and the educational gender gap will shrink. As such, it is equally
important to examine how the gender gap will change as the coeﬃcients on
gains are equalized. The simulation showed that equalizing the coeﬃcients on
gains results in a smaller educational gender gap. This implies that as child
labor falls, more so for males than for females, the educational gender gap will
also fall.
The two eﬀects mentioned above moved in opposite directions. As a result,
it is not clear how the educational gender gap will evolve as women’s gains catch
up to men’s gains in conjunction with the decline of child labor in Brazil. The
simulation of the combined eﬀect of equalizing both gains and the coeﬃcients
155on gains, however, showed that the overall eﬀect was divergent. This suggests
that the eﬀect of reducing child labor may not be large enough to overcome the
eﬀect of equalizing earnings gains, yielding an even larger gender gap over time.
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157Chapter 5
Conclusions
This dissertation set out to expand upon what little is known about the
educational gender gap in Brazil. The primary focus was the diﬀerential eﬀects
of maternal versus paternal education on gender diﬀerences in girls’ and boys’
schooling outcomes. A secondary focus was the eﬀect of gender diﬀerences
in expected earnings gains on the eventual attainment of adults. All three
chapters asked several questions and attempt to empirically provide answers.
These questions and answers are detailed below.
5.1 Chapter 2, “The Determinants of the Changing Ed-
ucational Gender Gap in Brazil”
Between 1982 and 2003, the gender discrepancy in grade attainment in-
creased in two-parent households and decreased among children residing in
female-headed households. There was no previous research that examined how
the gender gap changed over time and why it moved in diﬀerent directions
depending upon household type. As a result, this chapter contributed to the
literature by identifying and quantifying the determinants of the gender gap,
estimating how these determinants aﬀected the change in the gender gap, and
made comparisons by household type. Non-linear partial decomposition anal-
ysis allowed me to isolate the eﬀects of changes in the levels of and returns to
parental education on the change in the gender gap. Furthermore, I was able to
identify the eﬀects of changes in levels of and returns separately and together.
I ﬁrst asked if the eﬀect of parental schooling on children’s attainment dif-
fered by gender of parent in 2003. I found that maternal education always had
a stronger marginal eﬀect than paternal education on children’s attainment. I
then turned to diﬀerences in parental eﬀects on girls versus boys. The results
158revealed that parental marginal eﬀects were stronger for girls’ rather than boys’
attainment in 2003. Both of these results also held in 1982.
I then turned to parental eﬀects on the change in the gender gap over time.
The combined change in maternal education in two-parent households between
1982 and 2003 had an increasing eﬀect on the gender gap, whereas paternal ed-
ucation had a decreasing eﬀect. Looking across household type, the maternal
education eﬀects were not consistent. The combined change in maternal educa-
tion in female-headed households beneﬁted boys more so than girls, decreasing
the gender gap.
5.2 Chapter 3, “Gender Diﬀerences in Brazil’s Post Com-
pulsory School Attendance”
The majority of the existing educational literature on Brazil focuses on chil-
dren who are still required to attend school or adults who have completed their
education. As such, very little was known about children who fell between these
two categories. As such, this chapter analyzed school participation of teenagers
beyond the minimum school leaving age. In addition, I compared maternal and
paternal eﬀects in two-parent households as well as parental eﬀects across girls
and boys in both two-parent and female-headed households. Finally, I addressed
the causal relationship between parental education and children’s schooling out-
comes. This chapter exploited a change in the minimum school leaving age for
the parents’ generation to identify the relationship between parental and chil-
dren’s educational outcomes.
I ﬁrst examined if parents’ educational attainment had more of an eﬀect on
the school attendance of girls or boys in 2003. For the preferred speciﬁcation,
the results did not consistently show that parental education in two-parent
households had more of an eﬀect on boys or girls. This ﬁnding departs from
159the chapter 2 conclusion that parental education always had a stronger eﬀect
on girls’ rather than boys’ educational outcomes.
It h e ne x a m i n e dh o wt h ee ﬀect of parental educational attainment on the
probability of school attendance diﬀered by gender of parent. For girls in two-
parent households, the results showed that at high levels of parental schooling,
paternal eﬀects were stronger than maternal eﬀects. This ﬁnding held under
every model speciﬁcation. For boys, however, the results were inconsistent.
These results vary substantially from those found in chapter 2. As discussed
above, maternal eﬀects on children’s attainment were stronger than paternal
eﬀects. With respect to school attendance, however, chapter 3 found that for
girls in two-parent households, paternal eﬀects were stronger at high levels of
parental schooling.
Finally, I determined whether or not the maternal education results held
across household type. In both types of households, the preferred speciﬁcation
results showed that maternal education did not consistently have a larger ef-
fect on the probability of attending school for children of one gender versus the
other. This ﬁnding also departs from what was found in chapter 2, where ma-
ternal education always had a stronger eﬀect on girls’ versus boys’ educational
outcomes in 2003, regardless of household type.
5.3 Chapter 4, “Expected Earnings Gains and Eventual
Educational Attainment: Gender Diﬀerences in Brazil”
This chapter switched the focus from parental education to expected earn-
ings gains for 24 to 34-year-olds in 1996. When individuals are of school age,
they can observe the earnings payoﬀ of becoming highly educated. These ob-
servations help shape expectations of earnings gains from schooling. Human
capital theory suggests that larger gains increases schooling incentives. Fur-
160thermore, if there is a gender diﬀerence in those expected gains, the gender with
the higher gains should attain more education. In Brazil, however, the opposite
is true. For the sample considered, men’s expected gains were more than twice
the value of women’s expected gains in 1982, when these individuals were still
teenagers and making schooling decisions. Despite this fact, men, on average,
eventually attained more than half a grade less than women. This apparent
contradiction lead to an interesting area of research that had not been explored
in Brazil.
The ﬁrst question posed in this chapter addressed how important expected
earnings gains were in determining eventual educational attainment. The anal-
ysis showed that gains had a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on at-
tainment. This results held for sample 2, even after factoring in the indirect
costs of schooling as well as well as an interaction with paternal education.21
This paper then examined if expected earnings gains aﬀected men and
women diﬀerently. Wald tests showed that the gain eﬀects for women were
larger than the men’s eﬀects, and the diﬀerence was statistically signiﬁcant. For
sample 2, this was true even after accounting for the indirect costs of schooling.
In addition, the sample 2 gender diﬀerence in the eﬀect of gains on attainment
weakened as paternal education, an inverse indicator of the need for child labor,
rose. This result suggests that men were less sensitive than women to gains
partly because they were more likely to have engaged in child labor.
Finally, I simulated the eﬀect of equalizing gains and the coeﬃcients on
gains on the gender gap. The simulations showed that equalizing gains results
in a larger educational gender gap. In Brazil, the data indicate that women’s
gains are actually approaching men’s gains. This suggests that the educational
21Recall that sample 2 is the sample in which respondents with missing values were
included, along with dummies representating incomplete parental education informa-
tion.
161gender gap will continue to increase.
In contrast, the simulations showed that equalizing the coeﬃcients on gains
results in a smaller educational gender gap. The empirical results suggest
that as the need for child labor falls, men’s sensitivity to gains will approach
women’s sensitivity. As a result, as child labor falls, beneﬁting males more so
than females, the educational gender gap will shrink.
Unfortunately, it is not clear how the educational gender gap will evolve as
gains and coeﬃcients equalize simultaneously because the two eﬀects moved in
opposing directions. Simulating the combined eﬀect of equalizing both gains
and the coeﬃcients on gains suggested that the eﬀect of reducing child labor may
n o tb el a r g ee n o u g ht oo ﬀset the eﬀect of equalizing earnings gains, resulting in
an even larger attainment gender gap over time.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
This dissertation conducted an empirical analysis on gender and education
in Brazil. Despite the existence of a reverse gender gap for several decades, very
little research addressed the educational diﬀerences between males and females.
As such, this dissertation provides new information and insights into the source
of the gender gap, the factors that contribute to it, as well as how it may change
over time.
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